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ABSTRACT
A qualitative study of humour theory
This qualitative study of humour theory provides a broad descriptive account of the current
status ofhumour theory within the multidisciplinary context ofhuman and social studies. The
nature ofqualitative research is examined in terms ofits relevance to humour research studies.
Qualitative research is found to be a generic term applying to a range of types of data
collecting approaches that fall outside the ambit of quantitative paradigms. Quantitative
methods are shown as having limited applicability to humour studies which are primarily
reliant on data collecting. Humour is examined in terms of its biological, phylogenetic and
historical antecedents. The emergence of schools ofhumour theory is discerned; and a study
is made ofchanging social perceptions ofhumour in terms ofthe 'ruling discourse'. Humour
theory is examined in terms of parameters of contemporary research which entails the
processes ofdefining humour and theorizing about humour in terms ofa variety ofvariables.
Critiques are provided of Murdock and Ganim' s macro-level descriptive study of humour
definitions and theories as well as of Apter's reversal theory of humour. Reflectivity is
employed as a qualitative approach to analyse the personal experience ofa 'humorous event'.
Attention is also given to the relevance of orality, oral tradition and anthropological
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PREFACE
The occurrence of humour in academic writing is not commonplace. In more whimsical
moments, I have hypothesized that this stems from a pious bias that crept into the collective
personality of the early invisible college who have remained steadfastly unamused while the
ruling discourse has evolved dynamically along with changing epistemological perspectives.
I have also speculated optimistically that this hypothesis may have had the support of no less
an authority than Voltaire (in LeGoff, 1997:40) who is credited with once saying:
'People who seek metaphysical causes for laughter are not cheerful'.
There are also times when I have found humour in the notion that Voltaire's ex-cathedra
statement is in fact a shrewd example ofironic academic hyperbole. 'Shrewd' because I would
like to suspect that Voltaire may have anticipated that one day one of the 'givens' of human
studies would be that humour is a difficult concept to quantify, and certainly no laughing matter
for those trying to do so. 'Ironic' because I am amused by the equally unlikely possibilities that
Voltaire may have not only recognised his statement as hyperbole, but also anticipated that this
hyperbole would be lost on Twentieth Century positivists whose first reaction would be to
brand it as an 'unfounded hypothesis' and set about identifying appropriate construct variables
to create measuring instruments for studying humour theorists' dispositions. 'Ironic' also
because there is no doubt that the humour theorists themselves would see the funny side of
being subjected to quantitative scrutiny to disconfirm a qualitative notion concerning their own
'cheerfulness' or lack of it, and that most would smile in recognition ofthe fact that the results
of a study of their cheerfulness would probably be about as useful as discovering whether
dentists have good teeth.
Then again, perhaps Voltaire was just letting off steam. One thing is certain however, and that
is that Voltaire (who ifanything was known for his certainty) would have been comfortable in
a Twentieth Century milieu in which high technology and an Utopian belief in scientific
progress has bestowed upon technocratic idealists an unfounded sense of certainty embedded
in the erroneous belief that all knowledge is accessible to those who master the paradigms of
empiricism.
This study not only suggests the contrary, but also embraces the aesthetic of uncertainty as a
qualitative facet of humour.
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CHAPTER ONE
A qualitative approach to
humour theory
The central concern of this study is to provide a qualitative perspective of humour and
humour theories. This undertaking has three basic elements, namely 'qualitative',
'humour' and 'theories'. In these introductory comments, attention is directed towards
these elements in order to identify the parameters ofthe study. The term'qualitative' refers
to the nature of the methodological approach; whereas the term 'humour' refers to the
topic, and the term 'theories' refers to the aspect of the topic that is to receive special
attention. Although the issue ofmethodology is never far from the surface throughout this
dissertation, the main focus of the study is on humour in general and humour theories in
particular. Consequently, the present chapter deals mainly with the approach that will be
taken, and focusses on the nature ofqualitative research and its relevance to humour studies
and humour theory.
1.1 The term 'qualitative'
Although the term 'qualitative' is commonly used in the English-speaking world to
infer excellence, there is a grey area in interpretations ofthe term's etymology. The
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Concise Oxford dictionary of current English (1964:1003) indicates that 'quality'
stems froni~he Latin word 'qualis 'meaning of 'ofwhat kind' ,and that 'quality' may
have either an affirmative or a negative connotation depending upon its usage, as for
example in 'poor quality' or 'superior quality'. However, in spite ofthis, the quality
of neutrality is apparently ignored in subsequent dictionary definitions. Four of the
five denotations provided by the same dictionary for 'quality' emphasize its positive
and judgmental aspects, as follows: (i) 'degree of excellence', (ii) 'faculty, skill,
accomplishment', (iii) 'high rank or standing', and (iv) 'distinctive character' (of
voice). There is, however, one other entry that allows that 'quality' may have either
a positive or a negative connotation, and there is also an indication that 'quality' is
used as an opposite of 'quantity'. The semantic implication of the popular usage of
'quality' when juxtaposed with 'quantity' is the assumption that the former is
superior to the latter. This has led to the American colloquialism 'quality time' that
infers that a limited quantity of time can be used to create a more intense and
meaningful experience than normal.
The denotations in the standard language dictionaries are also reflected in early
specialist subject dictionary defmitions such as Drever's a Dictionary ofpsychology
(1964:237) that defines 'quality' as follows:
'Quality. A fundamental aspect or attribute of sensory experience, differentiating
one experience from another, within the same sensory field, of a non-qualitative
character, and independently of all aspects of a quantitative character.'
The principal features ofthis traditional definition have gained universal acceptance
among academics as a standard and neutral descriptive basis to denote the meaning
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of the term 'qualitative' in its application to categorise certain types of research
studies, and also as a label for studies that are not categorised as 'quantitative'. It is
also the definition that applies in this study, however this does not imply that the term
'qualitative' meets with the universal approval of the research community.
A case in point is Renata Tesch (1990:3) who early in the first chapter ofOualitative
research, expresses the sentiment that she dislikes the term'qualitative'. The reasons
she gives are convincing, and include the fact that there is ample evidence that in
current usage the word 'qualitative' has a positive and judgmental connotation, and
that it may be 'rather stilted'. Tesch also argues that 'qualitative' is an unsatisfactory
label for a generic category that has the non-membership of another category as the
main criterion for its own membership. It is the latter characteristic that appears most
irksome to Tesch who sees the origins of the term as not so much deriving naturally
from the intrinsic features of the objects it describes, but instead being selected for
the extrinsic reason that as a word it sounded like the opposite of 'quantitative'.
Tesch's standpoint concerning the term 'qualitative' appears to be corroborated by
information from her comprehensive survey of a vast diversity of research labelled
as 'qualitative'. Historical evidence indicates that from the 1920s onwards the
burgeoning influence ofscience and the scientific method ensured that the recognised
ruling discourse in human studies research methodology was the positivist tradition
that emphasized quantitative research. Support for positivism in the so-called
'human sciences' reached a crescendo in the United States during the 1950s when
3
behaviourism was at the vanguard ofhuman studies research in America. During the
past decade, the positivist perspective has continued to dominate the establishment
paradigms utilized in many fields ofstudy, as is evidenced by the ongoing popularity
ofpublications by Anastasi (1990), Kline (1993), Christensen (1988) and Berlak and
Hersen (1988) as 'recommended' university texts on quantitative research
methodology. However in recent years the dominance ofthe quantitative approach
in most fields of human studies has been challenged by the emerging popularity of
qualitative approaches.
Although in its application to research, the term 'qualitative' has been used by some
observers to identify a disparate group ofmethodological alternatives to quantitative
research, caution should be exercised in not making the erroneous generalisation that
qualitative research is derivative in the sense that it owes its existence to being a
reactionary alternative to quantitative research. During the high-profile rise to
prominence ofpositivism, many methodological approaches in human studies known
today as 'qualitative' approaches were in fact present under a variety of other
nomenclature. Examples during the 1950s were the ethnographic studies ofGeorge
Spindler (1955), the action research of Stephen Corey (1953), and the
phenomenological analysis of Adrian van Kaam (1959).
The politics of research have weighed heavily on the development of the so-called
'qualitative' movement, and during the 1950s the early qualitative approaches were
viewed as erring on the side of political incorrectness in the sense that they were
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embedded in alternative paradigms to the mainstream empirical paradigms of the
positivist ruling discourse. To some extent, the early 'qualitative' schools were
outcasts in a research climate characterised by the growing ascendancy ofpositivism
and the increasing preoccupation of the ruling discourse with observable behaviour
and statistics. Positivism and the scientific method became established in the eyes
of many as the sacred paths to the holy grail of universal truth.
The inevitable followed. The perceived rigidity of positivism was interpreted by
some members of the research community as a challenge to academic freedom, and
ultimately appeared to have the effect of provoking the ire of a new generation of
researchers who seemed to react against what they perceived as the prescriptive ethos
of a limiting 'world view'. In any event, a reactionary movement away from the
quantitative perspective gained popularity during the late 1960s. The movement
served to voice the collective concern of researchers who were not married to the
quantitative perspective and who were disturbed by institutional academic policy
during an era in which didactic tomes on quantitative behavioural research were
distributed to undergraduates on a large scale as the exclusive rule-books ofresearch
methodology. Examples of such publications include those of Kerlinger (1973),
Cronbach (now 5th ed., 1990), Borg and Gall (3 rd ed., 1979) and Carlsmith et al.
(1976).
The search for alternative paradigms to supplement the classic experimental
paradigms resulted in a variety ofapproaches. Some ofthese so-called'qualitative'
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approaches were related, but in general the tendency has been for tertiary textbook
writers to identify the primary common denominator of 'qualitative' approaches as
being that they were not quantitative. Tesch (1990:3) is of the opinion that it would
be more proper to label the data under scrutiny as 'textual' and the type of research
that is based on the data as 'descriptive' or 'interpretive/critical'. However, at other
times, Tesch simply refers to 'non-positivistic studies', and ultimately appears to
resign herselfto majority rule by accepting the popular usage ofthe term' qualitative'
with the following refreshingly laconic comment:
'However, once a tenn has caught on in the community, trying to change it is about
as fruitful as trying to unteach a parrot' .
(Tesch, 1990:3).
The ironic twist to this little tale of 'untaught' parrots is the fact that Tesch entitled
her book 'Qualitative research'. From the perspective ofthis study, this final turn of
the screw gives the situation all the necessary components ofthe type ofhumour that
the French refer to as 'rire jaune' - the rueful 'yellow' laughter of resignation in the
face of an insurmountable problem (cf. Chapter Seven). One is left to ponder the
probability that Tesch's title has raised more than a few wry smiles from the
authoress herself over the years as a constant reminder of her frustration over the
inadequacy of available universally-accepted nomenclature.
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1.2 Epistemological considerations: schools of approach
There has been a somewhat predictable aftermath to Tesch's (1990:3) observations
that qualitative data are by popular consensus' any data that are not quantitative' and
that 'qualitative data are all data that cannot be expressed in numbers'. The fact that
the qualitative category did not exist until there was an ex post facto grouping of
disparate non-quantitative approaches may to some extent create the false impression
among the uninitiated that there has been a fragmentation of 'qualitative' research
into numerous schools of approach. In actuality, the truth lies not so much in the
deconstruction of the monolith as in the removal of the generic veil.
The diversity within the qualitative research category is a strength as well as a
hallmark. A strong spirit of individualism pervades the qualitative research scenario
which if anything has its common denominator in an attitude of tolerance towards
nonconformity that contrasts starkly with the rigidity of quantitative paradigms.
This characteristic diversity is cast into greater reliefby the fact that rather than being
a natural term with a universal meaning, 'qualitative research' is basically an artificial
generic term used as a label for non-quantitative approaches. The situation pertai~s
in which different academic disciplines have developed different qualitative
approaches to research, with the inevitable emergence offavoured types ofqualitative
research in a variety of fields of study.
In the field ofPsychology, the well-known case study approach was for many years
the popularly established modus operandi ofqualitative researchers; whereas in more
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recent times, phenomenological approaches have gained increasing support in the
field ofqualitative inquiry. Likewise, the traditional participant observation approach
of Sociology has been joined in recent decades by the newer qualitative field of
ethnomethodology. In the case ofEducation, qualitative research has been conducted
in a number of areas including naturalistic inquiry, phenomenography and
ethnography.
Because qualitative research means different things to different people in different
disciplines, there are also just as many different ways of analysing and interpreting
the types of data that reflect these interpretive differences. In spite of their many
differences however, qualitative researchers do appear to have common ground in the
sense that they almost all defend each other's respective rights to be different. In
reviewing literature across the spectrum ofthe so-called 'qualitative' approaches, one
gains the impression that these researchers collectively adamantly reject
standardization which they see as another limited and limiting example of the
inflexibility that they perceive as characterizing the quantitative approach.
By implicit agreement on a multidisciplinary level, qualitative researchers also appear
to have reached a broad consensus in endorsing the principle that qualitative analysis
involves a process (however idiosyncratic) of l11aking sense of narrative data.
Qualitative researchers in general tend to emphasize the idea ofthere being no 'one-
best-way' (Tesch, 1990:96). Amid the wide diversity ofprinciples and procedures
of qualitative analysis that become apparent whenever qualitative researchers
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describe methodology, there appears to be a spirit of'vive le difference' and sense of
variety being the spice of life. The espirit de corps of a group that celebrates
heterogeneity engenders healthy diversity that is manifested in an implicit
encouragement of individual differences in approach as the source of variety that
provides a wider understanding of human phenomena.
It is not within the parameters of this study to provide an in-depth comparative
analysis of the formidable array of qualitative approaches to human studies.
Nevertheless, there is a need to contextualize this particular study within a general
epistemological framework ofthese approaches. For the sake ofbrevity, information
concerning the diverse range of approaches that have been labelled as 'qualitative'
is synthesized in Appendix A which contains an alphabetical listing of these
approaches. From an epistemological perspective, each of the listed orientations
represents a school of methodological approach in human studies. The table
presented in Appendix A is in effect a selective glossary of the best-known of the
so-called 'qualitative' approaches, and is drawn largely from Tesch's (1990:21-54)
extensive survey of current non-positivistic approaches in various fields of human
studies. Many ofthe terms ofreference listed are defined or described by appropriate
citations drawn from source references of authorities in these fields. For
convenience, a separate list of source references for these citations accompanies the
alphabetized list of approaches in Appendix A.
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Among these so-called 'non-traditional' (Goldman, 1982:87) schools ofresearch are
several that through longevity have become entrenched in recent 'establishment'
epistemology. Nevertheless, these schools of approach are still referred to as 'non-
traditional' because they offer alternative qualitative paradigms to the quantitative
paradigms that are associated with mainstream conceptualizations of traditional
positivistic research approaches. The more established 'non-traditional' qualitative
fields include ethnography, participant observation, case studies, ethnomethodology,
reflective phenomenology, and content analysis. These non-quantitative approaches
have been in existence for long enough to prompt some observers to describe them
as being both unorthodox as well as 'classic'.
1.3 The nature of non-traditional research
In an article entitled 'Defining non-traditional research', Goldman (1982:88) notes
that:
' ... precision tends to be associated in people's minds with numbers and with
experimental and correlational methods of research. However, there may be a
spurious air of precision about those traditional methods and an equally spurious air
of vagueness about the'X' methods'.
The issue at hand is not that the 'received view' (Suppe, 1977: 116) ofthe positivistic
tradition is challenged as a viable means ofknowing, but rather that until recently the
academic culture accepted the 'received view' as a ruling discourse in research
methodology, and by tacit approval conferred upon it a status that reinforced its
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implicit promise of certainty. This issue is both methodological and ethical, and
Goldman's (1982:88) emphasis of the term 'precision' is very pertinent in this
context. The goal of achieving greater precision exemplifies the idealistic ethos of
the technocratic society with its hopeful vision that technological improvements will
provide answers to all questions.
The march towards greater precision is generally accompanied by an accumulating
body of scientific knowledge supported by a research community encouraged by
tangible evidence ofprogress that usually engenders confidence and the promise of
a light at the end of the tunnel. The implication for research methodology is that the
characteristic 'hi-tech' nature of contemporary First World society tends to reinforce
the Weltanschauung (or 'world view') ofthe positivistic tradition, and to some extent
provides a research climate that is characterized by the implicit notion that all
problems can be solved if the appropriate procedure of scientific methodology is
followed.
The confusions oftechnological idealism are an ongoing feature ofthe contemporary
Electronic Age. The key distinction that is made too seldom in this context is that
between the physical and the metaphysical. The classic technocratic oversight is the
boundary between humankind's material and spiritual worlds. The effect is that the




There is a well-known incident in Shakespeare's Hamlet in which Hamlet's loyal
friend Horatio, a man ofreason, expresses his bewilderment at witnessing Hamlet's
father's ghost, to which Hamlet replies:
'And therefore as a stranger give it welcome.
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.'
(Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act II, scl. - ref. 1952:878)
These words, written by Shakespeare some four hundred years ago, aptly and
inadvertently identify some of the shortcomings of contemporary technological
idealism that surface in the shortsightedness of scientific determinism. Hamlet's
words signal the need to welcome a diversity ofalternative interpretations ofphysical
and metaphysical phenomena in a nonthreatening environment, and this has
contemporary relevance to the closeted academic environment that has grown around
positivism.
The confrontation between freedom and control is a perennial academic theme.
Frederick Suppe (1977: 116) indicates that '... the vast majority of working
philosophers of science seem to fall on the portion of the spectrum which holds The
Received View fundamentally inadequate and untenable'. The synergy between
scientific certainty and philosophical uncertainty has been an almost constant source
of academic tension over the generations as various social philosophers have
challenged 'The Received View'. In this respect, Koch (1981 :262) cites Bertrand
Russell's statement that' ... almost all the questions of most interest to speculative
minds are such as science cannot answer', and then proceeds to examine the
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approaches of social and human scientists in general and admonishes those guilty of
'ameaningful thinking' couched in 'method-fetishism'.
Koch's rather colourful criticism certainly doesn't spare the rod, and perhaps there
is a healthy measure ofplayful hyperbole in his castigations of his more positivistic
colleagues. This tendency is particularly evident in Koch's somewhat vitriolic
definition of 'ameaningful' as ' ...a fear-driven species of cognitive constriction, a
reduction of uncertainty by denial, by a form of phoney certainty achieved by the
covert annihilation ofthe problematic, the complex and the subtle' (Koch, 1981 :264).
Whereas Koch probably makes few friends among quantitative research
methodologists with this provocative statement, he also raises the controversial issue
ofthe tendency towards particularization to avoid 'the problematic' , and he identifies
this phenomenon as stemming from a scenario in which researchers are the products
of a subculture that seeks certainty.
According to Koch's argument, an 'ameaningful' research climate is one that
nourishes the undesirable tendency to avoid problematic or contentious topics in
formal academic studies, and to opt for the greater certainty of a neat quantifiable
project. The substance ofKoch' s reasoning has relevance within the present context
of this 'qualitative study of humour theory'. Koch's view is that 'ameaningful'
thinkers tend to take the easy way out by avoiding complex problems and choosing
simple projects that portend predictable results. Accordingly, the consequences of
'ameaningful thinking' are that the topics most popularly selected for academic
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research tend to be those that conform neatly to what are regarded as acceptable
parameters reflecting the prevailing conventions of academic research.
In the context ofthe present study, it does not require too great a leap in extrapolation
to observe that humour researchers may find themselves more attracted by the
comfortable certainty promised by the quantitative approach than by the potential
perils ofthe qualitative path. On the other hand, it must be emphasized that the latter
observation does not necessarily represent a denigration ofquantitative research per
se. On the contrary, both Koch's ire and my present criticism is directed towards
'ameaningful' thinkers rather than towards quantitative research itself.
Notwithstanding the proviso that the contributions of quantitative approaches to
humour research should not be underestimated, the priority in research design should
be the nature ofthe problem under scrutiny. Accordingly, researchers should design
their studies to solve rather than avoid problems, and should strongly resist the
'ameaningful' practice of searching among available content for specific problems
that may conveniently suit preferred preordained research designs. To do otherwise
would be to put style before substance. The findings of this study (cf. particularly
Chapter Four and Chapter Five) suggest that studies of the nature ofhumour tend to
lend themselves more naturally to qualitative methodological approaches because
much of the focus of attention is directed towards narrative data.
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The goal ofthe present study of humour theory is certainly not to reach the comfort
zone ofneatly quantified certainty. The search for universal truths in humour theory
presents something of a holy grail scenario, and the pursuit of some of these truths
should not be ignored because the process is problematic or complex. The nature of
knowing is itself both problematic and complex. Even our notions concerning
objectivity are challenged by the fact that we view the world through subjective eyes
which select and emphasize aspects of the particular phenomena being studied.
Almost a quarter century after Brand (1974:20) posed the question: 'What colour is
a chameleon on a mirror?', we still stand in wonder on the edge of a 'looking glass
universe' trying to find ourselves in a universe ofourselves (Briggs and Peat, 1984).
Notwithstanding the ambitions of the present study, efforts have been made to
conduct it with a sense of awareness of the nature of the beast that embodies the
activity of knowing.
A comprehensive philosophical study ofthe nature of'knowing' is outside the ambit
ofthis study. Nevertheless, there is a need to recognize that the process of 'knowing'
about phenomena associated with human studies cannot be addressed by quantifiable
methods alone. Qualitative studies are an essential element of the 'big picture'.
Polkingthorne (1984:427) exemplifies this sense of fascination amongst academics
with the 'big picture' of knowledge and the universe in his argument that:
'The activity of knowing is itself a human phenomenon. How can we turn the tools
of knowledge-making on ourselves when we are the tool makers? There is no
absolute point outside human phenomena from which to investigate. Moreover, the
knowledge gained when we study ourselves changes the object that we are studying' .
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Polkingthorne's observations focus onthe idiosyncratic synergy between subjectivity
and objectivity that appears to produce a self-reinforcing circularity in the thought
processes that are central to the individual's philosophical perspectives ofthe nature
of knowledge. These insights alert observers to both the complexity and the
uncertainty of the nature of knowledge, as well as to the need to look beyond the
immediacies ofwhat at first appear to be statistical certainties. From the standpoint
that the term 'qualitative' is a central referent in the title ofthis study, it is vital that
cognisance should be taken of both the universe we are observing as well as the
universe of ourselves as observers. In this case, for example, it is important to look
beyond the cybernetics of the issue at hand towards the level of the cybernetics of
cybernetics (Becvar and Becvar, 1996:63).
At the level of the cybernetics of cybernetics, researchers recognise science as an
activity performed on those parts of the whole that have been selected as objects of
particularisation (Becvar and Becvar, 1996:62-66). This recognition is accompanied
by a further recognition that the scientist is part of the process. The social
implications ofthe latter recognition are interpreted by some as an inference that the
scientist has a certain sociocultural responsibility in the grand scheme ofthings. For
present purposes, the standpoint of Becvar and Becvar (1996:340) on this matter
provides what I regard as a satisfactorily organised response to some of the 'big
questions' that have relevance to qualitative studies as follows:
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'A responsible reply to the cultural mandate to provide answers to questions, to solve
the problems, may be to reeducate the culture on the nature and limits of our
knowledge. A part of this education might include providing the following
information:
(1) We don't know what is real. We don't have a God's-eye view of the world.
(2) The answers we give to the questions posed are limited by the theoretical
framework and the methodology employed to study the questions.
(3) The solutions we provide, given theoretical and methodological limitations, are
based on the study ofa part, which is recursively linked to other parts comprising
a whole. Because of our limited frame of reference, such solutions may solve a
problem only to generate other problems at a higher order.
(4) The phenomenon we studied is not the way it was before we studied it. It is
different by the very act of observation.
(5) Given the logic of our solution to the problem, as it was posed and as it was
studied, the object of our attempted solutions will take on characteristics of the
theory implicit in our model.'
1.4 'Principles' of qualitative research
At the conclusion of the previous section of this chapter, the question of principles
or generally accepted rules of conduct was introduced. When the question of
'characteristics ofthe theory implicit in our model' (Becvar and Becvar, 1996:340)
is applied to this study, it will be observed that its idiosyncratic non-quantitative
nature permits its qualification as a 'qualitative' study. The approach taken in this
study has been identified as 'qualitative' because its characteristics are consistent
with those ofthe general category of non-positivistic approaches to human study.
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In this regard, a brief consideration of the primary characteristics of 'qualitative
research' contextualizes the present qualitative study of humour theory. Tesch
(1990:95-97) identifies ten so-~alled 'principles and practices' that she argues holds
true for virtually all types of so-called 'qualitative' analysis, as follows:
(l) It is concurrent with data collection or cyclic, and is never considered as the [mal
phase in the research process. Analysis is open-ended and ongoing.
(2) The analysis process is orderly, systematic and comprehensive, but not rigid.
(3) The analysis process involves attending to data through reflective activity that
results in a set of analytical notes that guide the process.
(4) A holistic perspective serves as a frame ofreference for the 'segmenting' ofdata
in relevant and meaningful units.
(5) An inductive process is used to categorize data segments according to an
organizing system that is predominantly derived from the nature of the data.
(6) The main intellectual tool is comparison to accomplish the goal of discerning
conceptual similarities, refining the discriminative power of categories, and to
discover patterns.
(7) Categories for organizing segments are flexible working tools, not rigid end
products. These categories are tentative at the outset, and remain flexible
throughout because research is ongoing.
(8) Creative involvement is central, and any form ofprescription or standardization
is avoided. Hence, there is no 'one-right-way' to manipulate qualitative data
during analysis which is in fact an eclectic activity.
(9) Qualitative analysis procedures can and should proceed 'artfully', and these
procedures are neither 'scientific' nor 'mechanistic'.
(l0) The final outcome ofqualitative analyses is some type ofhigher-level synthesis
that provides further insight into the nature of the data.
These ten principles identify general commonalities in an epistemological terrain
where it appears that an escape from standardization is a common goal ofmost ofthe
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'qualitative' players involved. This collective attitude exemplifies the Zeitgeist of
the qualitative movement and tends to militate against those naive enough to attempt
to identify a set of common laws that can be applied formulaically to all forms of
qualitative research. Whereas replicability is a tenet of quantitative research, a
persistent theme of qualitative methodology is the recognition of the researcher's
individuality as a research instrument. Differences in philosophical stances and
individual styles account for the fact that even when faced with the same task,
different qualitative researchers may produce different results without jeopardizing
notions concerning validity. Nevertheless in spite of the emphasis on individuality,
the ten principles provided by Tesch (above) serve as a useful composite frame of
reference within which we may contextualize qualitative studies in general and the
present study in particular.
In this regard, an interesting footnote that is also ofparticular relevance to this study
is the comment made by Goetz and LeCompte (1984: 172) with respect to qualitative
research design in ethnographic studies. In considering the 'unscientific' nature of
qualitative research (cf. the ninth ofTesch's above principles), Goetz and LeCompte
emphasize that flexibility is necessary for creativity, and that ethnographic research
may in certain circumstances be done 'playfully'. In this respect, the quality of
'playfulness' is an idiosyncratic but also appropriate feature of the present study.
Corroborating evidence is close at hand to confirm that playfulness is a central
characteristic ofhumour itself. For example, Murdock and Ganim's (1993) macro-
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analysis of humour theory indicates that the criterion of 'playfulness' is a primary
element of the spontaneity theory associated with the humour process (cf. Chapter
Five). Furthermore, the characteristic of 'playfulness' is a central feature ofApter's
conceptualization of the 'paratelic-mode' in his reversal theory of humour (cf.
Chapter Six). Accordingly, readers of this study are forewarned that at times an
element of 'playfulness' may find its way into this text, and for this I am appreciative
of the licence suggested by Goetz and LeCompte (1984:72).
1.5 Labelling this study as 'qualitative'
The present study may be characterised as an idiosyncratic descriptive study of
humour theory that involves scrutiny of data through reflectivity. The process of
analysis proceeds within a relatively systematic framework designed to be
comprehensive across a multidisciplinary range of humour-related theoretical
approaches. The study commences with an attempt to come to terms with its
epistemological locus in terms ofmethodological perspectives, and then proceeds to
discuss the concept of humour and humour theories from a variety of standpoints
with the aim or arriving at an integrated Olympian view of the topic (or as many
Americans aptly call it: 'the big picture').
The respective chapters of this study represent the stages in the analytical process.
Chapter Two is concerned with the retrospective study ofhumour theory in terms of
its historical antecedents and the development of theories associated with humour.
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Chapter Three examines the concept of the ruling discourse and its treatment of
humour, and is followed by a chapter in which the status of humour is considered in
terms ofits being a subject for contemporary research. Accordingly, in Chapter Four
the nature of humour research is examined within the dynamic context of the
controversy surrounding the ongoing synergy between the quantitative and
qualitative methods of investigation.
The following three chapters of the study are concerned with analyses of three
different approaches to humour research. Chapter Five concerns a critique of
Murdock and Ganim' s 1993 descriptive macro-level study ofhumour theories which
provides a frame of reference for the analyses that follow. By contrast, Chapter Six
presents a critique of a single humour theory, namely that of Michael Apter (1989)
whose reversal theory of humour is identified as deserving of greater attention.
Chapter Seven constitutes a further approach to humour research in an introspective
exercise in reflectivity that may be described as a 'micro-study' ofa single so-called
'humorous event' .
Finally, to broaden the base of the study, attention is given to two areas that merit
further consideration. Chapter Eight confronts the question of humour as related to
orality and the oral tradition. Whilst engaged in the process of researching this
relatively neglected area of study, I presented three related papers at South African
international and national conferences in Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban. Although
these conference papers were grounded in the preparation ofthe text ofthis study, the
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papers themselves should be regarded as separate entities that complement rather than
merely usher in this study. Although some of the ideas may recur, the papers
themselves have not been adapted for inclusion in this study. The papers in question
appear as Appendices C, D and E ofthis study in their previously published forms.
It is suggested that these papers be read as a general precursor to the study itself, and
also as they provide a complementary frame of reference for Chapter Eight which
presents a further and different perspective of orality and the oral tradition in terms
of its relationship to humour theory in the context of this study.
Another significant area of interest receives attention in Chapter Nine, namely the
application of humour theory to 'the anthropology of jest'. At this juncture, the
licence concerning 'playfulness' (referred to in section 1.4 above) may be invoked
to assure anthropologists that the tail-end positioning of this topic is not intended as
being representative of my opinion concerning the status of anthropology in the
social sciences. Quite the contrary, as a person interested in humour wherever it may
be found, I have long admired the humorous anecdotes of anthropological
fieldworkers who in many cases seem to have needed to cling to a sense ofhumour
as an essential requisite for survival in strange circumstances. The question of
•
humour in academic writing also receives consideration in the anthropology chapter
for two reasons. Firstly, in the context of this study, it is a neglected and pertinent
aspect of the anthropology of humour prevailing in the behaviour of persons
functioning within a culture of academia; and secondly, because frankly I have an
idiosyncratic desire to see more of it.
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In the final chapter, concluding comments are made concerning the strengths and
limitations of this study, as well as recommendations for further research. In the
interests ofencouraging deeper insights into the nature ofhumour, the main concern
ofthis concluding chapter is to present a frank overview ofthe value of this study in
the context of the ongoing body of research that contributes to the development of
humour theory.
Readers of this study are provided with enough textual evidence of my own
preoccupation with the dynamic nature of the ongoing synergy between qualitative
and quantitative methodological perspectives to perhaps conjecture that it is a crucial
factor influencing my own Weltanschauung (or 'world view') of the nature of
knowledge and the universe. However, while the latter may well be a tenable
idiosyncratic supposition, it must be borne in mind that I also regard 'intellectual
anxiety' as existing in a synergy between the certainty and uncertainty arising from
the individual's perceptions of the nature of knowledge and the universe. Like the
many before me who have decided that life is too short to dwell on the problem of
whether the chicken preceded the egg or vice versa, I also feel that life is a little short
to dwell too long in the realms ofthe circularity of speculations concerning whether
the individual's Weltanschauung is a product of intrinsic intellectual synergies or
whether idiosyncratic perspectives of these synergies are in fact a product of the
individual's Weltanschauung. It is however an interesting philosophical conundrum.
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Notwithstanding these personal observations, a fuller treatise on the mainsprings of
academic inquiry is beyond the scope of this study. For the present, there is always
the pleasure of the aesthetic of uncertainty, which is very much within the ambit of




2.1 The biological and phylogenetic roots of humour
The objective of this chapter is to provide a thorough but concise historical
perspective of the development of the concept of humour and the emergence of
schools ofhumour theory. In order to lay a foundation for this historical perspective,
a brief study of the biological and phylogenetic roots of humour follows as a
precursor to investigating the development of humour definitions and theories.
On the surface, this appears straight-forward because the obvious starting point of
any historical perspective of humour as a human phenomenon is probably a
statement concerning humour as a human trait, possibly along the lines of:
'In all likelihood, certain characteristics ofhuman behaviour such as laughter, joy and
playfulness have been unique features of the human psyche that have endured
universally since early recorded sociocultural history' .
In doing so, we would be in good company. The renowned Fourteenth Century
French satirist Francois Rabelais once proclaimed that 'le rire est le propre de
!'homme' thereby expressing his belief that laughter was a property peculiar to
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mankind (Gordon, 1996:1). However, with an advantage over Rabelais of five
hundred years hindsight, not to mention the big brother ofcontemporary behavioural
science at our shoulders, current approaches should be a little more circumspect than
the either talented Frenchman's or the bland common-sense statement cited above.
In the first instance, statements that commence with the phrase 'in all likelihood' are
usually untenable premises upon which to base any logical argument. In the
circumstances, it would be more prudent to proceed from the more cautious
standpoint that a survey ofhistorical and anthropological research suggests that while
humour can be described as by and large a universal phenomenon, the idea that it has
been with us since time immemorial has not been proved (LeGoff, 1997:40-45;
Driessen, 1997:224-241; Burke, 1997:61-75; Graf, 1997:29-39).
Furthermore, the idea that humour is a unique property of humankind is doubtful,
irrespective ofwhat Rabelais had to say - and more, especially because he said it well
over three hundred years before Charles Darwin published The descent of man in
1871. Cognisance must be taken ofthe contemporary neo-Darwinian perspective that
the idea that humour or other so-called 'human' characteristics are exclusive to
Homo Sapiens is not only a product ofobserver bias, but also represents support for
an untenable species-centric Western supposition with no· scientific basis. In this
regard, McCrone (1993:237-239) produces reliable evidence from his comparative
survey of primate studies that indicates not only the presence of playfulness and
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presumably light-hearted mischief in monkeys and apes, but also a tendency to bare
the teeth and emit a laugh-like primate sound at certain times.
In another survey, Jacob Levine (1968:5) examines the phylogenetic gap between
man and the animals, and ironically observes that '... behavioural scientists
acknowledge the validity ofthe most fundamental principle in biology: evolution, but
completely ignore it in humour theory and research'. Levine's review ofwell-known
early studies of primates (notably Darwin, 1872; Yerkes, 1929; Kohler, 1961)
indicates that apes possess 'primordial signs of a sense of humour' , and that these
animals have the capacity to communicate pleasure by providing facial and bodily
expressions not dissimilar in spirit to smiling and laughing. Levine (1968:5) reports
widespread evidence of playfulness among the primates who seem tireless in their
teasing and prank-playing. It is reported, for example, that monkeys in zoos readily
engage in clowning and comical posturing to obtain laughter from appreciative
human audiences.
In discussing similarities between humans and chimpanzees, McCrone (1993:238)
observes that studies have shown a strong similarity in emotional expressions, even
if the primates' use of laughing behaviour appears more restricted and stereotyped
by comparison. To humans, the chimp equivalent of the human smile looks more
like a threatening exposure of clenched teeth, and the suggestion is that it may have
evolved as '... a watered-down version of the chimpanzee's attack warning'.
However, to other chimpanzees, the chimp equivalent ofthe human smile has a social
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purpose as it is a signal of reassurance and appeasement either by a subordinate to
ward offa potential attack by a dominant chimp or by a dominant chimp to reassure
a subordinate.
McCrone (1993:238) also indicates that another chimpanzee characteristic that has
a strong affinity with the human smile is the so-called 'playface' in which the mouth
,... gapes open in a slightly idiotic fashion while the teeth remain hidden', and is
generally accompanied by an excited 'ah-ah-ah' breathing sound that seems to be the
equivalent of human laughter. This facial expression is generally present when
chimpanzees engage in playful wrestling or other forms ofsocial play. It is believed
that the chimp's 'playface' expression delivers the social message among other
animals of an absence of tension or true aggression, and introduces a tone of
playfulness in its place.
This knowledge ofchimpanzee 'smiling' and 'playface' behaviour helps put similar
human behaviour in perspective, and provides some insight into the relationship
between the overt products ofhumour (such as the smile or the laugh) and the process
of humour itself. In human behaviour, for example, the smile is a versatile social
device that is often used as a signal in a non-humorous situation to reassure others
that the smiler is unthreatening or has friendly intentions. The smile may also signal
a polite form of greeting, or a token display of pleasure, or an indication of
agreement. A smile may also be a signal of recognition to a joker in a
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communication process in which the smile acts as a formal response that registers the
message that the smiler has understood and appreciated a joke.
Laughter is primarily an indication of arousal, although it usually signals a response
to a humorous event. On other occasions, laughter may be an arbitrary behavioural
indicator of excessive arousal, as in hysterical laughter which may be a reaction to
a traumatic experience. There are also times when drug-induced high arousal may
lead to laughter as a manic reaction to over-stimulation, hence perhaps the association
ofhigh arousal laughter and the drug named Ecstasy. In this respect, there are those
who claim that the act oftickling a sensitive armpit can produce similar but less life-
threatening effects. In the present context, the examples cited above serve to confirm
the probability that these forms of laughter are induced by direct physiological
arousal rather than by subtleties of the humour process per se.
In more recent times, certain emotional reactions have been associated somewhat
vaguely with the concept ofhumour in the sense that, for example, laughter is usually
interpreted as a reaction that signifies a response to humour. Likewise, a display of
playfulness is sometimes viewed as signifying a willingness to humour someone or
gratify their pleasure. However, the task of collating these diverse aspects and
clustering them together under the umbrella ofa generalised conceptualisation ofthe
process and products ofhumour has been a relatively recent exercise. This has been
accompanied by a renewed interest in the historical antecedents of humour theory,
as well as the broad study of the origins and the history of humour. One of the
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manifestations of the popularity of this field of inquiry among the academic
community was the holding of an international conference with the theme of 'The
cultural history of humour' in Amsterdam in January 1994 (Bremmer and
Roodenburg, 1997:xi).
2.2 The historical roots of humour
In this section, preliminary attention is given to the usage of the word 'humour' in
the living language in order to set in motion a concise review of the historical
development of humour theory. The objective is to establish a frame of reference
against which contemporary perspectives of humour can be examined in Chapter
Three. The historical roots of humour are well signposted in the Oxford English
dictionary, 2nd ed. on compact disc for the IBM PC which provides a thorough
chronological overview ofthe etymological development of the term 'humour'. A
relevant section ofthis source has been adapted for use in Appendix B. For present
purposes, a brief consideration ofthe current usage of the word 'humour' serves as
an introduction to a discussion of its historical antecedents.
The term 'humour' is used most commonly in everyday speech in two senses. As an
abstract noun, 'humour' is a name given to any social event or series of such events
that involves the transmission and reception of a message perceived by the receiver
to be amusing. As a verb, humour refers to the sympathetic act of 'cheering someone
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up' or suspending criticism of notions they may express. Accordingly, the Concise
Oxford dictionary ofcurrent English (1964:592) uses terms such as 'comicality' and
'jocose imagination' to describe the current usage of humour as a noun, and refers
also to the act of 'indulging or gratifying another's pleasure' as a description ofthe
current usage of humour as a verb.
Baldensperger's early study ofthe etymology ofthe term 'humour' indicates that the
modem meaning associated with it had its origins in England in 1682, until which
time humour had connoted 'mental disposition' or 'temperament' (Bremmer and
Roodenburg, 1997:8). Probably, the most significant early etymological milestone
in the usage of the term 'humour' in its current sense came in 1709 when Lord
Shaftesbury used the term 'humour' to mean more or less the same as it does today
in his essay on 'The freedom of wit and humour' (Bremmer and Roodenberg,
1997:1). Although Bremmer and Roodenburg (1997:1) point out that Voltaire once
claimed that the word 'humour' had French origins as it had derived from the French
'humeur', the general consensus is that its present semantic usage had English
origins.
From 1725 onwards, there are records in historical documents that ' ... even the
French themselves' acknowledged the term's English origins, and that as late as 1862
the famous French author Victor Hugo, in the first volume ofres miserables. spoke
of 'that English thing they call humour' (Bremmer and Roodenburg, 1997:8).
Bremmer and Roodenburg (1997:8) report that according to their retrospective
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studies of French dictionaries, the French in fact only started pronouncing the word
'the French way' from the 1870s onwards (Bremmer and Roodenburg, 1997:8). To
reinforce this viewpoint, evidence from historical documents also reveals several
acknowledgements from Holland and Germany that the word 'humour' was an
English' import'. Furthermore, in 1810 an early German biographer ofJoseph Haydn
observed that a cardinal feature of the composer's personality was ' ... a sort of
innocent mischievousness, or what the British call humour' (Brendell, 1990:14).
A study of the etymological development of the current usage of the term 'humour'
reveals that an assortment of topics (such as wit, comedy, farce and practical jokes)
that are currently collectively associated with the term 'humour' had already been
studied separately before the generic label of 'humour' was applied to group them
together. As acase-in-point, classical scholars have examined humour as a sphere
of interest in antiquity. This task has been hampered by the sad loss ofmajor works
such as the second book ofAristotle's Poetics, as well as Theophrastus' On comedy
and On the ludicrous (Bremmer and Roodenburg, 1997:4). In contemporary homage
to these setbacks, Umberto Eco's novel The name ofthe rose effectively exploits the
irretrievable loss of the second book of Aristotle's Poetics. Nevertheless, the
principal legacy of antiquity to the field ofhumour studies is probably the surviving
workofCicero (106-43B.C.) who distinguished between the 'wit ofmatter' (viz. the
telling and / or the re-telling of anecdotes or entertaining stories) and the 'wit of
form' (viz. the making of humorous remarks and puns).
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The distinction made by Cicero in Ancient Rome in the century before the birth of
Christ was adapted and given a broader scope in 1528A.D. by the Renaissance Italian
author Castiglione who introduced a third category to complement 'the wit ofmatter'
and 'the wit ofform' . This category comprises the'burla' or mild practical joke, and
was described as being 'wit in action' (Woodhouse in Bremmer and Roodenburg,
1997:4). This insightful addition demonstrates that Castiglione recognised the need
to develop ideas concerning wit or comedy beyond the limitations ofverbal humour
by acknowledging the role of nonverbal humour, and thereby providing a more
holistic conceptualization of the nature of humour. Chapter Eight deals specifically
with the broader perspective ofhumour and its relationship with orality and the oral
tradition.
Further historical perspectives provide insight into the fact that the mainsprings of
ongoing contemporary etiological discussions concerning humour are to some extent
mirrored in disparate writings that in modern times have become part of a global
cultural history of humour. A brief consideration of the historical development of
ideas about humour reveals the antecedents ofthe principal contemporary theoretical
standpoints concerning the etiology of humour.
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2.3 The emergence of schools of humour theory
2.3.1 Superiority theory
The superiority theory of humour refers to the tendency of people to find
amusement in the mishaps of others presumably because it excites favourable
comparison with their own self-perceptions of superiority which are thought to
stem from deep-seated anxieties about inferiority. In recent decades, the image
of the fat man slipping on the banana peel has become a cliched example of the
superiority theory of humour. Typically, this involves laughter with a rather
selfish and callous tone which says: 'The-joke's-on-you, and better-you-than-
me!'. Basically, most would regard this genre as a rather undesirable form of
humour that has been with us for a long time. In this respect, McCrone
(1993:232) cites the example of Plato's description of laughter as self-
congratulatory pleasure aroused by the recognition of weakness, infirmity and
ignorance in others. The evidence of hearsay seems to suggest that certain
Ancient Greeks experienced humour as a feeling ofdelighted superiority. Levine
(1968: 1) cites Plato's Philebus in which the philosopher expresses his disgust with
the phenomenon ofhumour which he felt brought out the ugly and destructive side
of human nature by degrading art, religion and morals. In fact, Plato went as far
as to argue that humour should be avoided by civilised men.
During the Fifteenth Century, earlier ideas concerning superiority theory were re-
iterated by the English political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, who described
34
laughter as ' ... a sudden glory arising from some conception ofsome eminency in
ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly'
(McCrone, 1993:233). Perhaps Hobbes' insight into the characteristic nature of
humour in England provides a basis for understanding some of the sociocultural
trends of English folk over the centuries. A good example may be found in the
Nineteenth Century reports of social historians that many seemingly respectable
Victorians who spent Sunday mornings in church, also spent Sunday afternoons
jeering the inmates oflocal mental asylums (McCrone, 1993 :234). Today it seems
astonishing that the level of social acceptability acquired by this malicious brand
of'superiority' humour apparently legitimatized the practice ofthis form ofpublic
cruelty.
In similar vein, Robert Damton's well-known historical anthropology essay on
'The Great Cat Massacre' presents a startling exploration of the violent rituals
practised by mid-Eighteenth Century French artisans. Damton (1984:75)
commences his account of this tale of macabre humour with the sentence: 'The
funniest thing that ever happened in the printing shop of Jacques Vincent,
according to a worker who witnessed it, was a riotous massacre of cats'.
Damton's historically accurate account of the France of two hundred years ago
invites comparison with contemporary vicarious forms of mass enjoyment of
humour such as Hollywood-style 'slapstick' comedy that involves exploding
cigars, collapsing buildings, and consequently much pain and anguish on the parts
of the victims of this form of humour.
35
Bergson (LeGoff, 1997:40) was one of the earliest humour theorists of the
Twentieth Century to describe the sociocultural factors influencing the nature of
humour. In 1905, he described laughter as a shout of 'beware!' to others in the
community, and discerned the source of much laughter as being directed at those
victims of mishaps arising from a failure to adjust (Potter, 1954:22-23).
Ultimately, these forms of humour are based on what the Germans have termed
Schadenfreude which signifies joy at the perceived misfortunes ofothers (Burke,
1997:66), and in literal translation refers to joy ('Freude') deriving from damage
('Schaden').
Researchers such as Jacques LeGoff (1997) use the term 'superiority theory' to
characterise this perspective of humour which basically portrays laughter as the
manifestation of a perceived sense of dominance towards the victim of the
humour. This genre ofsomewhat malicious and derisive humour has been ofsuch
longstanding and widespread currency on both sides of the Atlantic that
Schadenfreude has long since been included in both the Oxford (1964:1125) and
Webster's (1957:2233) dictionaries as an acknowledgement that it is part of the
vocabulary ofthe living English language. Contemporary sensitivity towards the
presence of the humour ofSchadenfreude is to some extent reflected in the sense
of guilt at the base ofcurrent preoccupations with 'political correctness', and has
found humorous expression in literary works such as Gamer's topical Politically
correct bedtime stories (Garner, 1994).
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2.3.2 Incongruity theory
As in the case of superiority theory, the historical antecedents of present-day
incongruity theory also have their roots in the philosophical reflections of the
Ancient Greeks. In this respect, McCrone (1993:234) indicates that Aristotle
showed an awareness of the phenomenon of incongruity as an explanation of
humour. However, it was not until many centuries later that the theory of
incongruity was applied directly to humour by the Eighteen Century philosopher,
Immanuel Kant who wrote: 'Laughter is an affectation arising from the sudden
transformation of a strained expectation into a nothing' (McCrone, 1993:234).
Kant's conceptualisation of the humour of incongruity is remarkably enlightened
even by modem standards. The gist of his argument is that humour is created by
an incongruous twist in the tale, with the effect being achieved by the receiver's
surprise at the sudden descent ofthe expected course ofevents into insignificance
through a downward twist in expectations. The so-called 'humorous event' is
perceived as a sudden incongruity arising when mundane reality appears
transformed into the ridiculous, or when boosted expectations are revealed as
unfounded.
Murdock and Ganim (1993:57) cite the Nineteenth Century English essayist,
William Hazlitt who in 1819 described the incongruous as being 'the essence of
the laughable'. Hazlitt's insights into the nature of humour are also essentially
modem in their perspectives. A case in point is Hazlitt's essay 'On wit and
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humour' in which he states: 'Man is the only animal that laughs and weeps; for he
is the only animal that is struck with the difference between what things are, and
what they ought to be' (Murdock and Ganim, 1993:57).
Subsequent phylogenetic studies have indicated that monkeys and apes have their
own equivalents of laughing and weeping (McCrone, 1993:238 and section 2.1 of
this chapter). Nevertheless, the erroneous assumptions ofthe first part ofHazlitt,s
supposition can be temporarily set aside in order to consider the import of the
second halfofhis statement. Basically, Hazlitt succeeds in identifying the central
standpoint of the modem incongruity theory of humour that hinges upon the
effective juxtaposition of 'what is' with 'what should be' in the creation of a
situation in which the receiver is ' ... struck with the difference between what
things are, and what they ought to be'.
In another Nineteenth Century context, Leigh Hunt (1859, cf. Appendix B:4)
provides further evidence that the concept ofthe incongruity theory ofhumour is
by no means limited to contemporary humour theories, as follows:
'Wit consists in the arbitrary juxtaposition of dissimilar ideas for some lively
purpose of assimilation or contrast, generally of both' .
This statement presages the modem perception of the process of incongruity
humour as occurring when the juxtaposition of two or more potentially
incongruent elements leads to an inspirational 'aha' reaction as receiver of the
humorous input recognises the incongruous twist that runs counter to expectations.
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2.3.3 Relief theory
The relief theory of humour (also referred to as the 'tension-reduction theory')
provides a plausible explanation for certain kinds of laughter as being caused by
tension release. In this sense, laughter becomes a safety valve that releases pent-
up energies. This category ofhumour applies, for example, in Shakespeare's great
tragedies King Lear and Macbeth where the dramatic tension that is created is
leavened by the introduction of humour.
A classic example is provided by Shakespeare's use of the device of the humour
ofrelief as a natural bridge to heighten the intensity oftwo concomitant dramatic
scenes in Macbeth. The stark introduction ofthe noisy and rather comical porter-
gatekeeper at the opening of Act 2 Scene 3 of Macbeth provides a welcome
release of tension to an audience that is enabled to find relief in laughter
immediately after the intense drama of the preceding scene in which Macbeth
murders King Duncan. Shakespeare's introduction ofhumour at this juncture also
allows a pause ofrespite before the audience is taken into another highly charged
scene in which Macbeth and Lady Macbeth conspire to steel themselves to make
a plausible display of grief (Shakespeare, 1969:51). The introduction of the
humour ofrelief in the form ofthe buffoonery ofthe gatekeeper is a dramatic tour
de force that has not lost its effect over the centuries.
Unlike the cases of the so-called 'superiority' and 'incongruity' categories of
humour discussed above, there is little evidence of references in classical Greek
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philosophy that may be identified as harbingers ofthe contemporary relieftheory
of humour. Nevertheless, as can be seen in the comments concerning Macbeth,
there is evidence ofthe use of 'relief humour in literature, and there are also well
documented historical antecedents that give further meaning to the relief theory
of humour.
An excellent example is provided by Peter Burke (1997:61-75) who describes the
'disintegration' of traditional humour in Italy during the late Sixteenth Century.
This disintegrative process involved a reduction of comic domains, locales and
occasions to the extent that the nobility and clergy no longer participated in certain
kinds of humour. Burke' s description of the rise in popularity of the beffa (or
practical joke) in Italy between 1350 and 1750 indicates clearly thatthis so-called
'comic genre' served a number ofsociocultural purposes during times when social
taboos created much tension among the upper classes.
In this sense, Burke (1997:66) notes that the beffa was supposed to bring aesthetic
pleasure through the appeal of its ingenious trickery, but that the Schadenfreude
factor was brought to the fore by the fact that there was a victim. The presence of
aggression, cruelty and sadism created tension among victims as well as
spectators, and the constant element of revenge perpetuated the cyclic nature of
this tension. Burke (1997:67) notes that revenge (or bella vendetta) and cuckoldry
are' ... a source ofanxiety and so ofjoking', thereby endorsing the rationale ofthe
tension-reduction theory of humour. Burke's study provides an example of an
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eclectic perspective ofthe humour process as being an amalgam ofthe ingredients
of tension-reduction, superiority and incongruity.
The relatively widespread practice ofpractical joking to relieve tension caused by
sociocultural pressures is well documented. In his study ofhumour in the Tudor
and Stuart England of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Keith
Thomas (1977:77-81) reaches similar conclusions to Burke, and identifies
sociocultural areas from which laughter was excluded. In this respect, Thomas
refers to the existence of a 'cult ofdecorum' that cherished the values ofsobriety
and gravity. The period under review also saw the exit of the court jester, and
thereby the removal of a source of 'inversionary laughter' that had served as a
vicarious source of release of upper class tensions. Amidst this preoccupation
with decorum, there was also a reported increase in practical joking among the
upper classes, which Burke (1997:79) suggests served to release tensions. Other
sources, such as Samuel Pepys' diary of the decade between 1659 and 1669,
provide further evidence ofthe practical jokes relished by the English aristocracy
of the time (Bremmer and Roodenburg, 1997:7).
McCrone (1993 :235) describes the rationale of the tension-reduction theory of
humour in terms ofthe build-up ofa 'certain level ofnervous tension' because of
stresses and restraints, and of the need to discharge this energy in 'taboo-busting
humour'. In this respect, the rationale of the tension-reduction theory ofhumour
has obvious affinities with the ideas expressed by Sigmund Freud concerning the
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use of humour as a defence mechanism to discharge the tensions of the libido.
This aspect is dealt with more fully in the following section.
2.3.4 Psychoanalytic theory
Sigmund Freud (1960:52) expressed his views in his well-known treatise, Jokes
and their relation to the unconscious (1905), that provided a series ofcontroversial
interpretations of the 'real' meanings behind popular jokes thereby raising the
general ire of both the joking public and certain humour academics alike.
McCrone (1993:235), for example, refers to some ofthe Freudian interpretations
of popular humour as 'improbable', while Jacques LeGoff (1997:47) refers to
Freud's treatment of the subject ofhumour as 'poor'. In Freud's defence, it must
be acknowledged that the most vehement criticism has generally emanated from
non-psychologists who tend to ignore or misunderstand the main thrust ofFreud's
theories and consequently focus on one or other ofhis more dramatic examples,
generally drawn from his observations of patients he was treating by
psychoanalysis. It must also be acknowledged that along with the highly vocal
opposition he seems to have attracted, there is also wide support for the basic
principles of Freud's speculations concerning tension-reducing defence
mechanisms (ofwhich humour is a component) used by individuals to cope with
anxiety or to sublimate the psychic energies produced by their libidos.
Freud's early contributions to humour theory were considerable in spite ofthe fact
that he may have offended some cOnunentators with his speculative interpretations
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of examples of word association. Freud observed that the appreciation of a joke
signified 'the ability to master its constituent symbolic properties with their
multiple figurative and allegorical referents', and likened the humour process to
the solving of a problem through sudden discovery involving the reshuffling of
symbolic properties into a new relationship (Levine, 1968:2). Freud also
identified and analysed the familiar modern humour device known as double
entendre, and described it in terms of the joy of mastery as represented in the
pleasurable experience of grasping a second level of meaning. In this respect,
Freud drew attention to the relationship between humour and the universal human
attraction towards the enjoyment of exercising cognitive powers to solve
problems, decode mysteries and appreciate jokes.
Freud also analysed other cognitive humour devices such as incongruity,
nonsense, plays on words, and exaggeration; and argued that these were
characteristic ofprimitive modes ofchildhood thinking. He drew strong parallels
between humour and dreams, both of which were seen in terms of regression to
infantile forms of thinking and acting. Freud viewed this process in terms of'a
functionally adaptive mode of withdrawal from reality' into an imaginary world
(Levine, 1968:2). The Freudian interpretation of this process was as ' ... adaptive
ego functioning of the capacity to withdraw voluntarily from reality' in order to
pursue the pleasures of play, sport, literature and humour. On the other hand,
Freud noted that neurotic and psychotic subjects exhibited invpluntary
pathological symptoms of withdrawal in their attempts to cope with conflict and
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anxiety, and in this way lacked the element of control over adaptive ego
functioning in selecting appropriate times for their use of humour as a source of
tension release.
Further discussion of Freud's contribution to humour theory is provided in
Chapter Seven which focusses on the interpretation of a 'humorous event' by
means of reflective practice.
2.4 Concluding comment
A study ofthe foundations and fundamental principles of three traditionally popular
approaches to the etiology of humour has revealed that mirth derives from diverse
sources. These three popular schools of approach have been identified as
respectively involving theories of superiority, incongruity and tension-reduction;
however the complex nature ofthe variables involved indicates that in practice these
theories are probably not mutually exclusive. In this respect, parallels can be drawn
between Darnton's (1984:75-106) tale of 'The great cat massacre' in Eighteenth
Century France and Burke's (1997:61-75) discussion of the development of beffa
behaviour in Italy between 1350 and 1750. Both accounts offer grounds for
speculation that all three of the above-mentioned schools of approach played roles
in the evocation of the humour in question.
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In both Darnton's and Burke's analyses, the element ofvictimisation appears to be
central to the humour created within the confines ofan increasingly restrictive social
climate in which the norms of sobriety and decorum were emphasized by the upper
class. It would not be unreasonable to conjecture that circumstances were conducive
to the creation of humorous events based on incongruity. The underlying motive of
such behaviour could plausibly be attributed to tension-reduction amidst a repressive
environment, and the central element of victimisation may well have been the
conscious or unconscious expression of a deeply-felt need to experience a sense of
superiority in a situation removed from the norms of the individuals' oppressive
class-dominated milieu.
By way of a concluding observation to this chapter, it is appropriate to demonstrate
that the eclectic theme regarding the superiority, incongruity and relief theories of
humour may also be extended to communication theory and reception theory. In
considering the mechanisms relevant to the creation of circumstances that may be
considered favourable to the creation ofhumour, it may be hypothesized that humour
arises within a communication situation that involves activity on the part ofa sender
and receiver ofa message that is construed as a potentially humorous communication.
There are also times when the sender of the intended humour (such as the practical
joker) is also the receiver of the humour at the expense ofa victim who may regard
the event as the product ofcruelty or mean-spiritedness rather than humour. In such
cases, there may be other receivers of the intended humorous event who are
spectators rather than victims, and the practical joker may use the act of intended
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humour to seek the gratification of esteem from others in cases where there is an
audience present to appreciate (or fail to appreciate) the practical joke. In this
respect, reception theorists generally subscribe to the phenomenological perspective
that the phenomenon of humour is created in the mind of the receiver.
A briefhistorical overview has been presented in this section to provide insight into
the development of interpretations of the phenomena that have been conceptualized
as humour over a period ofapproximately three hundred years. Humour emerges as
a somewhat nebulous concept that has been used loosely as a label that has been
applied to a diverse range of behaviour associated with a variety of forms of levity,
including laughter, playfulness and practical joking. Given these historical
antecedents, there is little evidence to suggest the likelihood of universal consensus
being reached concerning a precise definition of humour, and it is this issue that






The brief survey conducted in Chapter Two of the historical antecedents of the
development of the generic concept that has been labelled as humour suggests that
there is no simplistic route to arriving at a universal definition ofhumour in terms of
either its mainsprings or its process. After due consideration of the task from a
variety ofstandpoints, there seems little option but to concur with the observation of
the Dutch anthropologist Henk Driessen (1997:222) that humour is ' ... an elusive and
difficult topic to explore'.
Nevertheless, while the topic ofhumour demands respect for its complexity, humour
is also a commonplace and integral. part of social behaviour that needs to be
addressed systematically. Accordingly, an important aim of this chapter is to look
at humour in terms of contemporary approaches to the understanding of human
behaviour. This undertaking involves a survey ofa range ofbehavioural perspectives
that have been espoused in varying degrees by the human studies research
community, as well as a discussion of the question ofthe potential effects that these
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so-called 'discourses' may have on current practice in human studies research
methodology. Particular attention is given to factors with the potential to influence
the output ofthose members ofthe human studies research community investigating
humour theory.
3.2 Identifying the ruling discourse
The term 'discourse' is used in two senses. Firstly, 'discourse' is used as a verb to
refer to the act of conversing or holding forth in speech or writing on a subject; and
secondly, 'discourse' is used as a name for a 'dissertation', treatise, or sermon'
(Concise Oxford dictionary of current English, 1964:342). It follows that the term
'ruling discourse' refers to a particular dissertation or perspective ofknowledge that
dominates other views in a particular field of study, usually to the extent that
perspectives that do not conform to the ruling discourse are labelled as 'alternative'.
Parallels that can be drawn in this regard are, for example, that of conventional
medical practice as opposed to so-called alternative medical practices such as
acupuncture, where there is a familiar pattern of a ruling discourse which achieves
formal recognition by majority consensus, while the alternative discourse is
marginalised to minority status. Of course, no aspersions are cast in this study on
either mainstream or alternative medical practice; the purpose is simply to clarify the
use of the term 'ruling discourse' in regard to fields of academic inquiry. The
example already alluded to in this study in both the Preface and Chapter One has
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been that of the mainstream 'human sciences' movement with its quantitative
research paradigms as opposed to the minority qualitative schools of research.
In respect ofthe concept ofthe ruling discourse, a few issues require clarification at
the outset ofthis chapter. The first is that although this study is entitled'a qualitative
study of ... ', it does not follow that I espouse the qualitative cause to the exclusion
ofall things quantitative. On the contrary, I am aware of the considerable merits of
the quantitative approach, and regard its predominance as being by virtue ofnatural
selection through popular appeal based on the promise oftangible results founded in
systematic principles. I also tend to support the broad view that ruling discourses
generally earn their status on Darwinian 'survival-of-the-fittest' grounds. However,
there are also times when popularity tends to promote prejudices against alternative
approaches that in many instances have more to offer in certain directions than the
mainstream perspectives can ever hope to, and it is some of these aberrations that
receive their deserved platform in parts of this study.
The concept ofa ruling discourse in a particular field ofknowledge is relevant from
the standpoint that it provides a clear indication of the way in which the essential
nature of the field of knowledge is conceptualised by the mainstream of academics
operating within the sociocultural context of the times. The idea of the existence of
a ruling discourse relates to the observation by Becvar and Becvar (1996:350-352)
that the concept of objectivity is relative in the sense that people are generally
members ofa society that punctuates their experience by encouraging a perspective
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of reality in terms of a Weltanschauung (or 'world view') that is a product of
prevailing sociocultural factors.
Irrespective of whether or not they simply philosophize in their armchairs or
experiment in their laboratories, few academics involved in human studies operate
in intellectual isolation. However idiosyncratic their personal ideological stances or
methodological approaches may be, human studies researchers tend to be aware that
they are members of a research community that corresponds with the concept that
Lancaster (1978) aptly refers to as an 'invisible college'.
The rampant technological progress of the Electronic Age has brought the invisible
college of the research community within the context of McLuhan's vision of a
'global village' through a global network of telecommunication links (McLuhan,
1962). The Internet has ensured that the 'real time' concept is now a reality, as
members ofthe invisible college and other interested parties from all over the world
have become electronically empowered to make immediate communication with
their peers. These telecommunicational advances have given new meaning to the
term 'distance education', and a new dimension to the concept of a research
community.
In this context, further attention needs to be given to the idea of a ruling discourse
that represents an expression of the dominant collective preoccupations of the
invisible college of a particular field of study. In this respect, the research
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community can in some ways be compared to a sort of extended global family in
which the prospective researcher is able to benefit from his study of the collective
body of knowledge of theory and practice pertaining to his field of interest, prior to
making a contribution to the communal enterprise.
The analogy ofthe research community and the family is interesting in the sense that
specialist research communities have similar characteristics to those of extended
families. For example, in the case ofthe researcher, dominant family values may be
conceived of in terms of being the dictum of the ruling discourse. Whereas some
family members continue to make a contribution within the auspices and protection
of the family enterprise, other family members may leave home to seek new and
independent pastures. In some cases, where for example the researcher sets out and
succeeds on his own and is considered a 'pioneer' in the field, the influence of the
invisible college (or extended family of fellow researchers) may seem to be limited.
However, the maverick theoretician is generally extremely sensitive to the nature of
the dominant theories ofthe ruling discourse. This tendency is endorsed by the fact
that the maverick theoretician's output is usually characterized as being an alternative
or reactionary response to the prevailing ruling discourse.
In this sense, the invisible college may be the setting for intergenerational conflict in
which the ruling discourse represents the establishment against which the researcher
expresses opposition by means ofa reactionary theoretical or methodological stance.
This occurs where, for example, the researcher's endeavours are by and large a solo
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effort based on the de-bunking ofa mainstream beliefor theory. In the context ofthis
study of humour theory, this sequence of events pertains in the classic example of
Michael Apter's reversal theory of humour which in fact stemmed from the
researcher's efforts to offer an alternative explanation for a traditional theory that he
had exposed as being invalid. Although Chapter Six is devoted to an in-depth study
of the reversal theory ofhumour, this particular aspect ofApter's approach receives
attention in this chapter because of its relevance in context.
Apter (1989:9-29) initially applied his own comparatively unknown reversal theory
ofmetamotivation to de-bunk Hebb's (1955) traditional optimal arousal theory that
had stood virtually unchallenged for over three decades and was very much part of
the establishment ruling discourse. The result was that in the tradition of the
principle of' survival ofthe fittest' , Apter's own position on the fringes ofthe ruling
discourse was improved as the gathering support of other members of the invisible
college of motivational studies propelled reversal theory into a more prominent
position. An indication of the fact that Apter has gathered around himself his own
invisible college of reversal theorists during the past decade may be obtained by a
perusal of the bibliography ofApter's own 1989 study as well as the bibliography of
this study which lists a host of supporting publications consulted in the course of
investigating the current status of reversal theory (cf. Chapter Six). Michael Apter
and his colleagues in the school of reversal theory represent a group of researchers
who are members of a research community or invisible college that technological
development has enabled to operate within an electronic communication setting.
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The individual researcher's perception of the ruling discourse that characterises the
global research community to which he or she belongs arises from personal
experience of the prevailing Zeitgeist within the field of interest. The researcher's
vision of this field is generally influenced by an awareness of prevailing
epistemological perspectives that are a dynamic manifestation ofthe Weltanschauung
(or 'world view') of the ruling discourse. In short, there is some sort of subjective
frame ofreference within which the researcher makes so-called'objective' academic
observations.
In considering this phenomenon, Churchman (1979:5) warns that to ignore the impact
of the social and intellectual environment is to court the disaster of the
'environmental fallacy' , and concludes that a more appropriate label for it may be the
'fallacy of ignoring the environment'. In the contemporary context, this
conceptualization of an academic or intellectual environment that is influenced by a
ruling discourse has fairly broad application. A pertinent example is the systems
approach which posits the theory that no problem can be solved simply on its own
basis because it is part of an interdependent global infrastructure. Accordingly, it
would probably be more accurate to argue that no problem is independent of a
framework of belief that defines it as a problem. In short, every problem has an
environment, to which it is inextricably bound.
The implications of this view are that human science cannot be entirely objective
because it is created within a subjective framework. It follows that the character and
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content ofthe so-called ruling discourse in any relevant field ofstudy constitutes the
sociocultural and intellectual environment of a topic under consideration, and an
understanding of the topic's environmental setting is necessary for those attempting
to understand the nature of the topic itself. In the present context, the consideration
in question is humour theory, and in the next section, attention is given to a
qualitative retrospective study of the evolution of sociocultural perspectives of
humour within a dynamic environmental context that has influenced the development
of the ruling discourse.
3.3 The ruling discourse in retrospect
The cultural history of humour was the theme of a recent international conference
held in Amsterdam in 1994 (Bremmer and Roodenborg, 1997). Various academics
presented a variety of papers within a multidisciplinary setting, and many of their
contributions discussed the nature of changes in sociocultural attitudes towards
humour as a function of the historical development of this concept. In order to gain
a fuller understanding ofthe origins and nature ofthe current state ofhumour theory,
attention is now given to a brief overview of the historical development of the
concept of humour with particular reference to the manner in which perceptions of
this concept were changed and modified over time in response to changes in the
character of the prevailing ruling discourse. A useful adjunct to this topic is
Appendix B which provides a selective collection of relevant definitions,
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etymological features and quotations on humour extracted from the Oxford English
dictionary, 2nd ed. on compact disc for IBM PC (1994).
The contributions to humour and humour theory by the Ancient Greek philosophers
were significant, and are discussed in Chapter Two which provides some information
concerning the nature of their specific contributions to the origins of contemporary
humour theories. In this context, the defining characteristic is that during times of
Antiquity, discourses concerning humour were dominated by philosophers and
theoreticians such as Aristotle, Theophrastus and Cicero (Bremmer, 1997:11-28;
Graf, 1997:33-34; Parker, 1996:306).
By contrast, the Middle Ages saw the emergence of monks and theologians as the
dominating figures ofthe invisible college. The legacy of theoretical discourses left
by the authoritative sources of this period suggests that the ruling discourse had an
inhibiting effect on the public development ofhumour in general. In this respect, the
graphic descriptions ofLeGoff(1997:40-53) aptly capture the tensions ofthe milieu
which he describes in terms of 'the battle between carnival and Lent' (LeGoff,
1997:52).
The Renaissance and Reformation brought further changes in the nature of the
authoritative sources associated with the ruling discourse, and these changes were
reflected in changes in the nature of the humour that characterises these eras. The
Renaissance is traditionally depicted as an era characterised by the re-birth of the
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human artistic and intellectual spirit. Creative writers, among them novelists such
as Rabelais and Cervantes as well as playwrights such as Shakespeare, emerged as
popular practitioners and producers of imaginative humour that appealed to wide
audiences. It became socially acceptable to attend performances ofcomedies, and to
indulge in ribald witticisms that would have been considered infra dig in earlier eras.
This was an era that left as a legacy the epithet 'Rabelaisian' that is currently used to
describe the humour of wild farcical excess and sometimes gross obscenity, and
stems from popular perceptions of 'The divine comedy', a fierce satire by Francois
Rabelais (1490-1553) directed chiefly against medieval Catholicism but superficially
viewed as an extravagantly humorous burlesque that has been aptly described as
'riotous' .
By almost complete contrast, the Reformation brought with it a renewed social
emphasis on morality founded on a reassessment of Christian principles. The
prevailing social climate of the middle and upper classes is probably most
appropriately encapsulated in Thomas' (1977: 17) use of the phrase 'the cult of
decorum'. This preoccupation with the need to be 'serious-minded' obviously
worked to the detriment of the public development of humour, although there is
documented evidence that humour thrived in less public contexts. In Chapter Two,
attention is directed towards certain reactionary Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century
practices within the Italian upper classes who presumably sought some form of
compensatory relief from the oppression of their humourless existence by releasing
their tensions in a predilection for malicious practical joking (Burke, 1997:66-67).
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The Refonnation initiated a longstanding tradition ofdidactic public refonners who
through the years have striven to reify the 'cult of decorum' in the publication of a
diversity of manuals of civility and good conduct. The popularization of pious
essayists such as Joseph Addison and Richard Steel in England during the Eighteenth
Century is an example of this ongoing tradition which still seems to promote the
interesting social attitude that humour is frivolous and therefore unhealthy, as
opposed to what I consider to be the more rational view that humour is liberating and
therefore healthy.
3.4 The ruling discourse in the Twentieth Century
In past eras the existence of relatively distinct sources ofpower and influence (such
as for example the church during the time of the Refonnation) made it easier to
recognize the identity and character of the ruling discourse. However, the greater
complexities of the contemporary milieu as well as the increasing emphasis on
individualism have forced epistemologists to reconsider their conceptualizations of
the idea ofa ruling discourse. The result is that the question ofthe existence ofa so-
called ruling discourse in the Twentieth Century has to be viewed within a dynamic
multidimensional sociocultural context in which the traditional order associated with
the social and intellectual class structure has changed In previous centuries, the
European class structure predominated with the upper classes, as custodians ofwealth
and education, also acting in the roles ofpatrons ofthe arts and religious institutions.
The European upper classes (in which I include both the aristocracy and the church)
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have left their historical legacy as paternalistic purveyors of culture, much in the
manner of benevolent dictators.
By contrast, the contemporary era of government by the people for the people has
been one of 'future shock' in which the social trends that were anticipated have been
supplanted by new and unexpected events (Toffler, 1970:3-4). The power of the
aristocracy and church have waned, and the democratization of education and the
campaign for universal literacy as a basic human right and tool of empowerment
(Freire, 1971) have coalesced in the rise of a 'meritocracy' (Young, 1958) that has
not only considerably narrowed the gap between town and gown, but also changed
the attitudes and perceptions of the people towards academic inquiry.
During the Twentieth Century, the individual and his role in society have become the
focus of attention in a post-industrial era appropriately typified by the popular
phrases 'the Me Generation' and 'the Electronic Age'. The concept of the ruling
discourse has to a large extent been applied within a more specialised frame of
reference than ever before. The Twentieth Century milieu presents a range of
scenarios that are much more varied than the scenarios that pertained in past eras
when the intellectual mainstream could be recognised in terms of sociocultural
emphases such as the Greek philosophers, the Renaissance literary artists, the
Reformation 'cult ofdecorum' and so on. The contemporary milieu has many more
areas of specialisation, each with a ruling discourse and its own gurus.
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When viewed from a traditional perspective, it appears that the various contemporary
ruling discourses have been largely dominated by the mainstream intelligentsia that
may have been physically ensconced in various academic ivory towers but who are
part ofinternational invisible colleges representing their field ofinterest on the World
Wide Web. In the context of the present study, the various humour theories current
in contemporary academics would be recognised as being central to
conceptualizations concerning a ruling discourse, and the absence of a dominant
theory complicates the matter somewhat.
Furthermore, there is also the issue of research methodology in the broader field of
human studies as well as the more specialized area of humour studies. In both
spheres, the current synergy between the quantitative and qualitative approaches
indicates a change in contemporary perspectives ofthe ruling discourse that hitherto
had been biassed towards the quantitative paradigms associated with the so-called
'scientific method'. In recent decades, tradition has been challenged by the swing of
the pendulum towards qualitative approaches, thereby putting matters into a healthy
state of flux as a wider spectrum of alternative methodological paradigms has
presented itself to the research community.
While it may be suggested that the current ruling discourse in humour theory is the
domain ofthe mainstream intelligentsia in tertiary institutions, there may be more to
this seemingly simplistic scenario than meets the eye. As mentioned above, the
Twentieth Century has been characterized by rapid change and the democratization
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of most aspects oflife; and in the context of humour theory, there is a need to look
at the possible impact on the ruling discouse that may have been brought about by
the combined forces of rapid change and the weight of popular opinion. In this
respect, we cannot ignore the possibility that the exponential growth of the mass
media entertainment industry has produced a Third Force at street level that may be
seen as promoting a populist ruling discourse in the field of humour itself, and
thereby impinging upon the status quo of the adjacent field of humour theory.
This is an interesting line of inquiry in which it may be conjectured that the idea of
'people's humour', like 'people's power', is a Twentieth Century phenomenon that
has been fed by contemporary social trends operating at a macro-level. The
respective effects of these so-called 'megatrends' (Naisbitt, 1984:2) are inseparable
and comprise the total effect of social climates affected by multidimensional post-
industrial forces such as the popularization of the concept of democratic
empowerment allied with the 'information explosion' and the concomitant force of
mass communication media that have brought relevant social issues into every family
living room.
The suggested possibility of a 'populist ruling discourse' in the field of humour is
relevant in the context of 'a qualitative study ofhumour theory' from the standpoint
that popular ideas about 'what is funny' may shed some light on theories concerning
the nature of humour. Section 3.5 (below) on 'popular humour' provides a
discussion of aspects of the considerable contemporary growth of the Twentieth
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Century First World 'humour industry' in the context of what can be referred to as
humour practice as contrasted with humour theory. This brief review ofthe current
status ofpopular ideas about humour serves as a precursor to a discussion ofhumour
theory in the context of academic research. Accordingly, section 3.6 (below) on
'contemporary humour studies' deals with humour theory as well as humour research
methodology in terms of the concept of a ruling discourse within the context of
academic inquiry.
3.5 Popular humour in the Twentieth Century
The Twentieth Century has witnessed the advent of a rampant technological
revolution that has provided extensive multi-media communication facilities to the
producers of humour. The humour business is no longer limited to authors and
actors, as it was during the times of Shakespeare and Dickens. It is now a humour
industry in which the various producers of humour are parts of a well-developed
infrastructure. Their tribe has increased, diversified and become integral parts of
production teams that directly influence the nature of the content emanating from a
wide range of mass media of communication.
Marshall McLuhan (1962) has characterised his conceptualization ofthe 'Electronic
Age' as being marked by a revolutionary social transformation from a print-based
mentality (which he terms 'the Gutenberg Galaxy') to that of an electronic 'global
village' in which the family sit before the flickering screen like urban cave dwellers
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and participate in the universal communication experience provided by the purveyors
oftelevision. McLuhan's perceptive perspective was attacked by the majority ofhis
contemporaries as being mere armchair speculation; and it must be acknowledged
that McLuhan's views are the products ofa reflective process that reveals his social
philosophy. The conclusions he drew were based on subjective observation and
eschewed the conventional empirical observances of the tenets of sampling and
systematic data collection, and no attention was given to the question of attaining a
balance in the distribution of sociological variables. In other words, McLuhan's
futuristic insights were the idiosyncratic outcomes of qualitative reflectivity, much
as are many of the insights of the present study. As such, these insights must be
addressed at face value.
In respect ofhumour, the implications of the concept ofthe global village cannot be
ignored. We are regularly informed by television publicists that various American
situation comedies, such as Seinfeld and Friends, are translated into umpteen
languages and shown in umpteen countries. Whether or not the accuracy of the
statistics in these promotional press releases is authentic or not, there is no doubt that
popular American television and movie humour is internationally distributed, and
has the potential to influence people on a vast scale. A small example of the
magnitude ofthis influence can be gleaned from the fact that WaIt Disney Studio's
full length motion picture, The Lion King appeared on the South African movie
circuit with complete Zulu dubbing during 1995. When the practical implications of
mounting this relatively minor venture are considered, some idea is obtained of the
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extent ofthe humour industry which in the latter case would have involved an entire
production team oftranslators, script writers, 'voice' actors and directors, as well as
audio production facilities and technical personnel.
There is no disputing the vastness of an international humour industry that is fed by
popular demand. There is however, some dispute over the issue of social
responsibility and the role of the entertainment industry as a potential shaper of
populist morality. The current focus of this issue has been largely upon questions of
morality and concepts of social or political correctness. Awareness of these issues
has been fuelled by public interest, and they have been the subjects of an ongoing
high-profile controversy that closely affects the lives of the vast international
audience of broadcast television. However, behind the bombast and posturing that
has characterised this public debate, there are grey areas that still require further
investigation. A key factor in this issue is the intrinsic nature ofthe communication
relationship between sender and receiver, as well as the extent to which this
relationship influences the character ofthe message. The crucial issue that still needs
to be addressed in spite of all this discussion is the extent to which the receiver is
influenced by the message.
Participants in the well-worn debate concerning the power of television usually
assume one of two conflicting standpoints. On the one hand, those in favour of
unrestricted television content emphasize the discriminatory powers ofthe receivers,
and generally argue that the television audience has the choice of either changing
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channels and watching something else, or turning off their sets and not watching at
all. On the other hand, those in favour of greater control over television content
generally ascend the moral high-ground in this issue on the basis of the unproven
assumption that the audience ofmass media will follow their electronic leaders like
sheep.
In spite ofthe mass ofwell-documented research that suggests that this controversial
issue is grey rather than black and white, a popular attitude persists that there is no
middle ground. Views have tended to become polarised between one camp who
liken television to ephemeral moving wallpaper that has no lasting impact, and
another camp who accept as fact that television moulds the morals of the masses.
This issue is one that needs to be addressed on an ongoing basis because there
appears to be no emphatic answer that will satisfy either or both camps.
Notwithstanding, the thorough academic attention given to this topic, the public
debate continues unabated. Some observers regard the mass dissemination ofpopular
television and/or movie humour designed for mass entertainment as being akin to
electronic circuses designed to amuse the proletariat. However once again, a
variation of the same question arises as to whether the content is media-driven or
simply a case of the humour industry giving the people what they want. If one
accepts the argument that the media moguls decide what the public should deem as
'funny', then the implication is that the content of the humour in media productions
is inevitably itselfa product ofa prevailing ruling discourse in the humour industry.
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Furthermore, if the rationale behind this scenario is accepted, then trends should be
discernible in the products of the humour industry that influence what people find
funny.
My own reflective impressions obtained from viewing popular American situation
comedies (such as Seinfeld, Frasier, Mad about you and The naked truth) shown on
South African television is that the content is generated by the acute observation and
adaptation of topics that become socially-acceptable targets of humour with which
members of the American public can readily identify. As such, programme content
reflects a form ofpopulist ruling discourse ofcurrent humour, and reflects prevailing
social mores, attitudes and belief systems. It is also obvious that a corporate
infrastructure harnesses ongoing market research and the feedback of viewership
ratings to test the waters ofthe American public's tastes in humour, and at times also
plays the role of' gatekeeper' by selectively exposing certain areas ofhumour to the
public.
In the final analysis, there is a possibility that the nature of the type of comedy
presented to the mass audience as a viable commercial entertainment product is
subject to trends that are influenced by some sort of invisible college or informal
ruling discourse that vicariously controls the character of the humour and the
conventions of its presentation. There is also a possibility that this informal ruling
discourse tackles issues of morality and sociopolitical correctness on a continuous
basis, and is strongly influenced in its corporate decision-making concerning humour
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content policy by close attention to feedback derived from ongoing monitoring ofthe
responses of those receiving the humorous messages.
Ultimately, such speculations remain in the realm of whimsy until tested, and this
areaofstudy has interesting research possibilities that have already beenrichly mined
by media researchers. This dynamic open-ended field of inquiry holds interest not
only for media researchers but also for social philosophers and futurists who like
John Naisbitt (1984:2) seek 'megatrends' in the informal ruling discourse. In this
respect, it seems fitting to conclude this section by citing a selection of megatrends
identified by Naisbitt (1984: 1-2) that are relevant in the present context:
'Although we continue to live in an industrial society, we have in fact changed
to an economy based on the creation and distribution of information.'
'No longer do we have the luxury ofoperating within an isolated, self-sufficient
national economic system; we must acknowledge that we are part of a global
economy.'
,... we have rediscovered the ability to act innovatively and to achieve results -
from the bottom up.'
'We are shifting from institutional help to more self-reliance in all aspects ofour
lives. '
'We are giving up our dependence on hierarchical structure in favour ofinformal
networks.'
'From a narrow ... society with a limited range of personal choices, we are
exploding into a free-wheeling multiple-option society.'
Naisbitt's speculative observations were coincidentally made in 1984, giving them
an ominous Orwellian nuance, and they appear to have held up very well into the late
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1990s when it is considered that rapid change seems to be one of the few constants
characterising the modem era. Naisbitt's prophetic megatrends (above) serve as an
interesting introduction to some of the views expressed in the following section
concerning megatrends influencing the ruling discourse in humour studies.
3.6 'Megatrends' influencing the ruling discourse in humour studies
The concept of a so-called ruling discourse in contemporary humour studies which
may represent the explication of the mainstream ideas of some form of invisible
college is a possibility, however in the present research climate there appears to be
no single dominating contender for this title. An appropriate starting point in
considering this question is to examine relevant sociological variables associated with
the concept of the ruling discourse. Although an interesting veil of uncertainty
presently enshrouds the precise nature of megatrends in various spheres, certain
factual evidence sheds some light on the situation. An example was provided in
section 3.5 ofthis chapter where it was mentioned that the rapid development ofmass
communication media, particularly· television, had provided a massive and
unprecedented boost to the humour production industry.
In this regard, there have also been changes in other areas of interest relevant to this
study. Alongside the exponential growth ofaudiovisual humour production in an era
of multi-media mass communication, there has also been a shift of focus in the
politics of academics that has modified perceptions of the concept of the ruling
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discourse. During the past fifty years, the rise ofthe so-called 'human sciences' have
brought psychologists and sociologists to the fore, and more attention than ever has
been directed towards aspects of human behaviour. One of the by-products ofthis
particular megatrend is the fact that in recent years much reflective discussion and
some quantitative research has been directed towards the question ofhumour and its
role in both the human psyche as well as in society at large.
The nature ofthe ruling discourse in a variety ofhuman studies disciplines has been
influenced by significant changes in social structures and social attitudes. As
mentioned above, one ofthe sociocultural features ofthe Twentieth Century has been
the movement towards a classless society with an increasing emphasis on
individualism and the democratization of educational and socioeconomic
opportunities. The Twentieth Century drive towards universal suffrage to provide a
platform for the voice of the people has been accompanied by a narrowing of the
social distance between the street and the ivory tower. Certainly since World War
II, universities have shed some of the traditional mystique with which they were
regarded by the lower classes, particularly as tertiary education has now been
democratized in many countries where previously it had been reserved for the upper
classes. Part of the democratization policy has been a widening of the scope of
intellectual pursuits, and it has become standard practice to study areas of human
behaviour (such as humour) which have not received their due attention in previous
eras.
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Another feature of democratization has been the rise of the meritocracy, which has
resulted in the status quo being challenged in many spheres of academics (Young,
1958). Positivism reached its zenith in behavioural studies during the 1950s and
1960s when it came to represent the 'Received View' (Suppe, 1977:116) of
establishment academics. Since the mid 1960s, certain academic reactionaries have
treated quantitative practice with less than customary reverence, with the result that
recent developments have given prominence to alternative paradigms in the current
epistemological debate in human studies. A variety of qualitative approaches,
typified by the recent popularity of trends towards hermeneutic and semiotic
orientations in qualitative practice, appear to be asserting their rights to stand
alongside the more established positivistic incumbents ofthe ruling discourse in the
research domain. These recent changes have had the effect of broadening the
horizons of the research community and have benefited fields of study such as
humour which does not lend itselfreadily to quantitative paradigms ofinvestigation.
From a practical standpoint, an indication ofthe nature ofthe ruling discourse in any
field of a particular era is generally provided by a review of the content of the
literature of that era. In recent decades, the phenomenon known as the Information
Explosion has made this practice increasingly complex because of the exponential
growth of the number of available sources on a vast range of topics. Fortunately
these difficulties have been offset to a large extent by the advent of automated
bibliographic control strategies that have provided researchers with the technological
wherewithal to access a far wider range of sources more swiftly than ever before.
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In the context of the present study, some idea of the nature of the so-called
Information Explosion can be gained by considering the extent of the exponential
growth of the mass of subject matter available on humour. Hence, for example, the
catalogue of the Schmulowitz Collection of Wit and Humor, contains details of
11,200 volumes in the English language for the period from 1961 to 1993 (Murdock
and Ganim, 1993:60). Likewise, the bibliographic indexes edited by the H.W.
Wilson Publishing Company listed 530 bibliographies on wit and humour that were
published between 1937 and 1993. An indication of the magnitude of the
'Information Explosion' is obtained when one considers that bibliographies are
exclusively devoted to providing lists of publications on specific topics, and that
there are sufficient bibliographies of publications on humour to warrant the
publication of a bibliography of humour bibliographies - in effect, a
metabibliography.
The above statistics were drawn from Murdock and Ganim's extensive 1993
descriptive survey of humour and creativity research which is discussed in detail in
Chapter Five. The bibliographic procedures ofthis survey are ofinunediate interest
in this context because they reveal the limitations ofcontemporary search strategies
designed for electronic media with keywords as access points. For example, one of
.the drawbacks of the literature review cited in Murdock and Ganim's study is that
the researchers do not record a distinction between 'humorous' publications and
theoretical humour publications. Another drawback, which appears to be the
conunon problem ofall attempts to bring together source materials about humour, is
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that not all humour is signposted in titles or abstracts. In this respect, personal
reading experience has led many to realise that some ofthe most memorable humour
in print occurs as part of a human drama or 'love story' or biographical work that is
not usually classified as a comedic work.
Likewise, some of the most significant insights in the field of humour theory derive
from sources that may not be classified as dealing exclusively with humour theory.
This study contains a number of appropriate examples such as the historian Robert
Damton's (1984) 'The great cat massacre' (cf. Chapter Two), the anthropologist
Henk Driessen's (1997) field work experiences in rural Andalusia (cf. Chapter Nine),
the psychologist Michael Apter's (1989) extensions of his reversal theory to
encompass the concept ofhumour (cf. Chapter Six), and social commentator Stephen
Potter's (1954) insightful comments on the significance of the oral ritual in
Westernized joke-telling (cf. Chapter Seven). The uncertainty concerning the
location of the sources of both humour theory and humour itself is unfortunate, and
as such presents opportunities for further descriptive research.
The content of the first three chapters of this study has provided a theoretical and
historical introduction to both the methodological debate in humour studies, as well
as the wide range of diversities that characterize the field of humour theory. There
is now a need to examine the question of applying quantitative and qualitative
perspectives directly to the study of humour and humour theory. In the following
chapter, consideration is given to the implications faced by researchers in applying
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the conventions ofcontemporary behavioural research to the task ofdefining humour




Humour as a subject for
contemporary research
4.1 Introduction: quantitative-qualitative synergy
The current debate concerning behavioural research methodology is an inevitable
product ofan intolerable situation. The source of this aggravation is the need felt by
researchers to make meaningful contributions in fields of human studies without
either their methods of inquiry or their breadth of vision being constricted by the
limitations imposed by their having to conform to the conventions of traditional
quantitative paradigms. In the first three sentences of her book on qualitative
research, Renata Tesch (1990:1) identifies the crux of the problem as follows:
'There was a time when most researchers believed that the only phenomena that
counted in the social sciences were those that could be measured. To make that
perfectly clear, they called any phenomenon they intended to study a 'variable',
indicating that the phenomenon could vary in size, length, amount or any other
quantity. Unfortunately, not many phenomena in the human world come naturally in
quantities' .
Tesch's introductory observations presage a situation that is symptomatic of the
ongoing synergy that exists between the respective standpoints of adherents of the
qualitative and quantitative research perspectives. As discussed in Chapter Three,
73
until relatively recently the locus of power of the so-called ruling discourse of
research methodology in human studies was heavily tilted towards positivism. This
ensured that until relatively recently non-quantitative approaches were viewed by
mainstream academia with an element of suspicion, and categorised under the
dubious label of 'unconventional methodology'. However, currently the politics of
research have veered somewhat from the extreme right, and a group of alternative
approaches collected under the label of 'qualitative research' has acquired enough
respectability to challenge the status of quantitative research as the sole
representatives ofthe ruling discourse. Presently, the two forces ofmethodological
orientation in human studies (namely, the qualitative and quantitative approaches)
exist in a healthy state of synergy which in effect represents the current state of the
ruling discourse, as discussed in Chapter Three.
The place of humour within this context is not entirely without ambiguity because
there are many appropriate avenues suited to quantitative humour research; however,
by and large, humour studies appear to offer more opportunities for qualitative
research because ofthe preponderance ofnarrative data. Although the present study
is explicitly 'a qualitative study of humour theory', the merits and demerits of the
quantitative approach need to be addressed in order to achieve a balanced
perspective. The purpose ofthis chapter is to examine this issue systematically from
the perspective of the prospective researcher seeking to evaluate the benefits that
traditional quantitative behavioural research has to offer in the study of humour
theory, while at the same time not losing sight of the value of the qualitative
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approach. From the standpoint of reflective practice, it is hoped that the views
expressed in this chapter will provide readers with the required transparency to enable
them to detect elements ofobserver bias in my attitudes towards quantitative studies.
The term 'traditional' is used with some reservation in reference to the contemporary
positivist research movement in human studies. When one considers that the heyday
ofSkinnerian behaviourism in the United States was the 1950s, then one realises that
this is a comparatively young tradition. Nevertheless, the term 'traditional' is
relative, particularly in a milieu that was characterised as being an era of 'future
shock' as long ago as 1970 (Toffler, 1970). For present purposes, humour research
may be viewed in the context of the so-called traditional conventions of
contemporary behavioural research which are outlined in numerous educational texts
including Kerlinger's classic Foundations of behavioural research (1973) which
describes the application of quantitative conventions within a variety of 'human
science' paradigms.
As a starting point, Kerlinger (1973 :28-29) distinguishes between concepts and
constructs, indicating that a concept '... expresses an abstraction formed by
generalizations from particulars' , and that a construct is characterised by the fact that
it has been constructed for use in human scientific research. An important
implication of this approach for humour researchers is that some means must be
found to 'concretize' humour as a quantifiable variable in order to subject it to
specific observation and measurement. Accordingly, it appears that the crux of this
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matter lies in the decisions that must be made before the qualitative concept of
humour can be transformed into a quantifiable construct.
A common problem that appears to beset virtually all the so-called 'human sciences'
is that quantitative research is dependent upon the formulation of satisfactory
definitions of relevant variables in order to apply the basic principles of
quantification. A primary consideration facing those attempting to effect the
transformation of humour as a concept into humour as a construct is the need to
define humour as a quantifiable variable. Kerlinger (1973 :29) indicates that certain
concepts such as 'intelligence' have received universal attention in this regard, and
that the construction of a variety of national and international standardized testing
procedures have been used on a worldwide scale in behavioural research. By contrast
with intelligence, humour is a concept that has been relatively neglected by human
scientists. Consequently, humour's status as an operational construct is less secure
than that of intelligence because the field of humour research is comparatively
undeveloped. The lack of universality in perceptions of the nature of humour has
resulted in there being no universally accepted 'humour tests', whereas by contrast
there are a variety of 'intelligence tests' that have achieved levels of acceptability.
4.2 Defining humour in the research tradition
Irrespective ofwhether humour is considered as a concept or a construct or both, the
process offormulating definitions of 'humour' has traditionally proceeded within the
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parameters of the conventions of the current ruling discourse, namely mainstream
behavioural research. In this regard, Torgerson (1958:2-5) makes the important
distinction between constitutive and operational definitions in behavioural research.
Constitutive definitions are those in which concepts or constructs are defined in terms
of other concepts or constructs; whereas in operational definitions, constructs are
assigned meaning by specifying the operations or activities necessary to manipulate
them. For the purposes ofshedding more light on the nature ofhumour, a discussion
follows focussing upon the application ofthe constitutive and operational approaches
to the task of defining humour.
4.2.1 Constitutive definitions of humour
Constitutive definitions ofhumour abound, and are principally represented by the
variety of lexical definitions provided by dictionaries. These attempts at
supplying alternative meanings for terms generally reflect the current usage of
words in the living language, and usually consist of the provision of lists ofother
words or synonyms that approximate in varying degrees to the meaning of the
word in question. Hence, for example, the Concise Oxford dictionary of current
English (1964:592) provides terms such as 'facetiousness', 'comicality' and
jocose imagination' to provide readers with a patchwork idea of the meaning of
humour in current English usage. Appendix B study provides extensive lexical
input concerning the definition, etymology and historical development ofhumour
and humour-related topics.
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While synonyms and related phrases often provide clues concerning the meaning
of the term in question, the constitutive approach has severe limitations for the
human scientist because calling something by another name often serves little
constructive purpose. At times, however, there are compensations. In the case of
humour for example, the use ofthe word as a verb to imply the act of 'indulging
or gratifying another's pleasure' (Concise Oxford dictionary of current English,
1964:592) provides readers with an indication of the empathetic quality that is
normally assigned to humour as a broad category in order to distinguish it from
the narrower more cerebral concept of wit. In this regard, literary critics and
lexicographers alike tend to conceptualize this distinction as being primarily a
difference between heart and head. As early as 1900, Hammerton (Appendix B:4)
is cited as saying in reference to the literary output of lM. Barrie: "There is more
'heart' in humour, and more 'head' in wit".
Descriptions such as Hammerton' s (above) provide a general sense ofmeaning but
fall short of precise denotation. Although largely unsatisfactory to human
scientists, constitutive definitions nevertheless generally serve to provide
descriptive starting points for further investigation. In this respect, the product of
formulating a constitutive definition of 'humour' is the identification of a range
of humour-related concepts. In the example mentioned above, the starting point
was that in contrast to the broader meaning attached to humour, 'wit' had a
specific denotation as being a more cerebral (and therefore a less sympathetic and
more detached) form of amusement based on intelligent word play. By contrast,
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humour is popularly conceptualized as a more versatile descriptive term that
presents a blander but more emotionally compelling view of human nature than
wit.
4.2.2 Operational definitions
Barrett (1995 :20) defines an operational definition as follows:
An operational definition ofa concept is a statement ofthe activities or operations
which are needed to measure that concept in practice (or, in the case of an
independent variable, a statement ofthe activities or operations which are needed
to manipulate that variable in practice).
In the case of humour, Barrett's requirement of 'a statement of activities or
operations which are needed to measure that concept in practice' is problematic.
Over the years a wide selection of behavioural events have been classified as
'humorous' because they arouse amusement, with the result that a great diversity
of types of acts of human communication have accumulated under the generic
term of 'humour'. These range from the sharpness of wit to the bluntness of
slapstick, and from the superficial flippancy ofbedroom farce to the sadly sublime
Shakespearean tragicomedy of, for example, King Lear. In this respect, the
doomed Lear's ramblings may evoke sympathetic smiles tinged with sadness
among those who experience the intrinsic humour of Shakespeare's perspective
of the bitter irony of human frailties.
There is a wide gulfbetween constitutive definitions and operational definitions.
The task ofcollecting synonyms and appropriately meaningful phrases is a far cry
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from converting concepts into quantifiable activities. The application ofthe basic
principles of operational definitions to 'humour' extend the study for greater
meaning beyond the familiar territory of description and towards the greater
complexities and controversy of process and etiology. Evidence of this gulf is
provided in the study ofMurdock and Ganim (1993 :57) whose analysis ofthirteen
operational definitions ofhumour and eleven theories ofhumour demonstrates the
complexities ofoperationalizing a concept that appears more suited to qualitative
description than empirical quantification. Chapter Five comprises a critique ofthe
Murdock and Ganim study as an example of a macro-level humour study.
Kerlinger (1973 :31) identifies two kinds of operational definitions, namely
measured and experimental. Measured operationalism involves finite
measurement, such as for example the measurement of achievement on a
standardised achievement test; whereas experimental operationalism involves
supplying details of operations of the investigator's manipulation of a variable
such as for example humour. In respect of measurement, humour falls into the
category that Kerlinger (1973 :32) describes as 'difficult', as follows:
'Sometimes measurement is easy, sometimes difficult. To measure sex or social
class is easy; to measure creativity, anxiety, or organizational effectiveness is
difficult' . (Kerlinger, 1973 :32)
Certain implications derive from the process ofapplying an operational definition
either to 'humour' as a general behavioural entity or to 'humorous events' as
separate units of the generic term 'humour'. Operational variables are by
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definition limited and specific in meaning, and this basic limitation inherent in the
composition ofthe operational definition militates against its ability to encompass,
let alone express, the entire meaning ofa complex, multidimensional variable such
as humour. In this regard, humour emerges as a nebulous concept that means
different things to different people.
Kerlinger (1973:32) once observed that 'The creativity studied by psychologists
is not the creativity studied by artists'. Ironically, the same may be said of
humour as a field of study in which, for example, psycholinguists may study the
humorous wordplay of different social classes, whereas artists and political
scientists may study the humorous characteristics of topical sociopolitical
newspaper cartoons. The latter example receives some attention in my article on
'Humour and the oral tradition: it's not the joke, it's the way you tell it' which is
reproduced in Appendix E. In the present context, it is appropriate to paraphrase
Kerlinger (1973 :22) in the observation that the humour studied by psycholinguists
is clearly not the humour in the political cartoons studied by artists and political
scientists.
Despite these obvious obstacles to the question of identifying and constructing
suitable operational variables in the field ofhumour research, all is not doom and
gloom for those attracted by the level ofcontrol offered by quantitative paradigms.
The limitations inherent in the nature ofoperational definitions inevitably tend to
direct contemporary researchers away from the imprecisions associated with the
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generalities of a single all-encompassing Olympian definition of 'humour', and
guide them instead towards the more limited scope but greater precision of
operationally defining the particular aspects of humour that are the focus of the
study being conducted.
Hence, for example, a researcher in the field of humour may decide to measure
viewer preferences for certain categories of television situation-comedies by
requiring subjects to rank in order of preference a selection of such programmes
shown on national television. This process may be further refined by applying
parameters in respect of the stipulated type of preference being recorded such as
for example: preferred family viewing, preferred comedic characters, and
preferred comedic themes. Operational variables concerning humour are the bread
and butter ofthe extensive market research conducted by media studies specialists
on an ongoing basis.
4.3 Humour and the current methodological debate
As has been discussed in Chapter One, the current methodological debate is grounded
in the argument that the positivist approach is severely limiting because quantitative
parameters are generally inappropriate yardsticks to apply to much ofthe' qualitative'
content that characterises human studies. In the context of this study, this argument
has relevance in respect of humour studies, however the benefits of empiricism
should not be thrown out like the proverbial baby with the bath-water. In fact,
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humour researchers of all persuasions need all the help they can get, including the
meaningful contributions oftheir quantitatively-orientated colleagues in the invisible
college.
In this respect, the example ofMichael Apter' s well-balanced body ofreversal theory
research is highly commendable (Apter, 1989). Irrespective ofwhether the reflective
critic takes issue with Apter' s research conclusions or not, few would take issue with
Apter's methodological zeal in attempting to give substance to his predominantly
qualitative stance by engaging in an extensive follow-up programme of empirical
testing of relevant operational variables. This matter receives fuller attention in
Chapter Six which comprises a critique of Apter's contributions to humour theory.
In the present context, the example of Apter' s ready incorporation of quantitative
methodology alongside his qualitative approach serves as an indication that the
discipline inherent in positivism has decided advantages in human studies. The
cumulative nature of information deriving from the quantitative approach offers
human studies researchers the opportunity to contribute to an ongoing dynamic body
of scientific knowledge and research in a specific field. However, there is a need to
-
be mindful of the concomitant disadvantages of this approach such as the danger of
extreme operationalism which, because it is so restrictive, tends to frustrate the
efforts of investigators in so-called'difficult' fields of human and social research,
including humour research. On the other hand, as Skinner (1953:586) affirms:
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'The operational attitude, in spite of its shortcomings, is a good thing in any science
but especially in psychology because of the presence there of a vast vocabulary of
ancient and nonscientific origin'.
In this respect, the presence of a vocabulary of 'ancient and nonscientific' terms in
humour studies is undeniable, and is an indication that Skinner's observation is not
limited exclusively to psychology. Consider, for example, the ongoing tendency
among journalists and newspaper critics towards the imprecise use of terms such as
black comedy, slapstick farce, adult satire, practical joke and nonsense verse.
Ironically, the term that is probably used most imprecisely ofall is 'sense ofhumour' ,
which does not augur well for those approaching the ticklish question of a humour
theory. One can only wonder at the potentiality for imprecision that awaits the
investigator who hopes to operationalize concepts such as 'black comedy' and' adult
satire', let alone distinguish clearly between them.
As discussed in Chapter One, the ongoing debate between the respective merits and
de-merits ofqualitative and quantitative research is presently probably best resolved
by accepting the best that both worlds have to offer. Twenty-five years ago,
Kerlinger (1973:34) envisaged the role of the behavioural scientist as operating
systematically in terms ofspecific objectives, as 'he shuttles back and forth between
the level of theory-constructs and the level of observation'. Contemporary
approaches do not deviate greatly from the scenario described by Kerlinger.
Breakwell (1995: 10), for example, defines a theory as a ' ...set ofpropositions which
posit the nature of the relationships between predefined constructs (or variables).'
Guttman (in Donald, 1995: 116), perhaps a trifle more enraptured by the language of
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empiricism, defines a theory as: ' ... an hypothesis of a correspondence between a
definitional system for a universe of observations and an aspect of the empirical
structure of those observations, together with a rationale for such an hypothesis'.
Guttman's statement emphasizes the need for an accurate formal definition of the
area being studied, and the integration of hypothesis and data analysis. The current
approach of results-orientated positivists is to achieve some measure of empiricism
even in areas not immediately amenable to accurate quantification, by as far as
possible operationally defining variables relevant to a hypothesized theory, and
thereafter estimating (as accurately as allowed) the relationships between these
variables. To their credit, many current positivists have shown laudable flexibility
as evidenced by the fact that the operative phrase is 'some measure' (above), which
may be vague but it is better than no measure at all.
This approach has clear implications for studies of particular 'humorous events', as
well as for more general studies of humour theory. For example, in respect of the
latter, the researcher is mainly concerned with systematically building up a
knowledge-base that gives greater meaning to variables that the researcher feels have
relevance to humour theory. In this respect, the example ofApter's research (cited
above in this chapter) deserves another briefmention. Apter's ongoing investigations
ofaspects pertaining to applications ofreversal theory involved follow-up studies to
test the validity and reliability of his earlier studies by means of a further series of
quantitative laboratory studies in conjunction with Svebak (1984;1985;1986; 1997).
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4.4 Applying methodological principles to humour research
Other attempts to marry qualitative studies with quantitative research methodology
have met with varying success. An interesting example is the ambitious descriptive
study of Murdock and Ganim (1993) in which the researchers evaluate humour
definitions and humour theories in the literature of creativity researchers. Murdock
and Ganim's study has been singled out for special further consideration in Chapter
Five as an example ofa macro-level humour study. For the present purposes ofthis
chapter, the Murdock and Ganim study provides appropriate examples of the
application of methodological principles to humour research.
In the course of Murdock and Ganim's study, methodological decisions were made
in order to examine the 'theoretical strengths' of individual theories of humour by
identifying their chief theoretical elements or characteristics (1993:62-66). Content
analysis revealed that certain common characteristics were prominent across a range
of different definitions of humour. These emphases were developed systematically
to a further stage of theorizing about humour.
Table 4.1 provides a concise record of the theoretical elements or characteristics
identified by Murdock and Ganim, and used as criteria in the researchers' descriptive
study ofhumour definitions and humour theories. The theoretical variables identified
in the Murdock and Ganim study (1993) and summarised in Table 4.1 form the basis
for the critical discussion which follows in sections 4.5 and 4.6 of this chapter. The
remainder of the present section is concerned with obtaining a balanced perspective
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of the Murdock and Ganim study by examining its parameters, and identifying a
range ofcontributions to humour theory that Murdock and Ganim omitted from their
study.
With reference to the five humour-related variables identified by Murdock and
Ganim and presented in Table 4.1, it is clear that humour research has not as yet
attained the level of development that has been achieved in spheres such as
'intelligence' research (as discussed in section 4.1 of this chapter). The humour-
related variables identified by Murdock and Ganirn in 1993 are by no means
representative ofthe consensus view ofthe humour research community, and should
be regarded as being open to ongoing adaptation and modification.









refers to human characteristics associated with humour,
for example, flexible, handles high stress, open attitude, imagination.
refers largely to behavioural characteristics associated with humour,
for example, release of tension, playfulness, spontaneity, incongruity.
refers to observable products from humorous events,
for example, comic strips, cartoons, plays, television situation comedies.
refers to products of humorous events that cannot be examined as
tangible entities,
for example, a comic performance, a humorous episode, a spontaneous
jest.
refers to the environmental influences that may affect humorous events,
for example, lack of rigidity, open environment, legitimacy to laugh.
(Adapted from Murdock and Ganim, 1993 : 63-64)
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In this respect, cognizance must be taken of the fact that Murdock and Ganim's
humour study limits its focus exclusively to theorists dealing specifically with the
relationship between humour and creativity. While this is an area of fundamental
interest to humour theorists in general, care must be taken not to overlook other areas
of concern, not only within the field of psychology itself, but also in other fields of
human studies such as sociology, anthropology, oral studies, communication and
education. The implication of this cautionary advice is that a more Olympian
perspective than that of Murdock and Ganim (1993) may have produced a different
selection of 'theoretical elements' than those that appear in Table 4.1.
Murdock and Ganim's narrow VISIon of humour exclusively in terms of its
relationship with creativity has obvious implications for humour researchers
concerned with achieving a broader view ofhumour theory. Although Murdock and
Ganim's 1993 macro-level survey has meritorious breadth for the study ofthe theme
'humour-as-creative-activity', there are omissions in the above-mentioned fields of
study that fall outside these parameters. Due consideration must be afforded to
contemporary humour theorists not singled out by Murdock and Ganim, including
psychologists such as Michael Apter (1989) and anthropologists such as Mary
Douglas (1975), Mahadev Apte (1985) and Christie Davies (1990). Accordingly,
Chapter Six is devoted to Apter's theory, while the anthropology theorists'
contributions are discussed in Chapter Nine. There is also a body ofrelated research
by communication theorists who have developed and adapted the early
conceptualizations of Harold Lasswell (1956), and have latterly been dominated by
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the ideas of the reception theorists. In this respect, my own article of 1989 serves as
an example of the approach of a reception theorist applying a structural
phenomenological approach to a communication process incorporating educational
technology (Gordon, 1989).
Since the publication ofMurdock and Ganim survey of 1993, there have been a range
of contributions to the growing body of knowledge about humour from a variety of
sources. Obviously, no criticism can be levelled at Murdock and Ganim in respect
of works published after their own, however none of the studies mentioned below
emphasizes the significance ofcreativity, and this would probably have ensured their
exclusion from the 1993 study anyway. The studies in question include those of
sociologists such as Henry Giroux (1994), anthropologists such as Henk Driessen
(1997), ethnographers such as Peter Burke (1997) and Salvatore Attardo' s Linguistic
theories ofhumour (1994). In section 4.5 ofthis chapter, further attention is directed
to the contributions of Apter as well as the reception theorists, all of whom were
omissions from the 1993 study of Murdock and Ganim.
4.5 Variables that affect the nature of humour
In the previous section, the limited parameters of Murdock and Ganim's study of
1993 were identified as factors responsible for the omission of a variety of
contributions to humour theory. On the other hand, the strength of Murdock and
Ganim's study is chiefly that it is a broad goal-directed attempt to identify and
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analyse a relatively wide range ofhumour theories on a comparative basis with the
ambitious objective ofbringing some epistemological order to this rather uncultivated
field of study. In this respect, good intentions are among the merits of this macro-
level study, and Table 4.1 provides a synopsis ofMurdock and Ganim' s identification
offive variables that affect the nature ofhumour. In this section, closer consideration
is given to these five variables and their relevance within the context of the present
study.
Ofthe five variables identified by Murdockand Ganim(1993:63), only 'process' and
'press' are what Kerlinger (1973:38) would term 'active variables' that can be
manipulated, whereas 'person' and product' are 'attribute variables' that are
constitutive in character. In the case of humour, 'press' is very much a subset of
'process' in the sense that it represents the human environment (including
psychological conditions and social climate) in which the process takes place.
For the purpose of this study, attention is directed towards three theoretical
characteristics, namely process, product and purpose. The discussion will comprise
a critical examination ofthe nature ofthese variables and their appropriateness to the
study of humour theory. Brief consideration will be given to the theoretical
implications ofthese variables and the extent to which they relate to humour theories
as well as theories that can be readily adapted to provide meaningful theoretical
perspectives ofhumour, such as Lasswell's classic metacommunication theory and
the contributions of reception theorists.
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4.5.1 The process of humour
The terms ofreference applying to the concept ofprocess in relation to humour are
unambiguous. Basically, 'the process of humour' refers to humour in action, and
process theories offer explanations ofhow humour takes place. In this regard, the
attention given to process by communication theorists and latterly by reception
theorists serves as a working example of a dynamic process definition that has
evolved in response to changing epistemological perspectives. Furthermore, this
area of study embraces a theoretical frame of reference that accommodates
structural phenomenological explanations of the humour process.
Accordingly, an appropriate starting point for a consideration of the process of
humour would be to view humour as a communication process that can be
described in terms of principles pertaining to communication theory. In this
regard, the humour process may be viewed in terms of the classic
metacommunication paradigm originally formulated by Harold Lasswell (Hatt,
1976: 17) and characterised by the question: 'Who says what, in which channel, to
whom, with what effect?' .
Figure 4.1 provides a graphic representation of the classic Lasswell
metacommunication model, as well as the adaptation of this model to form a
process model of a 'humour-in-action' event involving a joke-teller and an
audience. An explication of the practical implications of this process model will
be developed more fully in section 4.6 of this chapter.
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Lasswell's classic model has been criticised justifiably many times over the years
as an untenable oversimplification of the communication situation that is
misleading because it fails to take cognizance ofthe significance ofthe receiver in
the process. Emphasis in the classic metacommunication model tends to fall on
the sender who in this case is the 'joke-teller'. Reception theorists argue
convincingly that the contrary pertains with the receiver as protagonist because an
appropriate stimulus is all that is required for a humorous event to take place.
While this criticism is particularly relevant in the case of humour studies,
nevertheless Lasswell's model (imperfect though it may be) serves present
purposes because it provides a basic example of the application of humour within
the parameters of a generalised metacommunication model
In this respect, the importance of reception in the humour process must be
underlined. In many if not most cases, the receiver is the prime mover in the
humorous communication process. In its most obvious form, this may occur when,
for example, the receiver witnesses the sender unwittingly doing or saying
something whilst unaware ofbeing observed. In such cases, the process ofhumour
hinges on the reception dynamics ofa process in which the unintended humour of
the sender is perceived as being humorous only by the receiver. In this situation
the sender is an unwitting catalyst, whilst the receiver is a proactive initiator who
gives substance to the humorous experience.
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.In the present context, it is worth noting that the widespread acceptance ofthe case
for reception dynamics is also the death knell of simplistic unidimensional
definitions of humour such as that of Bremmer and Roodenburg (1997: 1) who
define humour as 'any message ... intended to produce a smile or laugh', thereby
ignoring the dynamics of the humour process entirely. By contrast, the more
unwieldy character of other more multidimensional definitions, such as the one
formulated by Michael Apter (1989:139-149) as part of his reversal theory of
humour, can usually be attributed to their meticulous treatment of process as the
central feature of their conceptualizations of humour. (As mentioned above,
Apter's reversal theory of humour receives in-depth attention in Chapter Six.)
Other examples ofcategories ofhumour definitions in which the process variable
plays a pivotal role include incongruity theory, configurational theory and
release/relieftheory. These theories are discussed more fully in Chapter Two and
Chapter Six. For present purposes, the above example of the adaptation of the
classic Lasswell metacommunication model to provide a metacommunication
perspective of the humour process serves as a rudimentary illustration of the
centrality ofprocess to the epistemological stance ofstructural phenomenologists.
In this context, it should be noted that I too am partial to the perspective offered
by structural phenomenology, and consider 'process' to be the main course ofany
well-digested definition.
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Figure 4.1 Lasswell's classic metacommunication model and its application in
the telling of a joke
(1) GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LASSWELL'S MODEL
FEEDBACK
(2) APPLICATION OF LASSWELL'S MODEL
JOKE TELLERIIII~ IIII~ VOICE + GESTURE 1I11~ 111"- THE JOKE IIII~ 1I11~ AUDIENCE
t f
LAUGHTER
4.5.2 The products of humour
The variable termed 'the products of humour' is the cause of some controversy,
mainly because ofa basic flaw in the Murdock and Ganim study of 1993. In their
extensive descriptive study ofhumour definitions, Murdock and Ganim (1993 :62)
inadvertently conceptualize the 'products' of hum<;>ur as being the tangible
artefacts (such as the cartoon) and intangible humorous aspects (such as the
buffoonery of the clown's performance) that are part ofthe humour process. The
aspects that Murdock and Ganim have erroneously called 'products' ofthe process
are in fact elements that are integral to the humour process itself.
This misconception can be traced directly to the researchers' misconceived
interpretation of the process of humour in terms of the intentions of the sender,
and the fact that the logical extension of this line of reasoning is that if humour
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originates with the sender then its products are the jokes told.. or the cartoons
drawn. This is an example of the pitfalls of developing a process theory on the
basis of ill-conceived premises. The basic principle is that products derive from
process and are not part of it, and the so-called 'products' identified by Murdock
and Ganim are in fact elements that are essentially part of the humour process
rather than its products.
From the perspective ofthe resent study, the so-called 'products ofhumour' refer
---- --------
to the evs>yatiQD_ofexperi.enc_ejIl~~g.ctiq!!J.oJhe humour in process. The outcomes----_-.-....... - --~_..~-._~
of humour may vary from laughter to a momentary smile or glint in the eye, and
are usually recorded in terms of what human scientists refer to as 'response
behaviour' because they represent those actions brought about by the receiver's
exposure to a relevant variable, namely: the process ofhumour. In this case, the
independent variable is the process of humour, whereas the dependent variable
and presumed effect is the laughter or smile that is a product of the process. The
process is also open-ended and potentially ongoing in the sense that the laughter
that is a product in the process may also become incorporated into the cyclic
process by acting as feedback that influences the ongoing nature of the humour
process. Hence, a sender of humour may be encouraged by the receiver's
laughter, and on this basis may decide to prolong the humour process.
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4.5.3 The purpose of humour
While the 'purpose' of humour is generally not mentioned explicitly in most
concise definitions of humour, paradoxically it is also the central aspect of
Bremmer and Roodenburg's inadequate definition (discussed in section 4.5.1 of
this chapter). A consideration of 'purpose' has significance in this context as it
is sometimes a factor that drives process. However, 'purpose' is not simply a case
of the bringing to fruition of an intention 'to produce a smile or laugh' as
Bremmer and Roodenburg (1993: 1) would have us believe.. The characteristic of
'purpose' in humour refers partially to the intentions of the initiator of the
humorous event, but in terms ofJeception the~:Vit_I'l1ay also refer to the quality
that is ascribed to the experience of the event by the receiver.
As humour is often spontaneously or unwittingly evoked through the perception
of a stimulus that amuses the receiver, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a
'purpose' in humour. Humour often has a surprise element and laughter
sometimes comes after a momentary shock. Hence, often the attribution of a
cause-effect relationship to the humour process is ex-post facto. In such cases,
'purpose' is identified retrospectively, and the p~o_~e~_~. Qf a1tri1mJing cause to
humorous effect is by no me<l.ps.<l.lWays valid or reliable.
For example, the same episode ofhumour may be rationalised quite arbitrarily by
the person who experienced it as being either a tension-reducing experience or
alternatively a creatively-rewarding experience, depending on the person's
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personal disposition at the time of making the attribution. There are times when
the purpose of the humorous event in question is the overt reason for the event,
and the purpose is the variable that distinguishes it from other events. An example
of this would be that of an audience paying admission to hear a comedian tell
jokes. In other cases, the 'purpose' may be arbitrary and the humour may occur
spontaneously by chance or serendipity, such as, for example, when a person
misinterprets a question and gives a 'silly' reply that others present find amusing.
4.6 Humour-ill-action : a qualitative approach
As a concluding section to this chapter on the issue of applying research procedures
to humour studies, I feel it fitting in the context of 'a qualitative study of humour
theory' to engage in a relatively brief qualitative exercise in reflective practice in
order to shed more light on aspects discussed in this chapter. The result is basically
a concise reflective interpretation of two scenarios drawn from my own experience.
The main focus of attention of this reflective analysis is an examination of the
humour process in terms of the five humour variables identified by Murdock and
Ganim (1993), with due consideration to the implications that metacommunication
reception theories hold for the respective humour processes involved. On a more
general level, these two brief examples of so-called 'humorous events' or 'humour-
in-action' serve to clarify some ofthe practicalities ofthe process oftheorizing about
humour.
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The examples can be summarised as follows:
Example 1: A comedian in a place of entertainment tells a joke to an audience
who laugh uproariously in response.
Example 2: A new boss conducting his first formal meeting with office staff,
commences the meeting with a short, mildly self-deprecating joke in
order to break the ice. The response is largely one ofpolite laughter.
The two examples provided are in fact reconstructed from situations that I
personally consider as commonplace because I have experienced them on many
occasions as both a sender and receiver of the 'humorous events' in question.
Like many others before me, I have been on occasions an audience member and
a master-of-ceremonies in the situation in Example 1, as well as both the 'new
boss' and the polite employee in the situation in Example 2.
The common denominator of the scenarios in both examples is that they involve
the presentation of a funny story by a significant sender to a group of receivers.
In both examples, the purpose of the process of humour is to produce a laugh or
smile through the use of what Murdock and Ganim (1993 :62) termed an
'intangible product' which these researchers interpret as the oral performance of
a joke. The 'press' or environmental conditions pertaining to each of these
humorous events is different and has a significant effect on the reception dynamics
of the humour process.
The scenarios described in these examples can be further discussed in terms ofthe
humour variables discussed in more detail in section 4.5 of this chapter, namely
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the process, the product, the press and the purpose. In the first instance, the
process is the lifeblood of the humour, and the 'process' should explain how and
why people respond to a joke with laughter. Murdock and Ganim's
misinterpretation of the joke-telling or oral performance of the humour as the
'product' ofthe process has been disputed in section 4.5 ofthis chapter.
I regard the oral performance as an integral part of the process model of the
'humorous event' , and not as a 'product' of it. Oral performance is the medium
of the message that links the sender and receiver, and as such represents the
process. Laughter is the product of the humour process, and is in fact often the
feedback that informs the sender of the effect that the potentially humorous
communication exchange has been consummated. Laughter may also serve to
either prolong or regenerate the humour process when it acts as positive
reinforcement to the sender and receiver of the communication. Conversely,
laughter that is considered inappropriate may terminate or modify the humour
process by acting as a source of negative reinforcement.
From the standpoints ofthe respective examples cited above, the actual 'products'
of the processes or laughter deriving from the above examples varies greatly in
quality. The 'uproarious' laughter in the place of entertainment of Example I
differs significantly on a qualitative level from the 'polite' laughter in the
boardroom of Example 2. In this respect, the process of reflective analysis in
considering the qualitative similarities and differences between the examples
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involves a strong measure of empathy with the respective senders and receivers
in the examples.
Although the nature of reflectivity is essentially idiosyncratic in character, there
are certain aspects of the interpretations that are more or less universal. An
example would be the consensus view that the emotions expressed as laughter in
the respective examples are clearly different. There would probably also b~ a
consensus view that it would be pointless to attempt to 'quantify' the laughter
produced in the episodes for comparative purposes even if it were possible, as one
may measure, for example, the volume of audience applause on a comparative
basis for contestants in a talent contest. In the case of the two examples cited, my
own view is that the two laughter responses share little in common other than
their tangible behavioural descriptions as 'laughter', and that comparing them is
like comparing apples with oranges.
Ifthe examples are analysed in terms ofthe humour variables discussed in section
4.5 of this chapter, certain insights into the nature of the respective scenarios are
forthcoming. In the first instance, the 'press' (or environmental climate) differs
in the respective scenarios, in the sense that both situations invoke sets ofcultural
expectations that are popularly referred to as 'contextualization'. For example,
unlike the boardroom, the place of entertainment is a context that has relatively
few inhibiting factors that may prevent open displays of mirth on the part of the
audience, and one can deduce that any tendencies by spectators towards unbridled
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laughter are encouraged by the fact that a comedian is performing as part of an
entertainment situation that presents the audience with explicit expectations. By
contrast, the boardroom is a context that may have built-in inhibitory factors.
Generally, official staff meetings are expected to be marked by decorum and
civility, and there is little anticipation of the occurrence of events that may be
characterised as 'uproariously humorous', as one may expect in a place of comic
entertainment.
Furthermore, the 'purposes' behind the 'humorous events' in the two examples are
entirely different. In the case ofthe comedian, the purpose is very clear. It is the
comedian's job to make people laugh; and ifhe doesn't, he feels unsuccessful. On
the other hand, it is the audience's right and usually desire to laugh whenever they
feel like it. It can also be reasonably assumed that most of the audience have
built-in expectations of laughter because the reason for their attendance is
probably their anticipation of being amused by the comedian.
By contrast, the scenario of the second 'joke-telling' example is complicated
somewhat by the possibilities of the reception dynamics involved. On the one
hand, the 'new boss' has a relatively straight-forward purpose in telling the joke.
He wants to motivate the staffby presenting himselfpositively. By telling a self-
deprecating joke, he is actually saying some or all of the following: that he is
human; that he has made mistakes and still became boss; that he doesn't mind
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being informal ifthe occasion demands; and that he extends the hand offriendship
to his staff.
On the other hand, the staffs 'purpose' in responding with laughter is perhaps a
little more complex. Numerous factors present themselves. For example, there
may be many members of staff in contrast to the single boss who told the joke,
and the question of peer pressure may come into play. In cases where there may
be no collective drive towards conformity, it is even possible that each staff
member may have a different 'purpose' in laughing. The 'purposes' behind the
receivers' responses to the intended humour probably vary among the following:
they are polite to the boss; they did not really' catch' the joke but laugh along with
the crowd like sheep; they are showing the boss they like him; they are relieving
tension by just laughing out loudly because it seems to be acceptable to do so;
they are playing the 'corporate game' and flattering the 'new boss' by their
laughter. Individual differences abound, and some may have actually thought that
the joke was amusing!
The use ofreflective practice at this juncture in the present study has served a few
purposes, not the least being as an entree to its further use in later chapters of this
text. The qualitative methodological approach of 'critical reflection' (Killen,
1996:1) is further utilized in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight, however its use in
the present context provides a briefintroductory example ofa qualitative approach
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that reveals both its own idiosyncratic limitations as well as the limitations of
relying on an exclusively quantitative perspective.
'Critical reflection' permits a level of analysis that underlines the importance of
the mulitdimensional nature ofhumour depicted as an act ofcommunication in the
two examples (above). Reflectivity enables the investigator to digest the
realization that the scenarios of both examples viewed in juxtaposition illustrate
that humour is a more complex behavioural phenomenon when experienced
directly on a primary level in practice than it may appear to be in impressions
gained from armchair theoretical discussions on an indirect secondary level. The
nature of the two relatively straight forward examples (above) also heightens
awareness ofthe differences that obtain between responses to print-based humour
and responses towards oral performances of humour in a variety of contexts.
Another benefit ofconsidering contrasting practical examples of these types was
that it became apparent that the vital role of orality in the process of humour
required further investigation. This is forthcoming in Chapter Eight which deals
specifically with the question of orality and the oral tradition in relation to the
performance of humour. In Chapter Eight, the scenarios in the two examples
provided in the present chapter are developed in more detail as case studies that
are subjected to further qualitative analysis, against the background ofan eclectic
perspective of a diversity of humour theories. The reasons for this procedure of
separating the two considerations are both practical and logistical. At the present
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stage, for example, the presentation and analysis of a few meaningful examples
of everyday humour-in-action was considered necessary in order to give a
practical perspective to the theoretical discussions that have predominated. At the
same time, a fuller discussion was precluded by the fact that the basic frames of
reference for further theoretical analysis had as yet not been established in this
study.
For this reason, the focus in the intervening Chapters Five to Seven falls upon
establishing a more comprehensive knowledge-base to permit the possible
assimilation ofan eclectic theoretical perspective. Chapter Five deals with a broad
descriptive study that encompasses a comprehensive overview ofhumour theories
in general, whereas Chapter Six deals specifically with the status a significant
single theory within the context of humour theory in general. Chapter Seven
presents a specific example ofmy own use ofreflective practice to systematically
analyse a personal experience of humour, as well as provide a broad perspective
of a range of theoretical and methodological issues in humour studies. In this
way, the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters of this study act as a bridge from the
initial humour-in-action examples of the present chapter to the more in-depth
explication of an expanded view of these phenomena in Chapter Eight. In other
words, the more advanced level of the theoretical discussion attained in Chapter
Eight would not have been appropriate in the present chapter because the




Murdock and Ganim's descriptive study
5.1 Introductory comment
A comprehensive descriptive study of definitions of humour and theories of humour
falls outside the parameters of this study. This substantial task was undertaken by
descriptive researchers such as Treadwell (1967) and Goldstein and McGhee (1972)
some twenty-five to thirty years ago in the era before the Information Explosion had
provided automated databases such as PsychLit and SocioFile with the capabilities of
delivering exhaustive bibliographies on demand.
In 1972, Goldstein and McGhee were able to produce an annotated bibliography of
published papers on humour in research literature from 1900 to August 1971. At the
time of writing of this text, an undertaking of this nature would be of considerably
greater scope than that of the early 1970s because it not only involves the print
materials traditionally associated with bibliographies, but also audiovisual materials
emanating from the 'media explosion' that has accompanied the Information Explosion
(Gordon, 1989:412). The principle advantage, however, ofconducting a survey ofthis
magnitude during the so-called 'Electronic Age' (McLuhan, 1975) is the availability
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of a range of highly refined automated search strategies that provide ready
bibliographic access to a vast reservoir of sources.
As a consequence ofbeing confronted by this vast and exponentially increasing stock-
pile of information on a proliferation of topics and in a variety of media formats,
contemporary descriptive researchers in the human sciences tend to lower their sights
from the field of macro-analysis, and concentrate instead on specific areas ofconcern
within their already highly specialized fields. In the present chapter, consideration is
given to the contribution made by Mary Murdock and Ruth Ganim whose collaborative
descriptive study of the relationship between humour and creativity has relevance to
this study because it serves to bring some measure of epistemological focus to the
rather nebulous development of the body of knowledge about the phenomenon
identified as humour (Murdock and Ganim, 1993:57-70). The work of Murdock and
Ganim has been mentioned in specific contexts in preceding chapters of this study in
the course of discussing definitions, theories and the methodology used in humour
research. Special consideration is given to the Murdock and Ganim study in this
chapter principally because it is a rare example of evaluative humour research that
mixes qualitative planning with quantitative methodology, and in its stated aims
reaches towards the level of macro-analysis.
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5.2 Murdock and Ganim's descriptive analysis: aims and scope of the
researchers
Probably the most notable feature of the Murdock and Ganim study (1993) is the
breadth of its compass. A literature search reveals that it is probably the nearest
contemporary equivalent ofa descriptive macro-analysis currently available in the field
of humour research. In fact, one of Murdock and Ganim's stated objectives for
conducting this descriptive study was that the researchers considered it to be: 'a
baseline effort to sort humour definitions and theories for future research' (Murdock
and Ganim, 1993:57).
A study of this magnitude involved a fairly exhaustive level of categorization and
selection procedures to systematize the descriptive process. Accordingly, thirteen
definitions ofhumour and eleven theories ofhumour were identified from the body of
knowledge derived from the creativity-related research community. These definitions
and theories were then subjected to analysis, and the resulting findings were
systematized for the benefit offurther consideration by theorists and researchers in the
fields of creativity and humour.
In reviewing the literature in the field, Murdock and Ganim observed that the
relationship between humour and creativity had received attention from a number of
prominent researchers in the field of creativity, including Maslow (1954), Koestler
(1964) and Amabile (1987). Murdock and Ganim found that although there was a great
diversity in the respective foci of the research of these creativity researchers, the
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general consensus viewpoint was that humour was a form of creative expression.
Based on their findings that the expression and manifestation of humour was a
particular aspect of the more generalised process of creativity, Murdock and Ganim
(1993 :66) concluded that humour ' ... seemed to be sufficiently integrated to be
considered a subset of creativity'. They also suggest that this conclusion provides a
satisfactory basis for the productive study ofboth humour and creativity within similar
conceptual frameworks.
At the outset, issue must be taken with Murdock and Ganim because of the
questionable nature of the conclusion they have drawn in respect of the relationship
between humour and creativity. While this conclusion may have a measure ofvalidity
within the particular context of the content of the literature cited in Murdock and
Ganim's descriptive study, one must bear in mind that the study dealt exclusively with
literature on creativity. The result is that in effect the researchers' conclusion that
humour is a subset of creativity emerges as something of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Certainly it would be too great a leap ofextrapolation to apply this conclusion beyond
the designated parameters of Murdoch and Ganim's self-limiting study. In other
words, the conclusions of the Murdock and Ganim study do not apply to humour
studies that were not founded in creativity research.
Notwithstanding the fact that further reservations concerning the Murdock and Ganim
study are expressed in this chapter, it should be acknowledged that there is also no
questioning the merits or the general relevance of this study. Whatever critical views
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may be expressed on Murdock and Ganim's interpretation of their findings, there is
considerable merit in their ambitious efforts to present an in-depth descriptive study
that strives towards comprehensiveness and is grounded in sound methodological
procedures that provide insight into techniques of analysing descriptive data through
content analysis involving a variety ofqualitative evaluation methods and the technique
of constant comparison.
The methodological procedures used by Murdock and Ganim are representative of a
conventional descriptive paradigm for the human sciences in general, and have
relevance for researchers in the field of humour. The salient features of this
methodological approach and can be synthesized as follows:
Step 1: Collection and review of major theoretical and applied literature on
creativity and humour through a traditional literature review and use
of current media-organizing technology;
Step 2: Establishing criteria for the selection of researchers who combined
creativity and humour;
Step 3: Identification of key concepts in theories and definitions,
developmental parallels and previously categorized data;
Step 4: Analysis of the relationship among these key concepts by examining
the similarities and differences between them;
Step 5: Organization, coding and categorization ofsimilarities and differences,
and the identification of descriptive themes;
Step 6: Synthesizing ofkey data in the content domains ofboth creativity and
humour.
(Adapted from Murdock and Ganim, 1993:59)
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In the course of implementing these methodological procedures, the researchers
consulted a variety ofdatabases (for example, PsychLit) and bibliographies, and list
the following as their most pertinent sources:
• 1937 to present - Bibliographic indexes edited by the H.W. Wilson Publishing
Co. There were approximately 530 entries of bibliographies on wit and
humor in this resource.
• 1961 to present - Catalog ofthe Schmulowitz Collection ofWit and Humor:
this collection contained 11,200 volumes and published in 33 languages.
• 1967 - Treadwell compiled an annotated bibliography of empirical studies of
wit and humour.
• 1972 - Goldstein and McGhee developed an annotated bibliography of
published papers on humour in the research literature from 1900 to August
1971.
5.3 A macro-analysis of humour definitions
In implementing a course of action to accomplish their research objective of
comparing and categorizing selected definitions of humour, Murdock and Ganim
selected four areas of integration as the basis for examining similarities and
differences between definitions. The sorting framework was based on Rhodes'
(1961) integrated creativity framework of 'person', 'process', 'product' and 'press'.
The results for the thirteen key definitions of humour selected for second level








































































Van Gundy a comic, a catalyst release of tension open and
free
environment
(Adapted from Murdock and Ganim, 1993:62-68)
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It should be noted that the variables labelled as 'person', 'process', 'product' and
'press' are discussed in some detail in Chapter Four because they are representative
ofmainstream contemporary perspectives ofthe theoretical elements ofhumour and
relate to the task of defming humour. These variables are also used as the basis for
the analysis of the two examples of 'humour-in-action' presented in Chapter Four.
In this context, repetition will be avoided, although it should be noted that criticism
was levelled at the Murdock and Ganim study in Chapter Four for confusing
'product' with 'process', and the observation was made that this confusion was the
product of a restricted perspective of the concept of humour.
At this juncture, it would also be relevant to comment on the Murdock and Ganim's
ill-considered use of 'it theoretical framework suggested by Rhodes (1961) some
thirty-two years before Murdock and Ganim's research was published. Considering
the magnitude of Murdock and Ganim's research undertaking, it would have been
advisable to modify Rhodes' somewhat dated conceptualizations to meet
contemporary requirements. For example, if Murdock and Ganim saw fit to
dichotomize the 'product' variables into 'tangible' and 'intangible' categories that
were barely used in their analysis, then surely they should have seen fit to refine their
descriptive base for the 'process' variable to accommodate a wider range ofprocess
interpretations applied in contemporary perspectives of humour theory. The result
of utilizing too wide a variable category is that the entries tend to be oversimplified
for considerations of brevity, and may in some cases descend to levels of over-
generalization that create simplistic impressions. An example is Murdock and
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Ganim's synopsis ofFreud's contribution to 'process' as being 'energy is discharged
in laughter' (cf. Table 5.1 in this chapter), which I imagine may cause some die-hard
Freudians to discharge some energy in incredulous laughter.
With regard to Table 5.1 that provides a comparative synthesis ofthe characteristics
of humour definitions, it is of interest to observe that of all the thirteen selected
definitions, only that of Torrance (1966) constitutes a fully integrated approach
according to the selected four areas of interest. However, this observation may be
of relevance if only from the standpoint of the fact that Torrance and Rhodes were
contemporaries in the creativity research community in the United States ofAmerica
during the 1960s, during which time Torrance (1966) developed a series of well-
known tests to measure aspects of creativity as a construct variable. The fact that
Torrance's definition of humour took cognisance of the criteria deriving from
Rhodes' (1961) analysis of creativity is to be expected, and is not necessarily an
indication that Torrance's definition is superior to others selected by Murdock and
Ganim.
Ofgreater concern in examining Murdock and Ganim' s selection ofdefinitions is the
scant regard paid by virtually all their selected researchers to the so-called 'products'
of humour. In this respect, all thirteen definitions compare unfavourably with the
definition of Bremmer and Roodenburg (1997:1) which was criticised for its other
limitations earlier in this study (cf. Chapter Four), but is worth briefly recalling in
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this particular context: Humour is ' ... any message - transmitted in action, speech,
writing, images or music - intended to produce a smile or a laugh'.
By contrast with the above definition, all thirteen ofMurdock and Ganim's selected
researchers omitted references to 'intangible products'. The reasons for this common
omission perhaps include the perceived need for definitional conciseness on the part
ofa selection ofauthority figures drawn from 'creativity' literature who for the sake
ofbrevity may have felt inclined to put process ahead of the other criteria. While the
predilection of 'creativity' academics for process is understandable, there are other
vital issues to be confronted in the context of 'intangible products'. In this respect,
it must be acknowledged that orality may play a significant role in the humour
process, and that the orality factor permeates the entire process of humour from its
transmission to its reception and beyond. Chapter Eight provides a discussion ofthe
significance of orality and the oral tradition within the field ofhumour theory.
5.4 A macro-analysis of humour theories
Having examined definitions of humour in terms of a range of variables (described
above), Murdock and Ganim's descriptive study proceeds to a further stage in which
eleven humour theories are selected from the combined humour and creativity
literature, and analysed in terms of (i) the essence of their key concepts, (ii) their
emphases in formal definitions in terms of person, process, products and press, and
(iii) their theoretical strengths. The results of this analysis are synthesized and
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Basing their findings on these criteria, Murdock and Ganim (1993:65) conclude that
the current status of humour theory is 'immature' and 'in need of further
development'. Four of the eleven theories were found to show 'developmental
theoretical strength' by having systematic statements of principles and some
verification. The four theoretical groups in question were the configurational,
incongruity, release/relief, and play/spontaneity groups of theories, with the latter
being adjudged by Murdock and Ganim as having the strongest developmental
theoretical approach.
At the next stage of the methodology, Murdock and Ganim (1993:66) proceeded to
collapse the eleven humour theories into three basic categories, namely:
(1) play/spontaneity; (2) release/relief; and (3) incongruity/unexpected relationships.
The researchers suggest that these three theoretical categories provide an appropriate
starting point for 'the conceptual organisation of the construct of humour' .
5.5 A critique of Murdock and Ganim's study
Murdock and Ganim's 1993 study has considerable breadth, and it is not surprising
that it courts controversy. In the context of the present 'qualitative study of humour
theory', there are several issues that cannot be ignored. Firstly, as a point of
semantics, Murdock and Ganim's use of the term 'construct' cannot be condoned in
its context within an authoritative scientific report. In the conventional terminology
of contemporary research methodology, the term 'construct' implies that a concept
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has been rendered quantifiable for use as a 'construct variable' under controlled
experimental research conditions. The use of the term 'construct' as a descriptor of
relatively generic concepts such as humour or creativity is inappropriate, although it
is common for certain aspects of both concepts to be adapted for use as construct
variables that are amenable to measurement under controlled conditions.
Secondly, Murdock and Ganim advance the questionable claim that the results of
their study provide a suitable starting point for the so-called'conceptual organisation
of the construct of humour' . In this respect, it has already been emphasized that the
relationship between humour and creativity is the primary area of focus ofMurdock
and Ganim's descriptive study which was founded upon a consideration of the
treatment of humour by researchers of creativity, rather than vice versa. In effect,
Murdock and Ganim' s selection ofdefinitions ofhumour and theories ofhumour was
largely confined to the output of theorists who had made studies in the field of
creativity. For this reason, for example, Murdock and Ganim (1993:67) were able
to conclude that their study indicated' ... a weakness in creativity researchers'
elaboration in defining humour' (italics my own).
Murdock and Ganim' s 1993 study leaves certain issues unresolved. The most blatant
omission is probably the unanswered question concerning attempts to define humour
by researchers other than creativity researchers. In this respect, the contributions of
a specific case-in-point, Michael Apter, receive attention in the next chapter of this
study. A further unresolved issue is Murdock and Ganim's pivotal conclusion that
humour is a subset ofcreativity, which is a premise that has a formative influence on
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the development of the entire study. This conclusion has been described earlier in
this chapter as 'something of a self-fulfilling prophecy', and it was argued that the
crux ofthe researchers' argument for making humour a subset of creativity rests on
biassed conceptual decisions in defining 'humour'. In certain cases, the element of
creativity may be central to the humour process; but on the other hand, the links with
creativity become more tenuous if decisions are made to include Schadenfreude,
practical joking, slapstick, 'pie-in-the-face' comedy, buffoonery and other less
cognitively-dependent forms of behaviour as humour.
In this respect, it is enlightening to recall Harnmerton's statement ofalmost a century
ago that: "There is more 'heart' in humour, and more 'head' in wit" (Appendix B:4,
and already cited in Chapter Four). I would suggest that the more cerebral forms of
humour such as wit and humour of incongruity may well have an affinity with
creativity, whereas the less cerebral forms of humour may depend far less on the
creativity of the receiver. I would also go as far as to suggest that the Murdock and
Ganim (1993) study would have had considerably enhanced stature had its main title
been 'Creativity and wit' rather than 'Creativity and humour'. Although this
fundamental distinction would have complicated the process of collecting narrative
data and theoretical information, it would also have put the issue of the nature of
humour into sharper perspective. Furthermore, it should be noted that this
observation is made from the perspective of a humour researcher rather than that of
a creativity specialist, and its appears likely that there are at least as many facets to
creativity as there are to humour and that perhaps Murdock and Ganim should also
have been dealing with specific categories of creativity.
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Notwithstanding these reflective observations, it is clear that Murdock and Ganim's
descriptive study does not deliver proof that humour is in fact a subset ofcreativity,
although it should be acknowledged that this supposition provides food for thought
as regards wit and certain categories ofhumour. As descriptive researchers, Murdock
and Ganim have staked out the parameters oftheir domain ofresearch explicitly; and
as a consequence their study is by design by no means comprehensive. The
connection between humour and creativity may well be used as a starting point for
'the conceptual organisation' of ideas about humour as Murdock and Ganim
(1993:66) suggest; however the researchers' own restricted parameters indicate that
it would be a rather limited starting point.
As has been mentioned above, the consequence of the limited conceptual approach
of the study under review is that it ignores humour theorists who eschew the topic of
creativity. Among the notable omissions is Michael Apter (1989) who had
accumulated a respectable body of published humour research at the time that
Murdock and Ganim (1993) conducted their descriptive study. Admittedly, the only
explicit reference to 'creativity' in Apter's best known publication Reversal
psychology: motivation, emotion and personality (1989: 180) is a solitary passing-
reference to a study by Fontana (1985).
In spite ofthis apparent abstinence from indulging explicitly in creativity issues, the
general principles of reversal psychology have readily recognizable implicit
relevance to the concept of creativity. For example, Apter's conceptualisations
concerning reversal mechanisms and 'multiple synergy' (Apter, 1989:140) are
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compatible with Edward de Bono's conceptualization of 'lateral thinking' (de Bono,
1970, 1980). Furthermore, from a broader methodological standpoint, Apter and
Svebak's extensive research in the areas of the telic and paratelic modes has much
to offer to researchers in the field of 'creativity' studies (Apter and Svebak, 196,
1990; Svebak and Apter 1984, 1987). A small measure ofcompensation for Apter's
omission from Murdock and Ganim' s descriptive study may derive from the fact that
the next chapter of this study is devoted to a consideration of Apter's substantial
contribution to the growing body of humour theory.
In perusing the overall contribution of Murdock and Ganim (1993) to the body of
research on humour, one should always be mindful of the restrictions in scope that
the researchers themselves have imposed on their own view of their chosen area of
study. At the same time, care should be taken not to undervalue the extent of
Murdock and Ganim's contribution in gathering together a disparate collection of
humour-related creativity research and systematizing it within a relatively coherent
framework. It should also be noted that the term 'relatively' is used reservedly in
respect of the coherency of the theoretical framework that represents Murdock and
Ganim's epistemological simplifications.
A few problems are presented by Murdock and Ganim's decision to collapse the
eleven theories into three theory groups. If one accepts the principle of integrating
the theories are far as possible, then there may be some areas ofagreement in respect
of collapsing certain theories. For example, some justification may be attributed to
the decision to collapse the psychoanalytical category of theories into the
120
'release/relief theories category because Freud (1905) is generally credited with
being either the originator or chief proponent of the 'release/relief theory anyway
(McCrone, 1993:235; Driessen, 1997:224). However, even this apparently
re~onable rationale for the decision to integrate theoretical orientations would offend
purists who may argue with equal justification that Freud extended his theorizing
about humour from the reasonably conservative base oflaughter being 'a release of
libidinal energies' to the more radical terrain of psychoanalytical speculation
concerning the content of humour.
The case-in-point of collapsing the Freudian and relief theories is worth noting
because of the emotive factors involved. Although there may be little outcry
concerning relief theory, by contrast the speculative nature of Freudian
psychoanalytic interpretations ofthe forces impelling laughter tends to shock and at
times unsettle non-Freudians. Evidence ofthis can be gleaned from an example cited
by McCrone (1993 :235) ofpsychoanalytic speculation concerning 'penis envy' being
the basis for the suppressed laughter of certain women in response to certain
innocent-seeming jokes. In this case, it would not require a vivid imagination to
gauge the effect of this imaginative example of Freudian speculation on
contemporary feminist observers. My own opinion is that apart from the obvious
controversies involved, when the case is considered for collapsing humour theories,
we should be mindful of the basic Freudian principle that whatever form it takes as
a defence mechanism, the expression ofthe humour is interpreted as being motivated
by a desire to relieve inner tensions. Accordingly, if collapsing must be done, then
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it seems appropriate for the fundamental psychoanalytic standpoint concerning
humour to be subsumed into the 'relieftheory' category ofhumour.
While the psychoanalytic-relief theory amalgamation has its controversial elements
of debate, the remainder of Murdock and Ganim's exercise in collapsing humour
theories into three categories can be described as being even more questionable.
Whereas it would seem that the play /spontaneity category forms a natural category
on its own, the logic behind the collapsing ofthe rest ofthe approaches into a generic
'incongruity/unexpected relationships' category is difficult to fathom. This
observation gathers weight when one considers the inappropriateness of theories
grouped under the 'biological instinct', 'gallows' and 'arousal' sub-categories.
'Superiority' theory is an interesting case as well, because of its affiliation with all
three of Murdock and Ganim's proposed categories of humour. In many respects,
'superiority' humour results from a release of tensions that are very amenable to
psychoanalytical interpretation, but the laughter of 'superiority' humour is also
characterised by spontaneity and playfulness as in the well-worn example of the fat
man slipping on the inevitable banana peel. Furthermore, the laughter arising from
humorous situations with a superiority rationale is often the product of the usually
incongruous nature ofthe subject matter. In practice at least, the 'superiority' theory
of humour often also rests on incongruity, spontaneity and playfulness, as well as
tension-reduction.
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Apart from the above considerations and at the risk ofsounding facetious, a question
must be asked concerning the researchers' decision to divide humour theory into
three broad categories. It must be asked whether this is necessary or merely whether
the idea of division into three is symptomatic of a fashionable trend in humour
research? The antecedents are varied. LeGoff (1997:47) notes that Freud (1905)
identified and described three basic kinds of laughter, namely: wit, the comic and
humour. John Morreall (1982) distinguished three general categories of humour,
namely: superiority, incongruity and relief. Likewise, McCrone (1993:235) speaks
of 'three standard theories of humour' which turn out to be the same as Morreall's.
In this tradition, Murdock and Ganim (1993) also seem to feel compelled to select
three categories, but replace 'superiority' with 'spontaneity and playfulness' when
it is clear that superiority needs a category of its own. Basically, there is no reason
why there have to be three main categories ofhumour theories, more especially when
the respective elements do not logically gather themselves into three natural groups.
In the next chapter, the focus of attention narrows from one of macro-analysis to a
consideration of the contribution ofa single humour theorist, Michael Apter, whose
reversal theory ofhumour involves aspects ofall three ofMurdock and Ganim' score
categories, viz. incongruity, reliefand spontaneity/playfulness. However, in spite of
this, reversal theory also has a strong claim to being an arousal theory, which should
add interest to its analysis.
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CHAPTER SIX
A critical study of
Apter's reversal theory of humour
Whereas Chapter Five focussed upon a critical account of Murdock and Ganim's (1993)
descriptive study of definitions of humour and theories of humour, this chapter has a
narrower focus. The chiefconcern is a critique ofthe humour theory ofMichael Apter, the
British psychologist whose 'reversal theory' ofhumour represents a pertinent contribution
to the ongoing body ofresearch in the field. In effect, the shift of interest is from the level
of the macro-analysis ofhumour theories in general to a level in which analysis focuses on
a single current humour theory that I consider to be deserving of further attention. In this
sense, the emphasis shifts from a study of a descriptive secondary source to an analysis of
an investigative primary source.
6.1 Reasons for the selection of Apter's theory
The principal considerations that influenced the decision to select Apter' s theoretical
viewpoint as a special case for study are that his theory of humour provides a
systematic statement of general principles and is supported by a measure of
psychophysiological experimental verification (Apter, 1989:67-88). The result is a
worthwhile example ofa relatively comprehensive contemporary theory concerning
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apparent relationships that account for humour. Although at times controversial,
Apter's theorizing has the merit of confronting the central theoretical concerns of
humour in order to arrive at a coherent theory. A further personal consideration that
prompted the inclusion of an in-depth appraisal of Apter's reversal theory was that
although I harbour some reservations concerning Apter' s theory, it is nevertheless my
opinion that Apter has not received the recognition he deserves for the weight of his
meaningful contribution to the accumulating body of knowledge in the field of
humour theory.
An example of this lack of recognition is Apter's omission from the theorists listed
in the extensive descriptive study of Murdock and Ganim (1993), discussed in
Chapter Five. It may be noted that not only was Apter's theory not among the
theories selected for consideration by Murdock and Ganim, but that his omission was
compounded by the fact that none of his numerous publications were listed in the
bibliography that accompanied Murdock and Ganim's descriptive study (1993 :68-70).
The reason that was discerned in Chapter Five was that Apter had contributed little
at the time to the specific study of creativity which was a central prerequisite for
Murdock and Ganim's descriptive consideration. However, the explication of
Apter's theory in this chapter suggests that in spite ofits omission, reversal theory has
the potential to make a meaningful contribution in the fields of both creativity and
humour.
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6.2 Background to Apter's reversal theory
The starting point of Apter' s theory of humour has a psychophysiological basis. In
investigating the validity of what he describes as 'the more prevalent arousal view
that laughter is associated with a return to a moderate level of arousal from a higher
level' (Apter, 1989:83), Apter draws upon the results of the continuing programme
of psychophysiological research of Svebak and his colleagues at the University of
Bergen (Svebak, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1986a, 1986b, 1988a. 1988b).
Apter(1989:67) indicates that his attention was drawn to Svebak'sresearch because,
unlike most other psychophysiological researchers, from the beginning ofhis research
career Svebak had designed his methodological approach to allow him to examine
the relationship between physiological records and subjective experience. Basically,
Svebak's research programme during the 1980s focussed on four major investigative
areas ofphysiological activity, namely: (1) skeletal muscle tension, (2) cardiovascular
activity, (3) respiratory activity, and (4) cortical activity. Experimental studies were
conducted to examine the relationship ofthese physiological activities to the subjects'
states of mind. Svebak's methodological stance provided Apter with an empirical
foundation upon which to base his theory of humour.
Apter not only took cognisance of Svebak's Norwegian-based research on arousal
states, but also from 1984 onwards collaborated with Svebak in a series ofempirical
studies that sought to examine the psychophysiological bases of reversal theory
(Apter and Svebak, 1986, 1990; Svebak and Apter, 1984, 1987). Of particular
relevance to the question ofhumour theory is Apter and Svebak's collaborative study
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of 1987, the findings of which were published in an article entitled 'Laughter: an
empirical test of some reversal theory hypotheses'.
Apter's theory of humour grew from his dissatisfaction with the optimal arousal
theory postulated by Hebb (1955). The unchallenged longevity ofthe optimal arousal
theory had resulted in its being virtually enshrined within the so-called 'basic-
premises' of much psychological research in motivation, and the influence of this
theory was also implicit in the research emanating from a diversity of other areas of
interest such as humour theory. The essential idea of optimal arousal theory in its
application to the theory ofhumour is that humour arousal or hedonic tone resulted
only when an individual's arousalleve1s changed from a higher or a lower level to
a moderate level. In essence, the theory contends that there is a single optimalleve1
of arousal at which hedonic tone is produced.
For the purpose of both clarity and brevity, the discussion of the principles of the
optimal arousal theory as well as Apter's reversal theory is accompanied by a series
of explanatory diagrams. Figure 6.1 (below) presents Hebb's (1955) diagram
depicting graphically the motivational experiences ofthe optimal arousal theory, and
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Figure 6.1 The relationship between arousal and hedonic tone according to
optimal arousal theory (Hebb, 1955)
6.3 Apter's reversal theory of motivation
In his analysis of traditional optimal arousal theory, Apter (1981b) presents a table
depicting a basic set of four contrasting emotions, as follows:
Table 6.1 A basic set of four contrastin~ emotions (Apter, 1981)







Apter (1989: 14) emphasizes the diagonal relationships in this table. That is, anxiety
and relaxation are related by being opposite to one another, and likewise: excitement
and boredom. In structuralist terms, Apter refers to these 'binary opposites', and
maintains that these principles apply over the whole arousal range. The inference of
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this stance is that there are two opposing ways of experiencing arousal, in the sense
that increasing arousal may be either increasingly pleasant or increasingly unpleasant.
Figure 6.2 (below) provides a diagram in which Apter depicts the two opposing ways
ofexperiencing arousal as suggested by the reversal theory. The preferred inclination
ofthe individual (represented in Figure 6.2 by the hatched arrow-head) may be in the
direction ofeither lower or higher arousal, and consequently the motivational option















Figure 6.2 Reversal theory: experiencing arousal
Two opposite ways of experiencing arousal are suggested by reversal
theory. Each horizontal bar represents one ofthese 'modes', the direction
ofpreferred arousal change being depicted by the hatched arrow-head on
each bar. The possibility of reversing from one mode to the other is
represented by the double-headed vertical arrow.
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Figure 6.3 (below) presents a further graphic representation of reversal theory that
demonstrates that the satisfactory aspects of optimal arousal theory can be retained
and incorporated into a single theoretical design of reversal theory. The
amalgamation of these approaches involves a combination of the dual modes of the
X-formation of reversal theory in tandem with the single inverted-U formation of
optimal arousal theory to depict the relationship between hedonic tone and arousal.
The quality of greater flexibility enhances the options for reversing perceptions of
unpleasant arousal; while at the same time, the design accommodates the optimal
arousal principle that extreme arousal (i.e. too high or too low) can be felt as






The relationship between arousal and hedonic tone according to
reversal theory
The two hypothetical curves represented by a continuous and a
dashed line depict the two modes postulated by reversal theory.
For comparison, the dotted line making an inverted V-curve
represents the single mode of optimal arousal theory.
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6.4 Telic and paratelic modes
Apter's (1989:30-42) interest in motivational theory led to his conceptualizations of
telic and paratelic modes which were basically terms used to denote diametrically
opposite 'states of mind' (as phenomenologists call them) or 'systems' (as systems
analysts call them). On the one hand, the telic mode signified a preoccupation with
goal-directed motivation; whereas on the other hand, the paratelic mode signified a
preoccupation with activities in which the goal was secondary. People in the telic
mode generally place the end before the means and attach value to delayed
gratification, whereas those in the paratelic mode generally eschew the rigidity of
long term goals in favour of seeking immediate pleasure or the pragmatic
convenience of the moment.
Figure 6.4 depicts the difference between the telic mode and the paratelic mode.
People in the telic mode tend to be serious-minded and look to the future, whereas
people in the paratelic mode tend to be light-hearted and turn away from what Apter
(1989:86) calls 'the tyranny of the goal'. These modes fit perfectly into the reversal
theory scenario, as each individual ranges between telic and paratelic modes.
Apter's identification ofthe telic and paratelic modes reinforces his theory ofhumour
because clearly the process of humour requires a paratelic (rather than telic) state to
proceed. Apter (1989:43) cites an example of a collaborative study (Waiters et aI.,
1982) in which he was involved that supports the idea ofan association between the
telic and arousal-avoidance modes as well as between the paratelic and arousal-
seeking modes. These findings tend to reinforce the notion that serious-mindedness
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and planning-ahead are associated with preference for low arousal, whereas















aa.." '.8.. rr·EUC".' .rMftJIIjl ,.". .
Figure 6.4 Telic and paratelic modes (Apter, 1984)
A schematic representation of the contrasting way in which the
relationship between activities and goals is organized in the phenomenal
field in the telic and paratelic modes (after Apter 1984b).
6.5 Apter's reversal theory of humour
Apter's theory of humour is bedded in reversal theory. Apter (1989:139-140)
identifies five essential requirements ofhis humour theory which can be summarised
as follows:
(1) The comic situation should display cognitive synergy or 'the experience
of incompatible characteristics in relation to an identity' (Apter,
1989:132).
(2) The cognitive synergy should involve the 'unmasking' of an appearance
that purports to be reality. Comic synergy generally appears to be
accompanied by an atmosphere of playful ambience as the structure of
conventional reality appears to escape the bonds of logic.
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(3) The unmasked reality should be less than the appearance in some
evaluative sense. The comic identity is less than it seems, and removes all
cues that are serious or threatening in character.
(4) The humour process is dependent upon the paratelic mode, and the
humour will not be felt unless the paratelic mode is either induced or
already present. It follows that persons experiencing humour should be in
the paratelic mode, and that the induction of the paratelic mode is one of
the functions of the comic situation.
(5) Humour is a form of paratelic excitement which is a function of high
arousal, consequently the comic situation should be accompanied by a
'surge of increased arousal' (Apter, 1989:139).
In the latter respect, Apter's use ofthe phrase' surge ofincreased arousal' is mirrored
by Foster (1988) who, in discussing so-called 'reversal rituals' , indicates the presence
oftwo processes that reflect comic synergy, namely the 'triggering' ofa reversal and
the provision of material appropriate to the new mode. Foster hypothesized that the
enjoyment of humour is heightened by increased arousal and that the longer the
increased arousal can be sustained, the greater the enjoyment. Apter (1982b) also
contends that the quality of the comic synergies involved in the process of humour
relates directly to the nature and quality of the humour involved. He concludes that
the more shocking or surprising the synergies, the greater the arousal and the more
intensely pleasurable they are. For example, the introduction of taboo topics (such
as sex) into humour tends to be more arousing because of their 'shock' impact, and
the laughter that derives is accordingly usually more uproarious if the audience is in
paratelic mode (Apter, 1989:140).
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Apter's study of the 'multiple synergies' in an episode of the British television
situation-comedy 'Fawlty Towers' reveals the complexity of what he patriotically
describes as 'the best comedy'. The humour process rests upon both the ingenuity
of the presentation as well as the audience's abilities to cognitively appreciate the
multiple comic synergies of the content in an appropriately paratelic state of mind.
6.6 A critique of Apter's humour theory
The reservations that I have concerning Apter' s humour theory are two-fold. Firstly,
while the theory is relatively broad in its sweep across the humour spectrum, there
are areas that require further investigation. It would be interesting to hear the
'reversal' interpretations of the psychoanalytic defence mechanisms of Freudian
humour theory; or how Apter's five humour principles (cited above) apply to the
amused cynicism ofthe 'gallows' theory, or even the' eureka' experience ofsurprised
humour as described in the configurational approach to humour.
Secondly, in Apter's third proposition (above), he refers to the question ofa perceived
need for a 'less than' quality in the synergy ofthe denouement ofa joke. In practice,
humour does not always conform to this restricted perspective. There are occasions
when a 'more than' quality may also be found to be very amusing. There are a
number of well-known jokes in which the synergy of the denouement derives from
the sudden realisation that the 'simple' character is actually either the one with the
brains or the one that fortune favours. The humour in these 'more-than-we-expected'
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jokes resides in our empathetic sharing of the simple character's triumph over his
circumstances, and we smile because we identify with the fact that the 'right person'
has been rewarded in an amusingly heartwarming climax.
On the other hand, reversal theorists could well argue that 'more than' is simply a
reversal of 'less than', and that the denouement of the 'simple-man-triumphs' jokes
is essentially based upon a reversal of receiver expectations within the
phenomenological process of reception dynamics. However, this sort of semantic
circumlocution does not alter my opinion that the third ofApter' s propositions (cited
above) should read: 'The unmasked reality should be surprisingly 'less than' or 'more
than' than the appearance in some evaluative sense. The comic identity rests in a
qualitative shift or reversal that removes potentially serious or threatening cues'
(adapted from Apter, 1989:139).
In conclusion, some final comments on Apter's approach serve to give perspective
to the merit of his somewhat controversial theoretical standpoint. Firstly, few will
deny that Apter's theory of humour represents a positive contribution to the rather
disorganized body of ongoing research on humour. Apter's insight in critically
challenging Hebb's (1955) classic motivational paradigm represents a positive
starting point to his own contribution to humour research. From this starting point,
Apter sets about replacing the traditional optimal arousal theory with his own
metamotivational theory as a viable alternative upon which to base his own
theoretical perspectives ofhumour. With the basic planning ofthe metamotivational
structure ofthe reversal theory ofhumour in place, Apter (1989:67-88) then tests the
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waters of his reflective theorizing against some of Svebak's psychophysiological
empirical parameters. The obvious merits of Apter' s approach are to be witnessed
in his attempts to provide a meaningful and relatively comprehensive theoretical
perspective of humour, without losing sight of the need to marry speculation with
empiricism (Lachenicht, 1985:1).
Ultimately, we must concede that Apter's theory of humour presents an intriguing
picture ofa somewhat curious amalgam ofsubjective reflective practice and objective
laboratory testing. Apter's theory is founded in speculative planning and analysis
allied with a willingness to test these ideas wherever possible within the controlled
regime of behavioural science. The invisible college of reversal psychologists has
mushroomed since its inauspicious beginnings in the early 1980s, and the
contributions of 'reversal' researchers have enlivened the human sciences. As one
of the reversal school's leading gurus, Michael Apter has made a formidable
contribution to the behavioural sciences in general, and his initiatives have generated
an ongoing body ofconcomitant research and theorizing. His particular contribution
to humour theory is consistent with the basic tenets of reversal theory, and may be
described as a natural and meaningful product of reversal theory that enhances the
growing body of knowledge of humour theory.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
A micro-study of a
'humorous event':
reflective practice in action
Humour researchers have found difficulty in identifying and testing valid and reliable
construct variables from relevant aspects ofthe generic concept referred to as humour, and
theories of humour tend to derive from particular examples or classes of examples for
which the respective theorists offer plausible reflective explanations. This chapter is
concerned with employing the qualitative methodological approach of reflective practice
in a brief personal micro-study of a so-called humorous event. The aim is to apply the
observations deriving from this particular example of a personal perception of the
occurrence ofa humorous event to a range oftheoretical perspectives. The effect envisaged
will be the juxtaposition of Apter's reversal theory of humour (discussed in detail in
Chapter Six) with a range of other theories of humour (discussed in Chapter Two and
Chapter Five), and the textual recording of these perspectives will represent a product
deriving from what Smyth (1986) terms 'reflection-in-action'.
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7.1 The methodological approach
From a methodological perspective, a primary objective of this chapter is to report
the findings of an exercise in self-examination as an example of reflective practice
in action. The rationale ofthis introspective process ofqualitative research has been
discussed in Chapter One. In Chapter Four, a relatively brief example ofthe use of
reflective practice was presented by employing this technique to examine a variety
of humour variables in the context of two contrasting examples of joke-telling
scenarios. By contrast, the example provided in this chapter is much narrower, and
involves using reflective practice to subject to the scrutiny of 'critical reflection'
(Killen, 1996:1) a single seemingly insignificant event that I perceived as being
humorous. The approach followed is systematic though idiosyncratic, and the style
of expression tends to be more informal in tone than in other chapters in order to
capture more accurately the essence of the process ofreflective practice. The aim is
to provide enough transparency to give interested parties a window to the course and
characteristics of reflective activity as the process of reflective practice proceeds.
As was discussed in Chapter Two, the subjective approach of reflection is a
fundamental age-old technique of 'non-scientific' social philosophers who
traditionally have tended toward 'ex-cathedra' statements oftheir personal opinions
and standpoints on a huge diversity ofpersonal, social and philosophical issues. By
contrast, the style of reporting in reflective practice is designed to be transparent
enough to provide readers with accessibility to the sequential progression of
reflective reasoning. Accordingly, for example, lines of inquiry that a reflective
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investigator may have initially followed but later concluded to be of little
consequence are generally still reported for the reflective consideration of other
investigators reading the report of the study in question.
This modus operandi has particular relevance in the deliberately narrow case-study
selected for scrutiny in this chapter. In cases such as this, a technique of
systematically 'covering-various-lines-of-inquiry' may be employed in order to
identify perspectives of humour that promise more fruitful further investigation.
Likewise, a further aspect of the style of the reporting of reflective practice is the
recording of the investigator's personal feelings, attitudes and subjective
interpretations of various phenomena under scrutiny. This 'open door' policy of
transparency provides readers with greater accessibility to areas of subjectivity and
possible bias on the part ofthe investigator.
In this respect, Killen (1996:15) recommends the recording of verbatim data by an
observer as 'stable data' that may be analysed at a later time. In the approach taken
in this chapter, a more personal and opinionated tone is presented to increase the
reader's accessibility to the content. The idea is to give the reader the essential
information of both the actual content of the subject matter, as well as an indication
ofthe way in which the author is thinking about this subject matter. On the one hand,
we have the enterprise (viz. the analysis of the nature ofhumour); and on the other,
we have what Douglas McGregor (1964) described as 'the human side of the
enterprise', which in effect tells us how the investigator feels about humour.
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Reflectivity is an area in which many researchers justifiably feel insecure. To many
who have been schooled in the research world according to Kerlinger (1973) and
Cronbach (1990), talk ofintroducing 'the human side ofthe enterprise' into research
is tantamount to inviting human error. Likewise, suggestions of incorporating 'the
investigator's personal feelings, attitudes and subjective interpretations' (above) into
the mainstream of research methodology is something of an anathema to most
positivists who would undoubtedly feel more secure timing the duration oflaughter
with stop-watches. But ultimately we must acknowledge the fact that humour is a
human enterprise, and that personal feelings, attitudes and interpretations are central
human factors associated with the creation of humour.
Furthermore, it should also be borne in mind that the dangers ofthe application ofthe
products of intuitive study are well known. If proper caution is exercised in the
circumstances, the controlled use of reflective practice is probably one of the most
viable methodological alternatives at our disposal when we make the decision to
venture boldly but gingerly where few positivists have been before. Accordingly, it
is hoped that extraneous factors such as observer bias can be partially controlled by
critical scrutiny of any value judgements appearing in the details of the reporting of
the reflective process in action. The practice ofreporting attitudinal standpoints plays
an important role in promoting self-awareness ofthe presence ofopinionated content
in reporting reflective practice. Killen's (1996: 15) concept of' stable data' provides
guidance to those seeking greater transparency in the detection of observer bias.
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This chapter contains examples of attention to transparency in the use of reflective
practice in the analysis of a humorous event. A case-in-point in this context is the
fact that self-awareness ofobserver bias was considered an important criterion in the
briefconsideration ofthe psychoanalytic perspective (cf. sub-section 7.2.3 below) in
relation to the humorous event analysed in this chapter. This bias was reported as
'stable data' as part of the description of the reflective process. Sensitive of the fact
that I am personally a non-Freudian, I am also mindful of the widespread and
indiscriminate practice of 'Freud-bashing' by both qualified and unqualified persons
from a diversity oflegitimate academic as well as pseudo-academic persuasions. The
result is reflected in my reporting ofthe reflective process where obvious efforts are
made to give the much-maligned psychoanalytic perspective a fair trial by reflection.
The micro-study discussed below concerns a passing humorous event involving an
expression that brought a smile to my lips as an author engaged in creating this text.
The selected example (that appears in the latter part of Chapter Six) is the phrase
'semantic circumlocution' which is used to refer to a situation involving the
circularity ofa seemingly pointless and endless game ofwordplay. As author ofthis
text, I experienced a sensation ofhumour in using these words to describe the use of
too many words. The etiology of this smile (that was presumably the product of
some kind of humour process) is the subject of relevance in this so-called 'micro-
study' or 'case study' that in the event may probably be better described as a 'case-in-
point' study.
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My decision to employ a variety ofthird person references in this chapter to indicate
my own position is a personal perhaps idiosyncratic one, based not so much on
pedantry but rather on an attempt to heighten self-awareness as a technique of self-
objectification in reflective practice. In order to strengthen an awareness ofmy own
opinions, I found it better to objectify myself in retrospect. Hence, for example, in
examining the reasons for my smile in response to a certain phrase, I refer to myself
as 'the smiler' , and speculate as to why I became 'the smiler' who thereby created the
so-called humorous event. The reason may have included the fact that I was smiling
in self-appreciation because in the humour process I am both the sender and the
receiver of my own efforts as an author. To clarify my perceptions of this event, it
becomes more convenient to use the terms 'the smiler' and 'the author' to refer to my
different roles in the proceedings. This provides the idiosyncratic perspective of the
'new-self looking back on and objectifying the 'old-self to see why he was 'the
smiler'.
7.2 The self-study: reflective practice in action
Based on guidelines in the literature ofSchon (1987,1991), Killen (1996), Wickham
(1997) and others, techniques of reflective practice were applied retrospectively to
investigate the etiological possibilities ofthe particular phenomenon under scrutiny,
viz. the humorous event. Consequently, the nature of the information presented in
this study will be both speculative and ex-post facto, but hopefully also systematic
and fruitful. A variety of attributions suggest themselves as retrospective
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explanations of the forces giving impetus to the production of the above-mentioned
smile.
7.2.1 The smile of triumph
At the outset, the possibility must be conceded that the smile reaction may have
been the so-called 'smile of triumph' whereby the author may have felt that
'semantic circumlocution' was just the right turn of phrase for the situation. In
such circumstances, the smile may have been the afterglow of an experience of
elation occasioned by a perceived personal triumph of both style and substance.
In essence, this may have been a moment of celebratory self-indulgence.
In this respect, we are left to ponder as to whether this was humour at all, and
whether in fact the smile was not merely a self-congratulatory behavioural
reaction registering success. In other words, was the smile in fact a restrained
equivalent ofthe soccer goal-scorer's punching into the air in celebration? In this
case, the more searching question that must be asked is whether a general feeling
ofwell-being and even a whoop ofdelight that signifies personal satisfaction can
be classified as humour at all. Certainly, a smile resulting in these circumstances
would indicate that a person was in 'good humour' as a result ofbeing 'humoured'
by a therefore'humorous' event; however, whether the event would be considered
humour in the conventional sense is debatable.
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7.2.2 The smile of nostalgia
The smile reaction may also have been entirely or even partially the 'smile of
nostalgia' as the author recalled somewhat dimly from the depths of memory the
amusement he derived in his youth from Charles Dickens' humorous use of the
word 'circumlocution' in one of the lighter moments of Hard Times - or was it
Great Expectations? As in the first example, a smile in these circumstances could
signify a feeling of well-being as it may represent the warm afterglow of vivid
memories of past happiness. Once again, it should be asked whether the good-
humoured nostalgic smile is valid evidence of the existence of humour at all, or
whether the smile is simply a learned behavioural reaction to the experience of
pleasure.
7.2.3 Psychoanalytic theory
Whilst we reflect upon abstractions such as feelings of triumph and nostalgia, it
must be conceded that we have entered the realm of reflections about reflection
itself. In this respect, the term 'metareflection' may be coined, in much the same
way as 'metacommunication' refers to communication about communication. In
this context, reflection about reflection would involve concern directed towards
the inner dynamisms of the sub-conscious, as well as phenomena such as recall
that may result in words like 'semantic circumlocution' appearing suddenly in the
conSCIOusness. The process of 'metareflection' leads swiftly enough to a
confrontation with the issues involved in explaining the reasons for human
behaviour in general and humour in particular, and attention is inevitably directed
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towards theories ofmotivation. In this regard, psychoanalytic theory is prominent,
especially as Freud (1905) was one of the first theorists to deal specifically with
humour and its role in the general scheme of his theories concerning the
mainsprings of human behaviour.
Although and more relevantly because the author of this text has an Honours
degree in Psychology, he is aware that he is not qualified to speak on behalfofthe
psychoanalytic school or psychotherapists in general. He is, however, qualified
to observe that this is not the time or place for premature, petty sarcasm about the
manner in which various Freudian concepts (such as 'penis envy' or 'the nipple
complex') have been advanced by certain psychoanalysts to explain why certain
people have laughed at certain times about certain jokes. These oft-repeated
cliches in condemnation ofFreudian interpretations ofhumour are often founded
in prejudice or emotion rather than knowledge or reason. If one is to pay
Freudians and neo-Freudians the customary respect ofa fair hearing, then it would
be appropriate to examine the possibilities ofadapting the ideas ofpsychoanalytic
theory to explain the cause of the particular smile under examination.
The object ofhumour (viz. the phrase 'semantic circumlocution'), in the present
context may be briefly and cautiously subjected to closer scrutiny. Mindful ofthe
proposition that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, there are certain
possibilities that suggest themselves in the event of the application of a simple
word-association exercise. For example, it is not inconceivable that in certain
145
cases, depending on the individual, the words 'semantic circumlocution' may be
associated with either 'sexual' or 'circumcision', or even both at once. This
combination ofassociated terms may contain the potentiality ofsparking into the
consciousness an expression of a level of libidinal arousal or anxiety stemming
from a subconscious process in which perhaps taboos or a traumatic early
childhood experience had led the individual's ego to cope with the situation by
instantaneously resorting to humour as a defence mechanism to displace or
sublimate the internal force of Thanatos (which has been inadequately translated
as 'the death instincf).
The psychoanalytic theorist may argue with some conviction that the act of
bringing the concept of 'circumcision' to the consciousness produces a classic
example of the super-ego reacting under the threat of the expression of an
accumulation of id-dominated feelings in this regard, with the result that the ego
uses the defence mechanism of reaction formation to subvert an anxiety-driven
response into one of laughter or in this case: a smile. The reader should bear in
mind that these rather fleeting personal views concerning the formidable
psychoanalytic perspective are the tenuous reflections of a structural
phenomenologist with a Psychology Honours degree, and are neither the diagnosis
nor even the preliminary notes of a clinically trained psychoanalyst.
Despite the proliferation of neo-Freudians, Freudianism has always struck this
author as offering little room for compromise in the sense that it is usually either
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espoused or rejected with equal enthusiasm. It should also be acknowledged that
the criticism offered by psychologists themselves will usually reflect their
orientations within the field. Nevertheless, one doesn't have to have a PhD in
Psychopathology to realise that the meaningful contributions of Freudians and
neo-Freudians cannot be dismissed en-bloc because some of their views are
regarded as ludicrous by some or even most people who have never engaged in a
formal study of Psychology.
7.2.4 The smile of self-recognition
Self-examination is an important aspect ofthe introspective 'reflection-in-action'
process (Killen, 1997:1), and may lead to what some psychologists have regarded
as a 'higher' form of humour. In this respect, Gordon Allport's (in Gerdes et aI.,
1981 :56) analysis of criteria of maturity includes his statement that:
'The mature adult is also objective about himself, which gives him self-insight and
the ability to laugh at himself.
This view is affirmed by Gerdes et al. (1981:86-87) who cites the landmark works
ofMaslow (1954, 1968) and Allport (1961) in identifying 'realistic perception of
oneself' as a primary characteristic of maturity, and humour as a vital agent in
'self-objectification'. Gerdes et al. (1981 :87) states:
'The person who can laugh at himself reflects a capacity for self-objectification
and for retaining a sense of proportion' .
The mature person's sense of proportion is maintained by an ability to magnify
situations and characteristics to a point of absurdity thereby revealing
idiosyncrasies and enabling a distinction to be made between pretension and
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genuineness. Allport (1955:54) identified this quality as 'the self as knower', and
Maslow (1954) regarded it as a function of 'self-actualisation' at the pinnacle of
his hierarchical needs theory.
When viewed from the standpoint of reflectivity, these standpoints offer
interesting possibilities for those investigating personal reactions to 'semantic
circumlocution' . The possibility should be acknowledged that the smile in
question may be a 'smile of self-recognition' that indicates that the smiler has
experienced a moment of self-awareness of his own human foibles. The smile
may signify a moment of 'self-objectification' (Gerdes et aI., 1981 :87) in which
the smiler has become acutely aware that he has perpetrated another example of
his own tendency towards a preoccupation with wordplay and verbal niceties.
In this respect, the smile in question may quite possibly also have a touch ofwhat
the French call 'rire jaune' to refer to the rueful 'yellow laughter' evoked in those
who recognise their own foibles or misfortunes. In this case, the smiler's 'rire
j aune' may be the product of a shaft of personal insight. The smile may signify
a flash of self-recognition, and may be a signal that he realises that he has perhaps
been guilty of the same penchant for style over substance that he has scorned on
occasions in reference to certain post-modernists. There is also perhaps the
wishful thought that the smile may be a step towards maturity because it is a
symptom of a 'realistic perception of oneself (Gerdes et aI., 19881 :86).
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7.2.5 Appreciation of aesthetic qualities
The smile in question may be one of appreciation of the aesthetic qualities of
language, in the same way that we may smile at the anecdote (apocryphal or not)
of Oscar Wilde, locked in a cupboard by his friends until he could amuse them
with a worthy pun, shouting from the inside: 'O-pun the door!'. In similar vein,
the words 'semantic circumlocution' have a humorous ring to them possibly
because they 'turn in' on themselves semantically, in the sense that the words
themselves are verbose examples ofverbiage being used with verbosity to describe
'verbiage'. This process of the nature of words reflecting and reinforcing their
own meanings can also be discerned in the Wilde anecdote where the words '0-
pun the door' reflect back to the demand for a pun in order to open the door.
7.2.6 The reversal theory of humour
This so-called humorous event (if it is one) can also be viewed from the
perspective ofreversal theory, and related specifically to each ofthe five elements
of humour that Apter identified as being characteristic of reversal theory (cf.
Chapter Six). In terms of the first element, we look for evidence of the comic
synergy that sparks the humour, and perhaps find it in the use ofa rather grandiose
Dickensian phrase (viz. 'semantic circumlocution') to describe a relatively
mundane process (viz. 'the circularity ofa seemingly pointless and endless game
of wordplay').
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By contemporary standards, the phrase 'semantic circumlocution' is an archaic
and wordy expression that has a playful ambience because it may be perceived by
some to be used in an unusual mock-serious context that lifts it from the mundane.
Furthermore, in its 'unmasking', the meaning of the playfully-used grandiose
terminology is 'less than' the reality. Up to this point, this brief preliminary
analysis has revealed that the dynamics involved in the humorous event are
congruent with the first three ofApter' s five essential requirements ofthe reversal
theory of humour, as discussed in Chapter Six.
Apter's fourth and fifth requirements refer directly to the reception ofthe humour,
and in particular to the receiver being in both a paratelic mode as well as a state
of high arousal. These reception requirements that demand that the receiver be
relaxed and highly aroused are intrinsic factors of the personal disposition of the
person who experiences an event as humorous, and are difficult to confirm or
disconfirm without reliance on the personal testimonies derived from individual
case studies. To examine these aspects more closely, there is a need to consider
the context of the words that make up the humorous event.
The turn ofphrase that elicited the smile is not isolated, but instead contextualized
within a study of the nature of humour. Contextualization often promotes
expectations. Perhaps some readers of this text on humour read with the
expectation of experiencing humour as part of their reading experience, and are
predisposed to the reception ofhumour in any guise. Perhaps even the title of the
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dissertation in which humour is a key word, attracted the reader in the first place
and led to the anticipation of humour. Likewise, as the author of this text, I am
intensely interested in humour, and in writing about it undoubtedly my
subconscious is awash with thoughts about humour that may at times find their
way into the text.
In terms of reversal theory, the topic of humour alone is conducive to the
induction of a paratelic state of mind that may result in the person being more
sensitive to the possibility of the reception of nuances that suggest humorous
intent. In all probability, the reader of this text has not been discouraged by the
style and tone in which this study has been written. Harbingers holding some
promise ofsuch humorous events have cropped up in the text. There are examples
as early as the Preface in reference to Voltaire as well as to the fact that the study
of humour is 'no laughing matter', and there are probably humorous nuances in
every chapter of this study. For example, in Chapter Four there was a reference
to 'the ticklish question ofhumour theory', and the present chapter has more than
its fair share of humour because the technique of reflective reporting involves a
more informal approach. For those who require a cue, the next humorous nuance
lies between the lines of the second sentence of the next paragraph.
However, taken in balance, there have probably not been enough comic synergies
or humorous events in this text to establish a pervasive paratelic-dominant mode.
The author-as-academic in the true colour (viz. grey) of the telic mode has
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exercised considerable restraint in minimizing the humorous events in this text,
as he genuflects before the altar of scholarship which is after all a serious-minded
('telic-dominant') business. The result is that when a glimmer ofhumour suggests
itself to the reader in a telic-dominant mode, the level of arousal in context may
be greater than the humorous event seems to warrant. In short, 'semantic
circumlocution' may not be funny at all under normal circumstances. However,
in the context of the serious endeavour of editing a hopefully scholarly treatise,
unusual turns of phrase or tongue-in-cheek uses of academic jargon may well
bring that smile that eases the tenser atmospherics of the experience.
In saying this, I am aware that one ofmy gurus ofhumour (whose classic accounts
of 'one-upmanship' still bring me pleasure) once made this same point with far
greater clarity. Stephen Potter (1954:24) expresses the idea with characteristic
insight and elegance, with the observation that:
'Some literary research workers sink beneath the weight oftheir materials - buried
in their enthusiasm. The historian of wit, scraping his way through the sandy
centuries before English humour was created, is inclined, in the desert, to see
green spots of humour where it doesn't exist.'
Who is to say then that the author who smiled at the unusual turn of phrase of
'semantic circumlocution' was in fact not clutching at straws beneath the weight
of his materials? Perhaps it was a mirage after all - one of those 'green spots of
humour where it doesn't exist'.
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This process may be very plausibly explained in terms of reversal theory, as
follows: The reader of an academic tract may experience the conscious or
subconscious motivational impetus to escape the unpleasant arousal syndrome of
the telic-state induced by the reading of the dry and perhaps difficult-to-
understand academic text. The motivational impetus to escape may grow forceful
enough to influence the reader's behaviour to the extent that he effects a cognitive
reversal from the telic-mode to the paratelic-mode by taking a break from the task
that he perceives as unpleasant; and as a more pleasant alternative, engages in
relief-driven joking behaviour with friends. On the other hand, ifhe finds himself
undergoing this reversal but still persists with the task that he perceives as
unpleasant, the reader in question may find that his cognitive reversal from telic-
mode to paratelic-mode has put him in ajocular mood. His newly acquired light-
hearted attitude may be experienced as a spirit of relaxation or exhilaration that
may promote a need for humour, and he may even be driven to quench this thirst
by reading humour into events that in other contexts may not be funny at all.
The problem with reflective impressions such as these is that the person who does
the reflecting may also know about reversal theory (as I do). Consequently, there
is always the possibility that even though the person doing the reflecting is
convinced that he has the best intentions ofmaintaining neutrality, the subjective
dice may be loaded. Nevertheless, even if allowance is made for the fact that
observer bias is a distinct possibility because it is clear that I have singled out
reversal theory for special consideration and demonstrated my preference by
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devoting a chapter to this mission, it seems to me that the reversal theory
explanation of humour draws strength from the fact that it is grounded in Apter's
enlightened metamotivational theory that he suggested as an alternative to Hebb' s
somewhat outdated optimal arousal theory. In other words, Apter's humour
theory is not simply the product of a one-off reflective insight but has been
developed as a logical extension ofthe reversal theory ofmetamotivation and has
received the empirical attentions of Svebak and other members of the invisible
college. There is no doubt that the reversal theory school has earned its position
of strength.
In the case ofthis particular example, the crown has rested relatively easily on the
head ofreversal theory. After all, who is to deny that the reader seeing the words
'semantic circumlocution' in this text, experienced a sense of' comic synergy' that
triggered a reversal from the telic-dominant mode to the paratelic-dominant mode?
And who is to say that the now-infamous smile may not have been the result of
his 'paratelic' desire to read humour into what is essentially a serious-minded
endeavour from which at that time he was finding little respite? In the final
analysis, it must be conceded that reversal theory emerges with credit as a
meaningful contributor to the ongoing body of knowledge of humour theory.
Caution must be observed, however, concerning methodology and extrapolation.
Nevertheless, it would be remiss not to interrupt the positive tone of these
sentiments by asking whether this particular intuitive explanation for a particular
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humorous event can be extrapolated to encompass all other events that a particular
reader finds humorous. The other significant question that arises from this
plausible but idiosyncratic interpretation ofthe elements ofa particular humorous
event also concerns extrapolation. We need to ask to what degree a personal
explanation ofthe experience ofhumour applies to other people encountering the
stimuli that the reader found humorous. In other words, we need to know if we
can extrapolate the idiosyncratic fmdings of a one-off event that appears to
corroborate reversal theory explanations, and apply these findings on a universal
level to other people and other humorous events. There is no alternative other than
to admit that the present answer to that question would be a resounding negative,
and to agree that the reversal theory explanation requires further investigation.
7.2.7 Relief or tension-reduction
The idea of seeking humour to find respite from the tensions inherent in serious-
minded academic pursuits is by no means novel. In fact, humour as a means of
tension-reduction is one of the most enduring and popular humour theory
categories, and it would be remiss of the reflective practitioner to leave so
prominent a stone untumed. Furthermore, it seems a reasonable supposition that
perhaps in the situation under scrutiny, I had reached a level of inner tension that
I felt impelled to escape. In such circumstances, the smile may have been the
safety valve of tension release. Perhaps at the time, the phrase 'semantic
circumlocution' may have appeared to be more comical than under less oppressive
atmospherics. In any event, the possibility must be considered that the
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manufacture of a humorous event could have arisen in the midst of a build-up of
tension through a saturation of 'serious-mindedness'.
Reflective reasoning reveals that a good case can be made for the presence of the
tension-reduction theory, and also for the not at all far-fetched notion that reversal
theory and tension-reduction are not entirely incompatible. In this respect, it has
been shown that reversals are associated with a switch from unpleasant to pleasant
levels of arousal as a product of motivation. Reversal theory is after all an
alternative explanation for the dynamics explained by the classic optimal arousal
theory, and both theories are concerned with showing the metarnotivational
dynamics ofwhat the man-in-the-street refers to as 'coping with tension'. In this
respect, it may be suggested that the switch or reversal from the tensions of the
serious telic-mode to the relaxed lightness of the paratelic-mode is really just
another way of describing the individual's instinctive desire to seek the relief of
tension-reduction.
7.2.8 Incon2ruity theory
The [mal category under consideration is probably the most popular ofthe humour
theories, namely incongruity theory. 'Semantic circumlocution' is basically an
incongruous phrase. It has a mock-serious grandiose Dickensian ring to it that
emphasizes its incongruity in an academic treatise in the late 1990s, and this alone
is probably enough to evoke a smile. In the Preface of his book The order of
things, Michael Foucault (1970) refers to the seemingly weird incongruities he
came across in a Chinese encyclopaedia in reference to the qualities of animals,
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and in commenting on the cause of his laughter uses the phrase: 'The stark
impossibility ofthinking that ... '. The italics are his, and emphasize incongruity.
In this phrase, with its inflection on the word 'that', Foucault captures something
of the essence of the reason why we appreciate incongruity humour which
depends upon the element of surprise in a fresh perception of the familiar.
A very apt example of incongruity humour appears rather incongruously (which
adds to the humorous effect) in the Introduction of an undergraduate Library
Studies textbook entitled Classification, as follows:
'The normal solemnity of museums is broken by an exhibit to be seen in Exeter.
In the centre of a room devoted to whales, there is a large model of a giraffe
bearing the label 'Not a whale'.
(Langridge, 1992:x)
In the present context, the interesting feature of this (perhaps tall) story is that it
is both a prime example of incongruity theory, as well as a perfect fit for those
seeking to interpret it in terms ofApter' s reversal theory ofhumour. The situation
has comic synergy, a playful ambience in a solemn venue, and the label has a wry
'less than' quality. All that is required is a paratelic or relaxed receiver (or group
of receivers) and perhaps heightened arousal, as we may rest assured would be
close at hand with the arrival ofthe first party of school children! Furthermore,
it would not be far-fetched to observe that this inventive little homage to humour
amidst' ... the normal solemnity ofmuseums' could also be interpreted as a classic
example of relief or tension-reduction humour, and that doubtless there is a
perfectly plausible psychoanalytic interpretation of its humour as well.
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At this stage, it is clear that the various categories have their respective strengths
and weaknesses, and that at times these so-called 'categories' may have areas of
compatibility as etiological factors in the humour process. This prompts a more
eclectic perspective and with it a tendency to reflect upon the possibility of the
coexistence of alternative explanations. A further tendency is to treat every
humorous event on its individual merits by avoiding formulaic generalised
interpretations in terms of universal theories, and thinking instead in terms of
etiological factors in specific humorous situations.
Amidst this blurring ofthe demarcations between the etiological factors advanced
by the various schools ofthought, there appears to be one certainty concerning the
nature of humour. The truth is that there is no easy answer to the imponderable
question concerning the nature ofa cause-effect relationship in humour. Whatever
the explanation put forward by those experiencing humour, it is evident that the
smile is the tip of the iceberg and that controversy awaits those who go below the
tip of this iceberg. For the humour researcher, this is tantamount to venturing
beyond the solid ground of empiricism, and into the less certain grey areas of
introspective reflection. (At this point, as a reflective reporter, I am compelled to
confess to having had a titanic battle to avoid succumbing to the temptation of
introducing an extended metaphor about the dangers ofthe researcher steering his
ship through unchartered waters!)
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On second thoughts however, the apt use of the metaphor ofhumour theory as an
iceberg may not be very original, but it serves as a useful catalyst for a reflective
comparison between reversal theory and incongruity theory. Basically, what has
happened is that in the process of using the 'iceberg' metaphor in the writing of
this text, the author has demonstrated an example ofan idiosyncratic tendency to
experience humour as part of the decision-making process involved in weighing
up the options of whether to use or not use analogies and mixed metaphors in
expressing his ideas. In this respect, as a function of this wordplay, he
momentarily entertained a fleeting temptation to describe 'the iceberg ofhumour
theory' as 'a tough nut to crack', and perhaps found this comparison amusing
because the stark incongruity of the iceberg and nut aroused his sense of the
ridiculous. This plausible explanation seems to fit the basic notion that by
definition and convention, mixed metaphors represent grammatically unacceptable
incongruities that bring amusement as a reaction to the comic synergy that is
essential to the incongruity theory of humour.
On closer inspection, it emerges that a notable feature of the humour of
incongruity is that it is not simply a case of 'vive la difference', but must also
involve the tension ofa humorous synergy. If the above example is pursued and
'the iceberg of humour theory' is described as a 'tough nut to crack', I would
consider this to be more amusing than for example ifthe iceberg was described as
a 'tough road to travel'. Both comparisons may be incongruous mixed metaphors,
but I consider the humour deriving from the 'tough nut' analogy to be more
159
intense because there are greater elements of both congruity and incongruity
between the iceberg and the nut than between the iceberg and the road. Both
iceberg and nut are noted for their toughness to crack, and the main source of the
humour is in the incongruity of their respective sizes. By contrast, the road has
no distinct congruity with the iceberg with the result that their difference in size
seems of little consequence because size is not a quality or characteristic I
generally associate with roads. From my perspective, this lack of distinctive
differences or similarities nullifies the humour of incongruity.
The complexity of the humour of incongruity lies in the connections that exist
between the incongruous elements that are humorously appealing. Just as the
iceberg and nut are both hard substances ofdisparate sizes, it may be observed that
the whale and giraffe of the earlier example in this sub-section have enough in
common as living mammals to make their incongruous juxtaposition amusing. In
this respect, a comparison can also be drawn between these combinations and the
combinations formed by well-known pairs of comic and cartoon characters who
in juxtaposition appear to elicit laughter. Hence, for example, Laurel (small,
short, thin, shy and introverted) looks amusing next to Hardy (big, tall, plump,
robust and extroverted) in the same way that Tweety (a tiny but cheeky canary)
does next to Sylvester (a large, belligerent black cat), or Pinky (a larger, gormless
but kindly mouse) does next to The Brain (a nasty little mouse who at times
resembles Napoleon and wants to take over the world).
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The comic synergy in all these cases is based on the fact that these pairs have an
area of commonality that reinforces a starkly obvious sense of incongruity
deriving from a comparison of other characteristics. For example, in the same
way that the iceberg and the road have nothing in common and do not generate
mirth together, Laurel would generally not be considered to be amusing when
standing next to a large cow or bus. On the other hand, amusement derives from
the juxtaposition ofLaure! with Hardy because ofthe pair's physical incongruity.
They have enough in common to make their differences amusing, and are living
proof that the humour of incongruity is heightened by its congruent ingredients.
Distinguishable elements of congruity are the essential catalysts in the
phenomenology of the humour of incongruity.
7.2.9 Derivative reflections
Although it may be a trifle circumlocutory, this sub-section (unlike its
predecessors) does not deal directly with the humorous event based upon
'semantic circumlocution'. The sub-heading 'Derivative reflections' (above)
indicates that the discussion that follows derives from matters arising (in this case,
'mixed metaphors') in the course ofthe process ofreflecting upon the mainsprings
of the humour deriving from the phrase 'semantic circumlocution'. The lines of
inquiry that follow are presented in accordance with Killen's (1996: 15) concept
of 'stable data'. The aim is to provide accessibility to those following 'the
sequential progression of reflective reasoning' and 'guidance to those seeking
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greater transparency in the detection of observer bias' (both quotations from
section 7.1 ofthis chapter).
From the standpoint ofself-examination and in the qualitative tradition ofthe case
study approach, there is evidence in my own case history over many years that I
have enjoyed the humour derived from both the mixed metaphors ofothers as well
as the mixed metaphors of my own that have crept into my writing or thinking.
Examples of this tendency are in fact recorded in the reflective reporting of the
previous sub-section.
As an exercise in 'self-objectification' (Gerdes et aI., 1981:87), my own case
history tends to indicate that one of the currently less fashionable schools of
motivational thought has relevance as the source ofan explanation for my obvious
predilection for the humour ofmixed metaphors. In the interests of transparency
within the present reflective process, it is necessary that I should also admit that
through the years I have never been attracted to the behaviourist perspective which
I have tended to regard as sound as far as it goes, and which I have always felt is
not far enough, thereby limiting the behaviourist approach largely to superficial
matters. This somewhat negative attitude is to some extent evident elsewhere in
this text, but is probably most obvious in Chapter One where I dwell on the
alliance ofhuman 'science' with technocratic idealism, as well as in Chapter Ten
where I share Miner's delight in lampooning the pretensions implicit in the jargon
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of the 1950s human 'science' movement, at the vanguard of which was
behaviourism.
Accordingly, a degree of reticence accompanied my initial realisation of the
relevance to humour theory of the traditional learning theory approach in which
it is posited that behaviour that is positively reinforced will be learned more
effectively, and that successful behaviour will be a source ofmotivation for future
behaviour. Contrary to popular belief, the principles of positive and negative
reinforcement do not only apply to rodents seeking food pellets at the end of
mazes, but also to humans seeking 'reinforcers' or favourable outcomes such as
the gratification ofa pleasurable experience, ofwhich the delight found in humour
is an excellent example. It follows that the applications of these ideas to humour
theory are a relatively straight-forward extension ofthe observation that a person
who is gratified or partially gratified by participating in a pleasurable experience
will be instrumental in attempting to initiate a similar pleasurable experience again
when the need arises.
These seemingly common-sense ideas have their empirical foundations in the
operant conditioning theory conceived by Skinner (1953). Skinner's learning
theory approach has the merit of providing a motivational perspective that
portrays people as being instrumental in asserting themselves by initiating
behaviour that controls or modifies their interactions with others, as opposed, for
example, to the Freudian or psychoanalytic perspective which tends to give the
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impression ofpeople as the victims oftheir intrinsic and extrinsic moral and social
environments. In Skinnerian terminology, 'operant' refers to a voluntary response
to initiate goal-directed behaviour with the implication that it represents a
proactive attempt to change the environment to achieve a desired outcome
(Mischel, 1981 :77-81). Hence, persons, who accept the hedonistic principle that
organisms seek pleasure and avoid pain, will have little difficulty with the operant
principle that posits that people are instrumental in both initiating experiences that
are successful or pleasurable, as well as avoiding experiences that are associated
with failure and unpleasantness.
The logical applications of learning theory to humour theory are that the
appreciation of humour is a gratifying pleasurable experience that will be sought
by persons; and that if the pleasures of humour become routinized as a regular
feature ofpeople's lives, they will become instrumental in creating or re-creating
situations that promise repetition ofthe desirable response ofhumorous pleasure.
A familiar example is to be found in the regular pattern ofhumorous experiences
ofpeople who look forward to their favourite television situation comedies or who
never miss the 'Madam and Eve' cartoon in the Mail & Guardian. In doing this,
people develop 'humour habits' that they often feel compelled to satisfy on a
regular periodic basis. In this regard, Drever (1977: 114) indicates that this process
is sometimes erroneously referred to as 'habituation' (which is synonymous with
'accommodation' or 'adaptation') when in fact it is a form of 'habit formation'
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which in the present context is manifested in the desire to experience a regular diet
of humorous experiences, among which is the humour of mixed metaphors.
An interesting facet of this line of inquiry is the fact that people enjoying humour
are not like locusts that constantly move from one feeding area to another to
satisfy their needs. By contrast, humans generally tend to carry a store of past
humorous experiences in the recesses of their memories; and either revive these
humorous events in anecdotal form to others who are willing to listen, or simply
recall them privately with a smile or guffaw when these recollections are jogged
from memory by a pertinent expression or incident encountered in the routine
course oftheir daily lives. It is for this reason that most people tend to remember
'the good times' and carry within themselves a storehouse ofanecdotes about the
golden days oftheir childhood or young adulthood. It is also why people seek out
the pleasure of humour from sources and locations where they have experienced
successful humour in the past, such as for example the above-mentioned Madam
and Eve cartoon strip or their favourite television 'sitcom' or even from the
camaraderie in the pub at the local sports club.
In the present context with its emphasis on mixed metaphors as the source of
humorous events, there is no disputing that the use of mixed metaphors by both
myselfand others in various contexts has been a source ofamusement to me down
the years. Some of the more memorable examples have been lasting sources of
pleasure that have engendered camaraderie among friends who shared the
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experiences initially and later nostalgically relished their revival in convivial
circumstances. One such example was a farewell tribute to a colleague, ofwhom
it was said: ' ... his footsteps will forever be indelibly etched in the corridors ofour
memories', which in context had a convoluted sincerity that I found
simultaneously touching and aesthetically pleasing as a humorous event. While
the words ofthis farewell tribute may no longer be fresh to the ears of the original
audience, they are still a source ofnostalgic humour shared with friends who were
once also vocational colleagues.
The dynamics of the humour of mixed metaphors presents an interesting line of
reflective inquiry in which the process of reception emerges as having a pivotal
role. At fIrst glance, the impression may be obtained that the humour of mixed
metaphors contains an element ofSchadenfreude with the laughter directed at an
unfortunate person falling flat after tripping on words rather than a banana-skin.
However from my own more circumspect reflective viewpoint as the receiver of
such humour, the analogy with the cliched banana-skin scenario is inappropriate.
In my eyes, the incongruity involved is not an equivalent ofthe sort ofamusement
that may be derived when a pompous person loses his self-styled dignity in
incongruous circumstances that demonstrate that pride comes before a fall. By
contrast, I perceive the humour ofmixed metaphors in terms ofthe spotlight being
not so much on the players as on the play itself, which in this case is the play on
words. While the identity ofthe players may to some degree increase the level of
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arousal and interest, basically the focus is on the denouement rather than the
characters involved.
Reflections upon the nature of the responses deriving from my reception of what
I consider to be humorous mixed metaphors suggests that the humour derives from
the incongruities of the comic synergies of the mixed meanings of the metaphors
themselves, rather than from a sense of superiority over the momentary lapses of
others. In fact, not only is there an absence ofmalice but also a willingness on my
part in the company of others within a paratelic-dominant climate to volunteer
examples of some of my own faux pas in this category of humour. Some may
interpret the latter tendency in terms of a psychoanalytic perspective as a
compensatory defence mechanism to allay anxiety deriving from a sense of guilt
stemming from a supposed perhaps subconscious awareness on my part that my
laughter is based on Schadenfreude. I am sceptical ofthis interpretation, and also
aware that this sceptical reaction may be interpreted as 'denial'. Nevertheless, my
own 'world view' celebrates individuals' prerogatives to interpret events as they
see them, and I do not discount the possibility that the psychoanalytic perspective
may be a valid one.
My own feeling is that in the case of friends and particularly loved ones,
inadvertent human errors such as mixed metaphors have an endearing quality, and
to some extent reinforce the bonding process through the camaraderie of shared
humour. Furthermore, this interpretation suggests that in some cases the mutual
167
appreciation of mixed metaphors may well be a subset of a larger family of
humorous events that focus on social bonding. In much the same way as
Vygotsky (1968) identified a social motive in his reinterpretation of Piaget's
reflections on the relationship between language and thought (cf. Chapter Eight
for fuller discussion), there is a convincing case for the argument that humour
often has a strong social motive that as an end is often considered to be more
important than the means (viz. the cleverness of the jokes involved).
In the light of these observations, it may be hypothesized that in many cases
humour represents the personal expression ofa social need, and is at the same time
an agent ofsocialization that reinforces bonding and permits the easier passage of
human relationships. In the present context, reflections upon my own
idiosyncratic experience ofthe nature ofthe humour ofmixed metaphors suggests
an affinity with the ideas ofthe anthropologist Christie Davies (1990) concerning
'ethnic scripting'. The basic similarities are firstly in the respective emphases of
the social motive and the absence ofmalice; and secondly, in the fact that because
the humour tends to be personal, sharing it tends to increase social bonding and
creates a more intense atmosphere of camaraderie. The contribution to humour
theory ofChristie Davies (including 'ethnic scripting') is discussed in more detail
in Chapter Nine which is devoted to 'the anthropology ofjest'.
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7.3 Concluding remarks
The reflective method reported in this chapter follows Killen's recommendations for
providing 'stable data'. The reporting commences with shorter initial reactions to the
causes ofhumour in terms of 'the smile oftriumph' and 'the smile ofnostalgia' , then
moves through a consideration ofa comprehensive variety oftheories to a reflective
self-examination involving aspects such as social motives and learning theory. There
has been evidence in these reflections of an idiosyncratic tendency on my part of
tolerance towards a range of etiological viewpoints as befits the ethos of the
qualitative perspective. An implicit acknowledgement ofindividual contributions to
humour theory is reflected in the spirit ofeclecticism that characterises my reflections
in this chapter.
The reflective process itself represents a systematic subjective journey with the aim
offinding out more about non-quantitative phenomena. My subjective interpretation
of the raison d'etre of my own thoughts and actions is basically an act of self-
attribution which is the subject of interest of a vast body ofpsychological research.
Sampson (1976:143-197) and Tedeschi and Lindskold (1976:133-188) provide
reviews ofearlier research in this field which Martinko (1995) indicates has increased
dramatically over the past two decades. For obvious reasons, an in-depth study of
self-attribution theories is beyond the parameters of this study.
In the more limited context of this chapter, some pertinent issues are raised by my
own tendency to find amusement in mixed metaphors as well as in phrases such as
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'semantic circumlocution'. From the perspective of reversal theory, the suggestion
is that the predilection to enjoy verbal humour of this type signifies the expression
of a need through a process involving a reversal of a telic-dominant state of mind.
The interpretation of reversal theorists is that inner tensions give rise to motives to
reverse the telic impetus and assume a more light-hearted paratelic-dominant state of
mind that prompts the individual to indulge in humour.
However, reversal theory is not the only way to interpret this situation. A brief
consideration ofthe ideas ofrelieftheory suggests that humour is a convenient means
of tension-reduction, whereas incongruity theory suggests that the humour stems
from comic synergy created between disparate elements and depends upon the
presentation of the content in a creative and memorable way. An almost textbook
example ofincongruity humour can be found in mixed metaphors which are basically
confused or mismatched verbal comparisons that by definition are based on
incongruity.
While reversal theory, relief theory and incongruity theory appear to operate within
different parameters, there is no reason to assume that they are not compatible in
certain cases, or that the theories cannot coexist and reinforce each other. On the one
hand, both reversal theory and relief theory deal mainly with the dynamics of
reception and the way that the individual's internal psychological state promotes
conditions favourable to humour receptivity. On the other hand, incongruity theory
focusses mainly on the message, and the way that the humour-receptive individual
170
interprets elements of the message that are perceived to be incongruent. What is of
further interest in this context is that comments concerning the congruence of these
theories have been expressed in the language ofcommunication theory and reception
theory which are also very relevant to considerations ofhumour as a process variable.
On reflection, there are several qualities that characterise my own predilection for the
humour of incongruous phrases and mixed metaphors. Not only do I find the
incongruity of their content amusing for its own sake, but I am also aware of the
valid standpoints of relief theory and reversal theory that humour satisfies needs for
tension-reduction. Likewise, I tend to endorse the operant conditioning viewpoint
of learning theorists that people seek out proven sources of humour that regularly
satisfy and reinforce needs that have resulted from habit formation. Furthermore, the
social motive is an equally important aspect ofmy experiences ofhumour as sources
of pleasure that often invoke a pleasing sense of nostalgia by reviving memories of
times when I enjoyed pleasurable experiences of humour in the past. In this way, I
too am not like the locust, and cherish the storehouse ofmy inner world. The humour
I experience is also ultimately its own reinforcer, and very often the nature of the
experience is essentially social and its reinforcement takes the form of social
bonding.
The fact that the reflective analysis conducted in this chapter has been framed within
the terms of reference used in a variety of theoretical approaches is some indication
ofthe fact that the whole question ofhumour theory remains inconclusive. Humour,
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like beauty, is in the eye ofthe beholder, and explanations ofhumour usually devolve
to the level of individual interpretation. In the absence of a universally accepted
theory of humour, it is probably not surprising that my own explanations of the
mainsprings of humorous events generally rely very much on idiosyncratic eclectic
interpretation rather than formulaic adherence to any particular school of approach
to humour theory. The spirit of this reflective account favours the view that in the
absence ofthe certainty promised in the technocratic Valhalla, the researcher should
embrace the aesthetic of uncertainty by maintaining an open mind towards existing
humour theories and an open door policy to new ones.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Humour, orality and the oral
tradition
8.1 Introduction
The question of the relationship between humour deriving from print sources and
humour deriving from oral situations has received little or no attention in the research
literature, and yet this is an area ofvital concern to humour theory in general. In this
chapter, attention is given to an examination of the question of studying humour in
the context of orality and the oral tradition. It is a topic that I have raised before in
a paper entitled 'Humour and the oral tradition: it's not the joke, it's the way you tell
it' presented at the Vth International Oral Tradition Conference held in July 1997 at
the Centre for Oral Study, University ofNatal (Durban) on the theme 'Oral tradition
and its performance' (Sienaert [ed.], 1998). This conference paper is presented in its
entirety in Appendix E, and should be read in conjunction with this chapter which
approaches the topic differently in terms of its context as part of this study. In this
respect, the primary concern of the present chapter is to examine some relevant
aspects of orality and the oral tradition in terms of their implications for the
qualitative study of humour theory.
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This chapter also contains another example of reflective practice. Accordingly, the
features of transparency and informality that were emphasised in Chapter Seven are
once again prominent in the reporting of subjective responses to a range of non-
quantitative stimuli relevant to the orality factor in the humour process. By way of
introduction to this exercise in reflectivity focussing on the relationship between
orality and cognitive perceptions of humour, some comments are appropriate
concerning the early use of reflectivity as a necessary approach to the task of
formulating theories concerning the relationship between language and thought.
Pioneer naturalistic studies, such as those ofJean Piaget, have impacted significantly
upon the current development of human studies research methodology, and provide
tangible evidence that although the term 'reflective practice' has received recent
attention as an in-vogue qualitative methodological approach, it is by no means
novel. In fact, the process that is currently referred to as 'reflectivity' has a long and
distinguished tradition in the field of human studies.
By way ofexample, reference can be made to two of Jean Piaget's classic studies of
childhood cognitive development (Piaget, 1952 and 1954) that were based on
subjective interpretations of his own and his wife's observations of their three
children's behaviour on a continuous basis during the period of the children's early
development (Ginsburg and Opper, 1969:7). Among the various terms ofreference
that have been used to describe Piaget's approach, Ault (1977:6), for example, refers
to Piaget's use of 'naturalistic observation' in implementing 'the process approach'.
This is not to suggest that Piaget was not a proponent of empiricism. On the
174
contrary, Piaget's observations ofearly childhood development were meticulous and
systematic; however when he reached the inevitable stage ofconverting observations
into theories about process, his conclusions about the relationship between language
and thought in early childhood took on a reflective character.
Despite his international reputation for outstanding scholarship, there has always
been a lingering sense ofreservation concerning Piaget' s findings because his modus
operandi did not conform to the standard quantitative paradigm ofwhat Ault refers
to as 'laboratory experimentation'. Piaget's theories concerning the early
development oflanguage and thought were basically qualitative reflections based on
his empirical experience, and his conclusions met with criticism from other reflective
thinkers, such as for example Vygotsky (1962:9-24) who posits a convincing
alternative theory. However, the main issue in the present context is that Piaget made
his research contribution in a problematic area of study in the only manner possible
in the circumstances, namely naturalistic observation and reflection. He had no
recourse to a quantitative safety net, but showed the willingness and courage to
eschew 'ameaningful thinking' (Koch, 1981 :264, and cited in Chapter One) by
tackling a real problem directly although it was clearly problematic.
Piaget's supporters, including Ault (1977:7), readily acknowledge the potential
weaknesses and dangers inherent in the naturalistic process approach. For example,
although limited and biassed sampling procedures may allow for in-depth
observation, there is also the inevitable weakness that they nullify extrapolation
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because the sample is not random. Furthermore, there is no denying that there are
dangers inherent in subjective interpretations. Apart from the well-documented perils
of observer bias, there is also the issue that a flexible qualitative approach portends
a lack of systematization and consequently offers little opportunity for reliable
replicability by other investigators.
Nevertheless, there is another side to this issue that cannot be ignored, and this is that
quantitatively-orientated laboratory approaches tend to sacrifice natural situations and
breadth of vision at the altar of control, and consequently often suffer from
artificiality and narrowness of scope. Clearly, the paths of reflective practice are
strewn with thorns but also offer potentialities for insights to those who are cautious
and brave. In any event, there is merit in following the example of Piaget and not
avoiding the paths of reflection because the terrain appears problematic.
The question of examining the significance of orality in the qualitative study of
humour theory is very different from Piaget's process studies of his own children's
cognitive development. Nevertheless, it is also a topic of great magnitude that must
be respected for its complexity, and awaits a more comprehensive treatment than that
permitted by the somewhat narrow parameters ofa single chapter in this study. The
present avenue of inquiry, though limited, presents a range of insights into aspects
of the oral nature of humour and also into the fact that the orality factor has been
neglected by most humour theorists.
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Furthermore, it is also the orality factor that is the vital thread that holds the
construction ofthe present chapter together. At first I contemplated separate chapters
on (a) the practical everyday implications oforality as an intrinsic feature ofhumour,
and (b) the relevance of theoretical and philosophical interpretations of the literate
and oral traditions as related to process theories of humour. However, I decided
against this in spite of the apparent differences between these topics. The main
reason was an awareness of a prevalent social attitude that has often led to a
misleading distinction being drawn between practice and theory. On the one hand,
there seems to be a tendency among many practitioners of associating practice with
usefulness, skill, progress and the so-called 'real world', as opposed to what are
perceived as the more remote, armchair ruminations of theoreticians. On the other
hand, many theoreticians tend to associate the domain of theory with intellectual
insight, in-depth analysis and high-level academic participation as opposed to what
many perceive as the journeyman mundanities ofpractitioners 'who like to use their
hands rather than their brains' .
In the interests ofavoiding the old 'town and gown' argument, and with the hope of
bringing the street and the ivory tower closer together, I have incorporated both the
practical and theoretical perspectives oforality into this chapter. In the first instance,
reflective practice is utilised to reconstruct the essentials of two case studies based
on my own personal experience, to provide concrete practical evidence of the vital
role of nonverbal performance variables in the humour process. In the second
instance, the discussion concerning the concept oforality and its relevance to humour
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theory is carried on to a more philosophical plane with reference to the oral and
literate traditions and their significance in the evolution ofcultural patterns ofhuman
behaviour. In this respect the work of Marcel Jousse receives special attention
because although his views were produced some seventy years ago, they continue to
have relevance as an almost prophetic example of 'critical reflection' (Killen,
1997:15) that applies to the current status of literacy and orality in contemporary
academics.
8.2 The performance of humour
The sub-title ofthe conference paper referred to in section 8.1 above and reproduced
in. Appendix E, is the well-known expression: 'It's not the joke, it's the way you
tell it'. This sub-title serves as a moot starting point to introduce the concept of the
role of orality in the humour process. It also brings to attention the universal notion
that timing (which usually amounts to doing the right thing at the right time to appeal
to the specific audience involved) is the key to effective humour, and thereby
underlines the fact that orality is far more than mere verbalisation. On the contrary,
the dynamics ofhumour-in-action are essentially a matter ofthe gestalt ofverbal and
gestual orality in an interactional communication situation in which sender (or
senders) and receiver (or receivers) strike a common chord to achieve a humorous
reaction.
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Humour arises as the product of the dynamism of a personal reaction to a stimuli
perceived as amusing. As such, the level ofso-called humorous arousal experienced
by the individual is an emotional reaction to communication that often seems
spontaneous and usually has an element of cognitive interpretation at its root. The
question oflaughter as a spontaneous expression ofrelaxed arousal is to some extent
controversial because individual differences prevent a universal cause-effect
relationship from being established.
The receiver of the potentially humorous message is often perceived as making an
implicit decision as to whether the potentially humorous content is funny or not, and
then making this decision explicit by either laughing or not laughing. The
phenomenology of the humour process is influenced by environmental factors such
as the physical presence of others as well as the immediate impact of the
sociopolitical climate at the time the humour is experienced. The humour
environment also plays a vital role in cases when the question of political or social
correctness arises, which some may hypothesize occurs every time humour is shared
with another or others.
Contextualization and peer pressure are key factors in a communication situation in
which on occasions there may be a marked distinction between the intrinsic
appreciation ofhumour and the extrinsic expression of this appreciation of humour
in the presence of others. Common examples of this behavioural pattern may be
found in the polite laughter response to a joke that the receiver has already heard and
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no longer finds amusing, as well as in the act of laughing perfunctorily after an
evident 'punch-line' that the receiver has not interpreted as amusing. In these
examples, a convincing case can be made that the scenarios are devoid of humour
because the reception of the message has failed to produce the phenomenological
reaction that gives life to humour.
The dichotomy between the intrinsic reaction to humour and its extrinsic expression
is very much in evidence in the context of humour with content that pivots on social
or political correctness (popularly referred to as'good/bad taste'). Contextualization
usually plays a vital role in situations in which decisions may have to be made as to
whether the content is in good taste or not, and consequently whether laughter is in
order or not. The other side ofthis coin is that the elements ofthe latter scenario may
be reversed in situations involving certain people in certain circumstances, where
laughter may at times be considered to be in order simply because the content is not
considered to be in good taste.
In this sense, humour may be viewed from a phenomenological perspective with
laughter as the potential product of a situation in which the phenomenon of humour
is created in situ in the process of communication. In most cases, the reception of
humour is strongly influenced by situational variables such as the nature and tone of
the communicational situation. In the case of the oral transmission of humour, the
situational variables generally include factors such as the social and emotional
climate of the event, as well as the attitudes and state-of-mind of the other receivers
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of the potentially humorous message who are in a sense the individual's 'co-
conspirators' in sharing the joke. The importance ofcontextualization is once again
paramount. Quite understandably, for example, the so-called 'humorous' content that
may be considered acceptable in a tavern may also be considered to be blasphemous
in a place of worship or totally unacceptable at an inopportune time such as at a
funeral.
The humour in orality situations differs significantly from humour in literate
situations in which the receiver of the humorous message usually has a far greater
degree ofcontrol over the situational factors involved. Reading material is generally
portable, and readers of humorous material are usually able to decide when, where
and how much of the content they wish to receive. Whereas the literate tradition is
based on what Jousse (1990: 133) refers to as 'the dead letters of texts', by contrast
the essential ingredient of orality is what is popularly referred to as 'live'
performance.
In 'live' situations, actions may often be seen to speak louder than words. However,
what is more important in this context is that it is misleading to attempt to separate
the actions from the words. Even if the performance is not greater than the sum of
its parts, then it is certainly different from the sum ofits parts, and likewise the words
are different without the gestual setting. The Greek philosopher Heraclitus was
certainly correct in more ways than one when he said:
'You cannot step twice into the same river, for the water into which you first stepped
will by now have flowed on, and other water taken its place.' (Ross, 1962:76)
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The same principles apply to the performance of oral humour which at times loses
its impact after the first flush ofhumour is assimilated but which at other times may
gain in quality with familiarity.
In order to examine the performance aspect of humour more fully, sections 8.3 and
8.4 of this chapter are devoted to a consideration of two 'live' performances that
constitute case studies that serve as the basis for further discussion. These same
examples of performances ofhumour appeared in Chapter Four as the two briefjoke-
telling scenarios used as the basis for the reflective analysis of certain humour
variables. Issues arising from the discussion in Chapter Four served to give notice
ofthe need for further consideration of the role oforality and the oral tradition in the
qualitative study of humour. The decision to postpone a fuller discussion of these
scenarios until the present chapter was based on the perceived need to provide
information pertaining to a relatively comprehensive theoretical frame of reference
upon which to base the reflective analysis of these case studies. Accordingly, the
necessary theoretical territory has been traversed in the intervening chapters up to this
point, and the discussion that constitutes the process of reflective analysis proceeds
on the assumption that readers are familiar with the basic tenets ofa range ofhumour
theories.
Both case studies are re-constructed accounts of my own 'real-life' experiences of
'live' performances. The first case study represents a scenario that I experienced
several times as an audience member in places ofentertainment during the era ofthe
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so-called 'post-apartheid' South Africa ofthe mid-1990s when many contemporary
professional comedians were using topical sociopolitical material about the 'Rainbow
Nation' as their stock-in-trade to enliven their acts and stimulate audience arousal.
High on the list of crowd-favourites were jokes involving impersonations of high-
profile South African politicians and public figures such as Nelson Mandela, Gatsha
Buthelezi, Frederick de Klerk, P.W. Botha, Archbishop Tutu and Arnritraj Rajbansi.
The spontaneous laughter nearly always evoked by the these impersonations on
virtually every level across the cultural and racial spectrum probably constituted a
classic example of tension-reduction because these oral performances provided
welcome comic relief amidst a tense sociopolitical climate.
The first case study presented as 'The comedian' (below) is based on a 'live'
performance witnessed at a charity bier/est at a sports-club in Durban North (South
Africa) in 1996. The second 'case study', entitled 'The new boss', involves an
adaptation of my own experiences of corporate life within a bureaucracy over a
period of many years. During my time as a relatively civil servant, I experienced
scenarios based on the introduction of several 'new bosses', and on a few occasions
was introduced to others as a 'new boss'. The scenario involving the first formal
staff meeting conducted by the newly appointed 'lahnee' will surely strike a chord
of recognition among corporate animals everywhere, and it certainly amused those
ofmy erstwhile bureaucratic colleagues who were privy to this 'case study' prior to
publication.
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The modus operandi adopted in this chapter builds upon the foundations established
in Chapter Seven which represents an in-depth qualitative study ofa single humorous
event, and is grounded in the methodology of reflective practice. In the present
chapter, the process of reflectivity is applied to the reporting ofcase studies that are
also necessarily interpreted in a personalised fashion as is the custom in reflective
practice. It is my belief that humour, like beauty, is in the eye ofthe beholder, and
that idiosyncratic perspectives of the humour process have their part to play in the
grander scheme of humour theory. It is hoped that readers may offer alternative
interpretations ofthe scenarios provided, which is what sets this approach apart from
both the greater certainties as well as the greater limitations of the quantitative
perspective.
8.3 Case study: the comedian
In this scenario, a comedian delivers a humorous monologue involving a highly
prominent and controversial local politician during a performance in a place of
entertainment in suburban Durban (South Africa). The audience are relaxed and
ready to be entertained in convivial circumstances that favour the transmission and
reception of humour. The humorous story about the well-known politician, which
turns out to be a sort ofmodernised 'trickster tale' , is rendered effectively in relaxed
conditions in which there is no restraint on 'laughing behaviour'.
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The audience particularly enjoy the part of the monologue that involves the
comedian's caricatured impressions of a dialogue between the politician and an
equally controversial ex-Prime Minister. Several audience members clap while
others laugh loudly and uninhibitedly at periods during the comedian's performance
in which he contrives to capture the accents, mannerisms and nuances of the speech,
expressions, gestures and actions of the characters of his story.
Reflective analysis:
It is not difficult to interpret this 'case study' in terms of basic qualitative
approaches. The joke-telling scenario involving the comedian and his audience
fits readily into the basic paradigm of communication theory in which the
reception process is viewed in terms ofan interactive relationship between sender
and receiver, as discussed in section 4.5.1 of Chapter Four. As the sender of
communication, the comedian is aware of his audience's reception preferences
because he enters the communication situation with a set of expectations based
upon previous experiences that he proceeds to test against the feedback he receives
from the audience. During his delivery of the monologue the comedian
experiences the nature of the audience's responses to cues concerning the
politicians, and this information prompts him to decide that both politicians are
viable vehicles for the humour of good-natured ridicule.
For their part, the audience also enter the communication situation with certain
preconceived expectations and their response is to some extent dependent upon
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the beliefs, values, attitudes and ambitions that they bring to the scenario. Ifthey
demonstrate their glee in uproarious laughter and spontaneous applause when the
well-known local politician turns out to be the butt of the joke, this allows for a
variety of interpretations ofthe humorous event. For example, the comedian's
message may be interpreted by some as being embedded within a playful mood
ofSchadenfreude with the politician as victim by mutual consent (cf. section 2.2.1
of Chapter Two).
There are as many alternative explanations ofthe dynamics ofthis process as there
are perspectives of the nature ofhumour. In terms ofthe approaches emphasized
in the present study, this scenario can also be interpreted in terms of the criteria
selected by Murdock and Ganim (1993:57-70) for the macro-analysis ofhumour
theories, as discussed in Chapter Five. From the standpoint ofthe specific criteria
identified by Murdoch and Ganim, the joke-telling scenario (above) represents a
straight-forward, highly-structured humorous event conducted under favourable
press conditions in which the audience fulfills their expectations of the purpose
of the humour with laughter that is the product of the humour.
From the standpoint of tension-reduction theory, it appears plausible to assume
that the tensions that the audience have presumably built up in a rather tense
sociopolitical climate during the week are released as laughter becomes their
safety valve. Furthermore, there is a very small step from tension-reduction
theory to incongruity theory that posits that the laughter response on the part of
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the audience indicates that they have assimilated the joke's denouement (or in the
vernacular: 'caughtthe joke') by perceiving the incongruities that give a humorous
twist to the ending of the story they have just heard.
The scenario can also be interpreted qualitatively by a reflective process of
empathy with either the sender or the receivers of the communication. In this
respect, my own experience of similar situations leads me to conjecture that the
comedian feels a sense of exhilarated relief in reaction to the success of his joke.
This may be the culmination ofa growing feeling oftension-reduction that he has
experienced as a result of the audience's positive feedback throughout his
performance. The comedian may regard the audience's laughter as a product of
their collective experience ofthe humorous event ofthe comedian's own creation.
In terms of attribution theory, the comedian would view success as the result of
his own personal qualities, and failures as a function of external factors such as
racial or political prejudice by others (Tedeschi and Lindskold, 1976: 156). In this
respect, we may conjecture that the comedian probably regards the response of
laughter and applause as a tribute to his personal skills and capabilities as a
comedian, and the feedback that the comedian experiences from the audience
probably reinforces his self-perception.
In similar vein, a line ofreflective interpretation may be employed by empathising
with the audience in the joke-telling scenario. My own experiences as an audience
member awaiting the performances of a variety of well-known local comedians
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leads me to conjecture that audience members are active participants in a scenario
in which they hope to fulfill their own expectations of enjoying the humour
process they have anticipated. The informal and generally relaxed atmosphere
(that in certain cases may have been partially stimulated by the alcoholic
beverages that have been imbibed) reinforces the general mood oflevity. Reversal
theorists have chosen to refer to this relaxed state as 'paratelic-dominance' (cf.
Chapter Six). The audience have presumably assumed a 'ludic' frame ofreference
(Nell, 1988:7), and their new found spirit of playfulness is directed towards the
politician 'they love to hate' who in a paradoxical sense has fostered group
solidarity because he has emerged as a communal figure-of-fun.
In this example, a meaningful case can be made for the credibility of superiority
theory (cf. section 2.3.1 ofChapter Two). At least part ofthe audience's laughter
is produced by their playful but heightened emotional reaction to the fact that the
politician emerges as the butt of the story in the joke's denouement when the
audience's surprised laughter climaxes. The sudden perception that the politician
has become the victim of his own treachery pleases the audience, and seems to
feed their need to experience a sense of superiority. Furthermore, reversal
theorists indicate that the fact that the joke focusses on a controversial celebrity
and not merely a man-in-the-street has the effect of heightening arousal and
producing a more intense laughter response (Apter, 1989:139-140).
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8.4 Case study: the new boss
The second scenario is a reconstructed case study in which a new boss conducts his
first meeting with his newly acquired staff. In assessing the situation, the new boss
experiences an awareness of the press of environmental conditions that engender a
degree oftension and suspicion on the part ofthe staffwho seem fearful or distrustful
ofhim as their new boss. To alleviate this tension, the new boss decides to employ
a short joke about a foolish mistake he once made as a young employee. Amidst the
rather stilted atmosphere of the staff meeting, the new boss delivers the joke rather
awkwardly soon after opening the meeting. Nevertheless, the staff responds with
general but subdued laughter, and the meeting proceeds as planned.
Reflective analysis:
As in the previous sub-section, a qualitative interpretation of this scenario may
commence in terms ofa consideration ofthe communication interaction between
sender and receivers. On reflection, my initial impression was that the reception
dynamics of the second scenario presents a more complex picture than the
reception dynamics of the first scenario. I attribute the main reason for this
impression as being my observation that most of the audience members were
probably still in a predominantly telic-mode (cf. Chapter Six: Apter's theory) at
the time of the delivery of the joke. In what is described in the case study as the
'stilted atmosphere' shortly after the commencement of the meeting, the same
state of telic-dominance could probably also be attributed to the new boss.
189
In this respect, the interesting possibility arises as to whether in fact the humour
process would be considered as being consummated if the receivers did not
actually experience humour in the situation. Bremmer and Roodenburg (1997:1),
have postulated that 'humorous' intentions are all that are required for humour to
have taken place, but generally other theorists (including phenomenologists,
reversal theorists, systemic theorists, communication theorists and others) are far
more demanding. The general consensus is that humour involves communication
in an interactive process that emphasizes reception dynamics.
As mentioned above, my first impression in considering the possibilities of
reception in these respective scenarios was that there was far greater certainty
concerning the homogeneity ofthe audience of 'The comedian' than there was for
the audience of 'The new boss'. The comedian's audience was predisposed to
laughter, almost as a communal act of collective wish-fulfilment. By contrast,
some of the office staff were, if anything, predisposed towards 'future shock'.
This is not as contradictory as it first sounds because it must be remembered that
the protagonist in the scenario was a new boss who presumably had a new broom
in hand, and certain employees probably envisaged their past expectations
concerning the future as being swept aside. In the true sense of Toffler's
conceptualisation of 'future shock', some ofthe office staffwere confronting their
destiny in a scenario in which the new boss may have been seen as the epitome of
the future that they had not anticipated (Toffler, 1970).
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If we accept that the ambivalence of the circumstances surrounding the staff
meeting engendered a mixture of emotions among the audience, then various
possibilities suggest themselves to explain the presumably deceptive appearance
of consensual laughter among the office staff of the audience. For example,
because the joke was about the fallibility of the boss, some of the staff may have
laughed because they sensed a feeling of superiority over authority. Another
outcome or product in the process may have been polite, somewhat restrained
laughter on the part of some of the staff who were wary of decorum and seeking
to present an appropriate response in harmony with their conceptualizations of
expected employer-employee behaviour.
Others may have recognised the reason for the 'humorous event', and may have
decided that their interests would be best served by participating in the corporate
game by providing the new boss with the desired feedback oflaughter irrespective
of whether they found the intended humour to be funny or not. Some may even
have laughed as an act of kindness in sympathy with the new boss who was
apparently experiencing what they may have perceived as a moment of
embarrassment or difficulty as he faced his first confrontation with what may have
seemed to him to be a hostile staff. In the latter case, the laughter response could
be interpreted as the kind-hearted result of an empathetic reception dynamic.
Finally, of course, the possibility should not be discounted that some of the
audience may even have enjoyed the joke for its own sake.
191
A range of pertinent issues emerge from a brief analysis of the various causal
subsets that may have been attributed to the staffs laughter. An important
problem area is created by the fact that observers can only measure observable
behaviour which in this case is the staff s laughter. In the circumstances, this
laughter (if indeed it is as 'stilted', as implied in the reporting ofthe case study)
represents a routinized behaviour pattern as a stock response within a familiar
situation. Reflectivity is required to investigate the intrinsic elements of the
reception dynamics involved. There is a need, for example, to consider the
question of the qualitative spirit of the response rather than to simply attempt to
use the laughter as a quantitative measure of the effectiveness of the joke. The
laughter ofdifferent individual members ofstaffprobably meant different things.
For example, the laughter of one of the subsets signifies a sympathetic response,
whereas the laughter of another may signify calculated self-interest. In both of
these subsets, the response of the audience may have been at least partly a
ritualistic form of reciprocation to reward the new boss for extending a symbolic
hand of sympathy and cooperation towards the staff with his attempt at self-
deprecating humour. In both cases, the receivers' roles in the gestalt ofthis social
exchange may have been to respond to the intentions of the sender rather than to
the quality of his attempt to initiate a so-called 'humorous event'.
Furthermore, as was the case with the reception of the new boss' message, there
could also have been a variety of different ways in which the sender of the
communication could have reacted. He may have been in sympathy with the
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audience and the situation, and passed straight from his 'flopped' joke to the fIrst
order of business without any hiatus. Alternatively, the new boss may not have
had strong powers of self-perception, and may have failed to recognize the
realities ofthe situation because he was predisposed (perhaps naively) towards his
role as an initiator of self-deprecating humour in order to gain the support of the
staff. If his reality-orientation was not too strong, or if the acting abilities of the
staff were convincing enough, the new boss may even have been gratifIed to
witness evidence of the effectiveness of his contrived use of humour as an agent
of tension-reduction and public relations, and this feeling of success may have
reduced his own tensions as well. There are also some cynics who would argue
convincingly that the entire scenario was an endorsement of OffIce Rule Number
One (viz. 'When the boss tells a joke, everyone laughs') as well as OffIce Rule
Number Two (viz. 'Refer to Rule Number One').
8.5 General comment concerning the case studies
The juxtaposition ofthe analyses ofthe two respective joke-telling scenarios provides
some practical insights into the benefIts of systematic reflective analysis in terms of
key concepts or characteristics that may act as catalysts in the phenomenology ofthe
humour process. A further aspect of interest that emerges from this analytical
process is that reflectivity by its nature reflects the 'world view' of the observer. In
the foregoing analysis, for example, the tendency towards eclecticism becomes
apparent in the subjective qualitative considerations embedded in the reflectivity of
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the analytical process. The course taken by the process of reflective analysis tends
towards the multidimensional integration of diverse categories of humour theories
such as 'play/spontaneity', 'release/relief, and 'incongruity/unexpected
relationships', as identified by Murdock and Ganim (1993 :66) and discussed in
Chapter Five. Reference is also made to reversal theory, attribution theory,
communication theory and superiority theory in the analytical commentaries
accompanying the two case studies in question.
In the qualitative analyses accompanying the case-study scenarios, an attempt has
been made to present a picture of the multidimensional nature of two different,
relatively straightforward, top-down communication situations that focussed upon
deliberate acts by a joke-teller to initiate the humour process. The analysis of the
elements of these situations revealed the complexity of the respective
phenomenological reception dynamics pertaining to each scenario. Likewise, no
great leap of imagination would be required to appreciate the vast gulf between the
reception of print-based humour and the reception of orality-based humour. In this
regard, 'orality' encompasses more than the limited 'spoken' or 'word of mouth'
interpretation traditionally ascribed to it by lexicographers who are mindful of the
word's Latin origins as 'oris' (Concise Oxford dictionary of current English,
1964:851). By contrast, in terms ofthe vocabulary ofacademics specialising in this
field, 'orality' infers a wide range of performance characteristics, one of the
components ofwhich is the verbal aspect.
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Nevertheless, the idea of using words to convey thoughts and feelings is vital to a
fuller understanding of the nature of the communication process. The difference
between words in performance and words in printed form is vast, and this has
particular relevance in the case ofhumour where we have been assured that' It's not
the joke, it's the way you tell it' (cf. Appendix E). In the next section, this issue is
viewed from an ethnological as well as a philological perspective in a discussion that
demonstrates that there is many a true word spoken in Jousse (1970).
8.6 Translating performance into words
The scenarios discussed in the case studies in sections 8.3 and 8.4 reveal another truth
about humour that is difficult to communicate verbally. In fact, this difficulty itself
is indicative ofthe nature ofthe problem because verbal communication is the issue.
The ritual of using words to describe humour and to attempt to explain the
mainsprings of humour is an inadequate and inappropriate means to an end. In this
respect, the lyrics of the well-known 1960s popsong 'Words' (penned by the Gibb
brothers and sung rather plaintively by the same gents as members ofthe Bee Gees),
communicates this point succinctly as follows:
'It's only words, and words are all I have, to take your heart away'.
While these lyrics (like Gertrude Stein's'A rose is a rose is a rose ') may leave a first
impression ofbeing somewhat banal and inappropriate in this context, it will shortly
be evident that they convey a message that is pivotal in this chapter. In fact, this
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seemingly simplistic statement has relevance to the entire endeavour involved in the
act of writing a dissertation on humour. The experience of humour is a nonverbal
personal emotional experience that may well represent an expression of tension -
release as the playfulness of the ludic spirit dominates the consciousness to produce
a laugh or smile that for the moment in a figurative sense contrives 'to take your heart
away'. Clearly, words are an inadequate vehicle to express this experience. The
central paradox is equally simple. Knowledge is embodied in words, and yet
experience lies beyond language.
Likewise, knowledge about humour is largely embodied in words, but experience of
humour lies largely beyond language. Conceptualizations of humour have great
diversity, and may be characterised as verbal or nonverbal, oral or literate, or a
combination of all of these. Furthermore, in everyday life the humour process (as,
for example, in the two case studies cited above) may be permeated by the
characteristic multidimensionality of orality in a performance context containing
aspects such as timing, nuance, inflection, gesture, body language, eye contact,
impersonation, tonal range, clarity, and enunciation.
In discussing the significance of the performance dimension to anthropological
fieldworkers, Fabian (1990:6) emphasizes the difficulty of 'calling up' information
about culture and expressing it in discursive statements, and argues that ' ... actual
physical presence in their world is an absolute prerequisite to access their lived
experience'. According to Fabian (1990:6), the chiefdilemma for the fieldworker is
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the recording of observational data because ' ... most of the relevant information is
nonverbal and cannot be called up, but has to be experienced as performed' (italics
my own). To the author of a dissertation on humour, such as myself, these ideas
concerning orality may be enlightening, but they are also ultimately frustrating
because 'words are all I have' to convey a multidimensional experience of humour.
There is partial solace in historical antecedents. The inadequacies ofthe written word
are a recurrent anthropological theme reiterated by a long line of academics who
ironically use the vehicle ofwords to complain about words. Among their numbers
is Fabian (cited above), as well as Scheub (1971 :31) whose article 'Translation of
African oral narrative-performances to the written word' bears an innocuous-
sounding title that surely raises knowing smiles from those conversant with the
tradition of oral studies. The reason for the knowing smiles is that Scheub's article
title expresses rather cogently the perennial dilemma of ethnologists and
anthropologists who are all well aware of the fact that they do not have the means or
methods to translate oral performance into written language.
Scheub enunciates this dilemma in the form ofa rhetorical question, then supplies an
appropriate answer himself. Scheub's apt reply to his own question is worth
recording in this context because it captures the essence of the dilemma also facing
the humour researcher attempting to transform the complex nuances of the
multifaceted phenomena residual in humour-in-action scenarios into words that are
appropriate for publication in a text such as this one. Scheub (1971:31) seems to
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speak for the entire ethnological research community when he expresses his ideas as
follows:
'How does one effectively translate the verbal and nonverbal elements of such a
tradition to the written word? It is impossible to consider the verbal elements ofthe
performance in isolation from the nonverbal, yet there is no useful way oftransferring
the nonverbal elements to paper.'
The simple words used by Scheub to answer to his own rhetorical question should
not be taken lightly because they express an indisputable truth concerning the
fallibility ofthe printed word as a means ofrecording and storing knowledge. Sadly,
the inevitable outcome of an intolerable situation of this nature is to be witnessed in
a contemporary First World sociocultural context in which print literacy has been
elevated to the detriment of a rich anthropological gestual heritage.
In this respect, it must be acknowledged that there is nothing novel in the recognition
of the seemingly insurmountable problem of transforming the multidimensionality
of performance into a unidimensional textual format. This theme was expressed
some seventy years ago in the writings of the French social philosopher, Marcel
Jousse (Sienaert, 1990:133, translation) who argues convincingly as follows:
'The original and capital sin ofour written-style civilisation is to think of itselfas the
civilisation par excellence, the one and only civilisation. Everything which does not
'appear' on its written pages does not exist.
Anthropological facts thus find themselves neglected, and for the most part
misunderstood. It follows that the human sciences cannot be the development ofwhat
is anthropological in ethnicity, but can only be a light overview of bookish ethnicity.
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We have in the face ofthis attitude, tried to change the method. Instead ofnarrowing
our field ofobservation to the 'dead' letters oftexts, we have brought a methodology
which is firstly, and above all, the awareness ofa 'living tool': the human geste.'
In its original context, the passage cited above was a preamble to Jousse' s description
of the domain of the anthropology ofgeste, and he used it to identify the need for a
broader, more in-depth study of gestual behaviour. Jousse's criticism is directed
mainly towards the prevailing tendency ofmainstream academia to deify the written
word to the detriment of a holistic perspective of gestual behaviour. Jousse's
observations retain their relevance some seven decades later in a milieu currently
characterized as the Information Age in which electronic text has become almost as
prominent as traditional text was during the 'Gutenberg Galaxy' when the paper-
based printed text predominated (McLuhan 1962) and created an environment in
which 'bookish ethnicity' thrived (Jousse in Sienaert, 1990: 133).
In the present context, the orality factor remains an enigma to academics mainly
because ofthe inadequacy ofwords to encapsulate the true nature ofcommunication
situations. The urgency in the tone of Jousse's criticism signifies his realisation of
the magnitude of the compounded errors of the ways of academics in approaching
human studies. In considering the contribution ofVerriest, Jousse (1990:70) supports
the argument that: 'The written language has succeeded in establishing itself as a
bastard variation of the primary language'. Basically, Verriest's argument is that
written language is a secondary and limited vehicle of communication because it
represents a bastardised version of primary reality. The logical implication of this
reasoning is that written language provides a distorted frame ofreference because it
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has inherent limitations that cannot be overcome to communicate a truer reflection
ofreality. Jousse (1990:70) is acutely aware ofthe need to recognize the significance
of orality, and the implicit perspective that he presents of Westem academia is of a
ruling discourse beset by a communication dilemma and clinging to the limitations
of a 'parasitic language' as the textual basis for its development.
Jousse's views on the significance of orality have important implications in the
context of this qualitative study of humour. In the first instance, traditional
perceptions ofhumour as a phenomenon are challenged because they are bedded in
a methodological approach that has relied far too heavily on print-based
questionnaires and textual reports. Jousse effectively alerts us to the world beyond
the narrow confines of verbal and textual unidimensionality. In so doing Jousse
leaves readers with an uneasy awareness that they have inherited a legacy of
incomplete and misleading perceptions of a reality that they have been viewing
through the distorting prism ofwords. Herein lies the difficulty not only in finding
out the truth about humour, but also in having to explain it in the terms of
conventional language that is unsatisfactory because words are unsuitable vehicles
to convey the full meaning of a phenomenon than is infinitely broader than mere
textuality. In short, the experience ofhumour is beyond language.
As a case in point, for example, let us assume that a chapter in an academic
dissertation on the nonverbal humour ofgraphic illustrations was to be presented by
a phenomenologist. With regard to this example, it may be argued that a committed
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phenomenologist would demonstrate commitment to the ethos of the philosophical
discipline ofphenomenology by presenting the reader with a fresh opportunity for the
phenomenological experience of responding aesthetically to art. Hence, rather than
selecting the more conventional alternative of presenting the reader with pages of
textual verbal philosophical discussion, the phenomenologist may entertain the
notion that a humorous picture could be worth a thousand words. In any event, there
is the strong probability of an uneasy awareness of the inadequacy of words.
Ifwe reflect upon the implications ofthe arguments contained in the above scenario,
we may ponder the question of whether the presentation of a collection of
appropriately humorous graphics (without accompanying comment) is not a more apt
phenomenological treatment of nonverbal humour than pages of textual discussion
ofon phenomenological theories ofhumour? In this context, it should be emphasized
at the outset that the question of choice is in fact unnecessary and that it may be
advisable for the phenomenologist concerned to employ both text and graphics.
Nevertheless, an interesting comparison can be made between primary experience
and vicarious experience. Bearing in mind that the ethos of the phenomenological
perspective is embedded in the dynamics of the act of creativity, there would be a
strong argument in favour of exposing the receivers of the communication process
to primary experience rather than to the ex cathedra delivery of secondary opinion.
In this case, primary experience may be interpreted as the opportunity to appreciate
aesthetically the humour in graphic illustrations rather than to grapple with wordy
attempts (such as this one!) to intellectualize the humorous experience. Accordingly,
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many would consider the former course ofaction to be preferable to that ofexposing
readers to the secondary experience ofwords that attempt in some way to explain the
wit of the original. It may also be argued that to do otherwise would be akin to
claiming that vicarious experience was superior to direct experience.
Notwithstanding, it should be noted in this context that the present concern is not so
much with an evaluation ofvicarious experience per se, but rather with an affirmation
that direct experience should not suffer by comparison with its imitator.
Verriest (in Jousse 1990:71 ) ponders over the consequences ofan academic tradition
that aggrandizes the imitation rather than the original, as follows:
'By a peculiar error it is accepted as an obvious truth that written language is the true
and correct language. It is in fact only an image, or copy, or representation ofspoken
language. But in this case, the original is discredited and the copy believed to be
authentic; the model is blamed when it does not exactly resemble the portrait that
some extremely bad painters have made of it' .
Jousse, in citing Verriest, highlights a classic case of adding insult to injury. In the
'written-style' civilisation', not only is print preferred to the exclusion of primary
spoken language and 'geste', but print is also preferred to the detriment of primary
language and 'geste'. The implications are clear. As every ethnographer knows,
written language is a pale unidimensional replica of original language and cannot
hope to encapsulate the holistic experience ofthe total communication process. The
ultimate insult (added to the injury of preference) is when the original forms are
discredited because they are dissimilar to their inferior secondary representatives.
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Words are at the centre of a paradox in human studies' inquiry. On the one hand,
words are commonly regarded by ethnologists as inadequate vehicles to record
aspects of orality; but on the other hand, words draw power from their role as
humankind's primary symbolic means ofrecording knowledge. There is no denying
the value of language; the problem lies in an over-reliance on language as a means
of recording experience so that it becomes a preferred substitute for it.
The aggrandisement of text has led to a situation in which the original has been
supplanted by the more socially acceptable 'image' or 'copy'. Instead of serving its
masters as a useful vehicle of communication, the written word has become the
master itself in a milieu that overvalues 'bookish ethnicity' and fails to cherish the
underlying relevance of 'spontaneous gesticulation' (Jousse, 1990:71) that is the life-
blood of cultural transmission. The impression that the reader gets from Jousse's
vision is that 'written-style civilisation' has subverted the natural order by putting
text ahead of orality in an academic environment in which the ruling discourse
ensures that anthropological ethnicity falls victim at the sacrificial altar of bookish
intellectualism.
8.7 Humour in words and deeds
There are uncompromising implications for contemporary human studies researchers
to be drawn from Jousse's (1970:70) penetrating argument that the sin of 'written-
style civilisation' is to abuse the gift of literacy by undermining human
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communication that is not written. A primary criticism is that the tendency for print-
literate societies to aggrandize textuality produces a superficial and misguided
understanding ofethnicity thereby creating a climate in which substance is sacrificed
because in-depth analysis is replaced by a bookish facade. The essential argument
is that substance has become servant to style, and in this sense Jousse's views echo
the sentiments ofcontemporary critics ofpost-modernism who rile at the predilection
of certain post-modernists to favour style over substance.
The problem is not with the question oftextuality itself, but with 'the human side of
the enterprise' (McGregor, 1962). As members ofan 'alphabetic culture' (Havelock,
1988:135), researchers have at their disposal a means (imperfect and inadequate
though it may be) to store and advance areas of knowledge as part of an ongoing
culture of academic inquiry. However, as Graff (1987:70) implies, it is not the
written word that is on trial. The 'capital and original sin' is a human one, and it
concerns the question of attitudes towards the written word. The coming of the
'Gutenberg Galaxy' (McLuhan, 1962) has produced literate cultures that have
established an ongoing legacy of over-reliance on the printed word to the exclusion
of primary forms of expression.
This situation pertains in the field of humour research where the reporting of the
phenomenon ofhumour is central to academic studies. Students ofhumour are well
aware of the wealth of humour that can be distinguished as having a nonverbal
character. The term 'nonverbal humour' covers a wide spectrum and may vary from
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the level offormal 'humorous' performances (such as in mime or dance) to so-called
'informal' nonverbal humour such as may arise in response to someone raising an
eyebrow or 'pulling a face'. Likewise, there is a wide diversity ofboth primary and
secondary forms of visual comedy including cartoons, photographs, movies,
television or 'live' theatrical performance. These forms ofvisual comedy may have
either verbal or nonverbal elements or a combination ofboth, and there are variations
within the genres ofvisual comedies themselves.
In this respect, for example, there is a vast legacy ofnonverbal black-and-white silent
movies featuring the humour of actors such as Charlie Chaplin, Harold Lloyd, and
others who have become cultural icons. Most of the early silent movies juxtapose
gestual sketches with concise subtitles as an aid to receivers, however the humour is
almost entirely nonverbal. There is also an even more vast accumulation of more
recent audiovisual video and celluloid motion picture comedies that involve a
combination of verbal and nonverbal elements in the humour process. Most of the
humour evoked in these audiovisual media presentations does not rely on the printed
word, and there is a wide range ofaudiovisual devices used as catalysts for humorous
effects.
Examples of these catalysts abound in the vast television humour industry where
there has been a routinisation of the practice ofmanipulating the collective sense of
humour ofthe mass media audience by means ofaudiovisual cues that rely on studio
production and editing techniques. These devices range from the edited insertion of
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blatant audio cues (such as 'piped-in' audience laughter) to sensitize viewers to
humour content, as well as more subtle audio devices such as appropriate music and
sound effects. The television 'sitcom' industry also relies heavily on manipulative
visual devices such as extreme close-ups of the facial expressions of relevant comic
characters that signpost and reinforce intended humorous situations.
Sadly, the multidimensional nature of humour as a field of study is not reflected in
a representative manner in the content of ongoing humour research. In spite of the
diverse and rich array of types and forms of humour, the vast majority of humour
studies focus on words, and the explanations provided by humour theories inevitably
focus on 'humorous events' involving words. In effect, words have formed an
alphabetic curtain that screens observers from the 'big picture'. There is an urgent
need for researchers to venture beyond the alphabetic curtain of the 'alphabetic
culture' (Havelock, 1988:135), and to look more closely at forms of humour other
than verbal forms.
Accordingly, in the two 'humorous event' case-studies presented in sections 8.3 and
8.4 ofthis chapter, the performance elements were considered crucial to the humour
or lack ofhumour in the behavioural events that were described, and an attempt was
made to report the salient features ofthe verbal- nonverbal synergy ofthe humour as
a communication exchange. Like Scheub (1971 :31) some twenty-seven years ago,
I too found it ' .. .impossible to consider the verbal elements of performance in
isolation from the nonverbal' , and no amount ofhead-scratching could produce a ' ...
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useful way of transferring the nonverbal elements to paper'. The frustrations
involved were somewhat akin to being able to read a song's lyrics but being unable
to hear its melody.
There seems to be no ready-made solution to this dilemma. However, we do live in
an Electronic Age; and as urban cave-dwellers of the global village, the new post-
print media are at our disposal (McLuhan, 1975). For several decades, it has been
possible to make audio-tape recordings and video-tape recordings ofevents in order
to partially circumvent the 'dead letters of texts' (Jousse in Sienaert et aI.,
1994:flyleaf) as an imperfect means of recording 'oral' events. The results are
however usually disappointing because the media representations inevitably seem
oddly unidimensional and out of touch with actuality. To some extent these
disappointments can be attributed to unrealistic expectations. Audiovisual media are
by definition representative and secondary, and consequently seldom ifever capture
either the impact or the ambience of the original primary occasion. Nevertheless, in
many instances audiovisual media have provided records of performance events in
video or audio or photographic forms that have capabilities that are preferable to the
'dead letters of texts' , or at least provide a meaningful supplement to them.
Admittedly, non-print media do have certain drawbacks, such as deterioration in
storage or lack of durability in transit or even the fact that as software, they need
specialised hardware in order to be used. Nevertheless, despite these disadvantages,
researchers in the Electronic Age do have technology on their side, as well as a sense
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ofoptimism that further technological advances are imminent. In many cases where
the original primary source of experience is no longer available to us, alternative
sources are all that we have at our disposal, and a wealth of examples can be cited
regarding the effectiveness of secondary nonverbal sources.
A few relevant examples suffice. Who ofus, for example, would rather read a eulogy
on the late Nureyev's ballet performances than see a video of him performing? Or
for that matter, read an article praising the late Louis Armstrong's musicianship in
preference to listening to a recording of him blowing his own trumpet? In similar
vein, these principles may be applied to a wide range ofhumour studies. Are not, for
example, ten flickering black-and-white minutes of Laurel and Hardy more
enlightening than many critical reviews of their cinematic performances? Once
again, the fact is that no choice is necessary because all options can be combined.
Our secondary sources are usually pale imitations ofprimary reality, and the sum of
their parts is usually better than just using one of the parts.
Despite the meritorious ongomg international contributions from archivists
throughout the world, there is no doubt that academic humour studies have tended to
suffer by being tied to the conventions ofprint. Humour researchers can take partial
solace in the fact that they are not alone in their communicational plight. The
inadequacies of the written word are a recurrent theme reiterated by a range of
diverse academics whose views corroborate those ofJousse. For example, the noted
ethnographer, Ruth Finnegan (1991 :11) expresses an awareness ofthe shortcomings
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of any approach in which 'the key units are words' , and argues that even translation
is not an absolute process because' ... whatever choices are followed, something of
the original will not be conveyed ... or will be communicated in ways which change
the original' .
Finnegan's words can also be applied to the current status ofhumour research which
tends to be weighted in the direction of studies in which 'the key units are words'.
In this respect, the humour researcher shares the perennial dilemma of the
ethnographer, namely: how to convey the oral and the nonverbal without
communicating it 'in ways which change the original'. Obviously, there is a strong
temptation to bypass the problematic by choosing aspects of humour that are more
convenient to record such as studies involving the printed word, and perhaps this is
the main reason for the dearth of studies of the humour of orality.
The fundamental problem is of course a lot deeper than mere translation of action
into words to achieve a textual approximation of oral actuality. Basically,
Westernized perceptions ofreality are distorted by the filter ofliteracy. The need to
intellectualize, verbalize and reduce life experiences to fit the 'dead letters of texts'
provides a prism through which Literate Man views the world. Havelock (1988: 135)
speaks of 'the alphabetic mind' in which we may' ... discern the invention of a
conceptual language superimposed upon a nonconceptual; or alternatively a creation
of the abstract to replace the concrete, the invention of an abstract version of what
had previously been experienced sensually and directly as a series of events and
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actions'. Havelock's perspective of contemporary man's distorted vision of reality
through the filter of the 'alphabetic mind' confirms Jousse's view of the perils of
living within 'written-style civilization' in which 'bookish ethnicity' provides the
basis for observer bias towards direct experience.
8.8 Parallel synergies
As a concluding observation on this topic, an interesting parallel of sorts may be
drawn on a macro-level between the synergies prevailing in two different but not
disconnected themes in current epistemology. On the one hand, there is the synergy
between quantitative research and qualitative research that exists on a multi-
disciplinary level in the current human studies methodological debate. On the other
hand, there are the related synergies that exist between the verbal and nonverbal
traditions, as well as between the literate and oral traditions in the more specialised
contexts ofliteracy-orality studies as well as the traditionally anthropological studies
of ethnographers and ethnologists.
In both cases, the synergies are being played out as tensions created by academics
who refuse to conform to conventions created as a function of the politics of the
ruling discourse. On a multi-disciplinary level, the conventions of the ruling
discourse have been shaped by the traditional ground rules of the approaches
employed by researchers relying on quantitative methods. Likewise, in the above-
mentioned 'more specialised contexts', the ruling discourse has been dominated by
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the ethos of the verbal and literate traditions whose 'key units are words' (Finnegan,
1991:11), and orality factors have received limited attention.
In both scenarios, there has also been a reaction from academics who have spoken up
against what they perceive to be the subtle and implicit tyranny ofthe politics of the
ruling discourse. Credit is due to the integrity of qualitative researchers who refuse
to skirt important but potentially problematic issues because these aspects cannot be
quantified and made to fit quantitative paradigms. Likewise, there are also those
academics who have consistently refused to accept the subtle and often patronizing
mainstream denigration of the nonverbal and oral traditions. In both contexts, the
efforts of the upstarts appear to be vindicated.
The common thread running through these concurrent epistemological themes is not
difficult to detect. Both epistemological debates pivot on the synergies between the
finite and infinite elements ofdiscourse. In some ways, the emphasis on the literate
and verbal perspectives ofreality tends to run parallel to the emphasis on quantitative
positivism in the sense that both tend to emphasize control and purpose in the pursuit
of the finite and the quest for tangible results. By contrast, the oral and nonverbal
perspectives tend to run parallel to the qualitative ideal ofreflecting the rich tapestry
of reality in all its infinite textures. The raison d' etre is not so much the search for
the tangible certainty of the finite result, but rather the embracing of a
Weltanschauung that recognises that control can be relinquished in order to obtain
the greater depth ofmeaningful new perspectives.
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Presently, those researchers seeking a compromise to bridge the great divide between
the quantitative and qualitative standpoints are forced to wrestle with the question of
counterbalancing the factors ofcontrol and depth in order to achieve desirable levels
of probability in the results from which conclusions are to be drawn. In the context
of the present study however, the emphasis is not so much on compromise as on the
need to plan humour studies with a greater awareness of the multidimensionality of
epistemological perspectives. The aim of this particular chapter has been to
emphasize the need to be mindful of the importance of orality factors in humour
studies, and to look briefly at the inviting world that beckons beneath the polished
surface of 'the dead letters of the text'.
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CHAPTER NINE
The anthropology of jest:
the anthropologist as trickster
The chief concerns of this chapter are a brief consideration of some anthropological
perspectives of humour and their relevance to humour theory in general, as well as a
consideration ofthe attitudes attendant upon theuse ofhumour in academic literature with
particular reference to research reporting. In the Preface ofthis study, reference was made
to the paucity of humour in academic literature, and to some extent this chapter is a salute
to those anthropological fieldworkers who have enlivened their scholarship with their wry
observations, and in so doing provided their readers with some humorous insights.
9.1 The implications of the chapter title
The double-barrelled title of this chapter stems from two optional provisional titles
that I had penned whimsically during the preparation ofthis chapter, but eventually
decided to use both because of their appropriateness to the subject matter.
The first part of the chapter title 'The anthropology ofjest' represents a somewhat
obscure pun on the title ofMarcelJousse's work 'L 'Anthropologie du Geste' (1974),
the very recent English translation ofwhich is cited in the bibliography ofthis study.
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I felt that this reference was appropriate because of the importance of Jousse's
contributions to the study ofhuman behaviour, particularly in the area ofthe verbal-
nonverbal and literacy-orality facets of human communication. Furthermore, the
term 'the anthropology ofjest' sums up the anthropological perspective of humour
theory, in the same way as the second part ofthe chapter title 'the anthropologist as
trickster' identifies the academic as a protagonist in the humour process.
The phrase, 'the anthropologist as trickster' , as well as most ofthe inspiration for this
chapter, stems from my reading of the Dutch field anthropologist, Henk Driessen's
(1997:222-241) insightful paper 'Humour, laughter and the field: reflections from
anthropology' delivered at an international conference on humour in Amsterdam
(Holland) in 1994. Driessen (1997:228) speaks of 'the trickster role of the
anthropologist' with particular reference to the fieldwork experience. In discussing
the fieldwork experiences ofthe anthropologist, Laura Bohannan inNigeria, Driessen
refers to a passage from her factual novel, written under the pseudonym of Elenore
Smith Bowen, Return to laughter: an anthropological novel (1954) in which the
authoress reflects upon a humorous oral performance put on for her by Tiv tribal
fabletellers who mimicked anthropological fieldworkers as figures offun. Bohannan
comments as follows:
'Many of my moral dilemmas had sprung from the very nature of my work, which
made me a trickster: one who seems to be what he is not and who professes faith in
what he does not believe .... Only in a very sheltered life of the sort made possible
by civilisation can one maintain a fine and serious sense ofthe tragedy ofmisfortune.
In an environment in which tragedy is genuine and frequent, laughter is essential to
sanity.' (Bohannon in Driessen, 1997:233)
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Bohannan's words of some forty-four years ago show their age in a contemporary
milieu in which Western academia is highly sensitive to even the slightest suggestion
of ethnocentric bias, never mind the gross insinuation that theirs is the only
'civilisation'. But this apart, Bohannan's point about the Nigeria ofthe early 1950s
is compelling. Even in the Nigeria of 1998, tragedy is genuine and frequent, and like
the so-called 'thin line between love and hate', there may well be a thin line between
tragedy and laughter. The field experiences of Bohannon and a legion of other
anthropological fieldworkers this century tend to reinforce the homespun view that
laughter (even 'rire jaune' or Schadenfreude) is essential to sanity, and perhaps also
that this supposition applies to all civilisations. In this respect, there is much to be
said for the insight ofNicolson's observation (Appendix B:2) over fifty years ago
that 'Freud was not alone in defining the sense of humour as a defence mechanism
having as its main function the protection of the self against discomfort'.
I suggested at the beginning of this chapter as well as in Chapter One that there was
a wealth of humour in the anthropological field. This suggestion applies in more
ways than one. In the figurative sense ofthe term 'field' to denote a 'field of study',
meaningful contributions to humour theory have been made through the theoretical
and descriptive insights ofanthropologists, such as Mary Douglas (1975), Mahadev
Apte (1985) and Christie Davies (1990). Likewise, in the more literal sense of the
term 'field' as used in reference to 'fieldwork', the synergy between anthropological
fieldworkers and their human subjects ofinvestigation is a fertile area for humour in
the making.
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9.2 Humour in anthropological fieldwork
The anthropological fieldwork scenario has all the elements familiar to humour
theorists. The fieldwork experience is the product of a process in which there is a
consistent element of incongruity as cultures clash and worlds collide. As suggested
by Bohannan (above), humour and laughter assume constructive social and personal
roles in promoting tension-reduction as laughter becomes a pragmatic and primal
means to offset communication difficulties and cultural incongruities.
Chagnon's accounts of his fieldwork experiences mong the Yanomano in the rain
forests ofVenezuela and Brazil some thirty years ago have relevance in this context.
Reporting on his efforts to record genealogies, Chagnon recounts his efforts to list
names in a culture with a tradition of strict name taboos, as follows:
'They enjoyed watching me learn these names. I assumed, wrongly, that I would get
the truth to each question and that I would get the best information by working in
public. This set the stage for converting a serious project into a farce. Each
informant tried to outdo his peers by inventing a name even more ridiculous than what
I had been given earlier, or by asserting that the individual about whom I inquired was
married to his mother or daughter, and the like. I would have the informant whisper
the name of the individual in my ear, noting that he was the father of such and such
a child. Everybody would then insist that I repeat the name aloud, roaring in hysterics
as I clumsily pronounced the name. I assumed that the laughter was in response to the
violation of the name taboo or to my pronunciation. This was a reasonable
interpretation, since the individual whose name I said aloud invariably became angry.
After I learned what some of the names meant, I began to understand what the
laughter was all about. A few ofthe more colorful examples are: 'hairy vagina', 'long
penis', 'feces of the harpy eagle' and 'dirty rectum'. No wonder the victims were
angry.' (Chagnon in Driessen, 1997:234)
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Chagnon's South American anthropological fieldwork experiences of 1968 are by no
means isolated examples of the suffering endured by anthropologists in the cause of
scholarship, public relations and humour, as Driessen (1997:230) testifies from
personal experience as well as a catalogue of anecdotes from other anthropological
fieldworkers. Playfulness often becomes the order of the day as the locals seize
opportunities to play practical jokes or simply make fun of the fieldworker's
supposed peculiarities in terms of their own ethnocentric perceptions. When one
reflects on the available anthropological textual comment in the light ofthe tradition
ofbehavioural studies, several possibilities suggest themselves. Perhaps, the humour
encountered by the anthropologists is based in tension-reduction and perhaps also in
covert resentment towards the unintentionally patronizing attitude ofthe supposedly
'superior' fieldworker.
The classic Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) experiment demonstrated evidence
ofthe Hawthorne Effect many years ago at the Western Electric Company, showing
that the knowledge that one is being observed usually brings an accompanying edge
oftension that heightens performance. Perhaps, the subjects were flattered or aroused
by the attentions ofthe anthropologist and felt the need to 'put on a show'. In a way,
their behaviour could have been the enactment ofa self-fulfilling prophecy, based on
the idea that 'This person is interested in me because I behave in an interesting way'.
In this respect, for example, Driessen (1997:232) comments as follows:
'Generally speaking,joking relationships between anthropologists and informants are
person-oriented, voluntary and based in friendship. They may become patterned and
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ritualistic over time. For instance, my height, considerable for Mediterranean
societies, remained the object ofjoking and horseplay in male gatherings during the
entire length of my stay in Spain. Men never tired of climbing on bar stools in order
to outstrip me in height; putting very small men next to me; joking about the supposed
symmetry between my height and penis length, and inventing theories to explain why
I never got really drunk: 'It takes too much time for the alcohol to reach your brains',
etc. Horseplay was not always pleasant, although I learned to do it in return (which
was very much appreciated). The source ofthe recurrent banter was that my unusual
stature touched a sensitive spot in the code of masculinity.'
One suspects that Driessen was not far off the mark with his final observation
concerning the 'sensitive spot'. More important in this context is the fact that
Driessen's straight-forward factual account concisely illustrates the relevance of
observant anthropological field inquiry in situations in which the elements ofhumour
theories can be discerned. By contrast, more flamboyantly humorous accounts of
anthropological fieldwork have been written with the intention of amusing readers.
Probably the best known of these works are Nigel Barley's The innocent
anthropologist: notes from a mud hut (1983) and the above-mentioned Laura
Bohannan's Return to laughter: an anthropological novel (1954) (written under the
pseudonym of Elenore Smith Bowen).
Barley's much-translated account had the explicit commercial objective of
introducing the wider audience to the 'funny side' of fieldwork, and serves to
introduce the question ofthe compatibility ofhumour and academic literature. In this
regard, Driessen (1997:236) observes that Barley's book has been met with mixed
reaction by the members ofthe profession whom he conjectures may be suspicious
of the 'popularizing tone' of the text, or perhaps suffer from 'jalousie de metier', or
simply do not share the same sense of humour. Driessen's final remark in this
respect bears consideration:
'However this may be, it is clear that Barley's critics would not regard Rabelais or
Nietzsche as patrons of their profession.' (Driessen, 1997:236)
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Interestingly, Barley's critics are not alone in their negative reactions to the humorous
nuances of his literary style. In fact, Laura Bohannan's professor, Meyer Fortes, is
said to have been furious at seeing Return to laughter, and to have said that ifhe had
known that she was going to write a book of this nature, he would not have sent her
to do the fieldwork (Driessen, 1997:240).
These observations concerning the humour of the anthropologists in the field are
thought-provoking in the sense that they create an awareness of the idea that while
academics themselves are not necessarily a group lacking in humour, there is a
general paucity of humour in academic literature. Although this is largely
understandable because there is consensual agreement that scientific journals are not
forums for comedians, the question merits further investigation.
On the one hand, academic reporting may be justifiably regarded as a serious-minded
business; but on the other hand, the fact that it is regarded as a serious undertaking
may also promote an attitude among academics themselves that light-heartedness is
by converse undesirable and may in a subtle way undermine the status oftheir chosen
field ofstudy because it is associated with disrespect or a lack ofdiscipline (or both).
Once again, credit must be accorded to Driessen (1997:228-229) for his observation
that:
'The trickster role of the anthropologist is perceived by scholars in other academic
disciplines (sociologists in particular) and readers in the wider audience with mixed
feelings: some find it fanciful, sympathetic, pleasantly eccentric, while others react
in an irritated way and tend to view this role as yet another proof of the not so
scientific nature of the anthropological discipline.'
Apart from the playful jibe at the expense of sociologists for which Driessen
(1997:229) compensates immediately with a playful piece of self-deprecation (viz.
'Everybody knows now that the average Pueblo family or typical Mexican family
consists of a father, a mother, three children and an anthropologist'), the above
quotation may well be an appropriate example of the adage: 'There's many a true
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word said in jest.' As such, Driessen's explanation may well also support an
argument made in Chapter One concerning the position of qualitative observations
within a research climate that has been traditionally dominated by the ethos
associated with quantitative paradigms. If we are to read between the lines of
Driessen's statement (above), it is clear that he shares the feeling among qualitative
researchers that the influence ofpositivism as a mainstream methodological standard
bearer has resulted in a demonstrated lack of respect by sections of the invisible
college towards descriptive qualitative approaches such as those employed by
anthropological fieldworkers. Until relative recently, this prejudice has been the
cross that qualitative innovators have had to bear in many fields ofstudy, whilst their
more conservative colleagues have enjoyed the solace ofthe quantitative mainstream.
9.3 A Miner miracle
One of the greatest scientists of the Nineteenth Century, I.H. Huxley (1825-1895)
once proclaimed that: 'Metaphysicians, as a rule, are sadly deficient in the sense of
humour' (cf. Appendix B:2); and the lack of humour in their massive written output
since Huxley made this statement in 1879 appears to corroborate this view.
Fortunately, not all social researchers have succumbed to the humourless
environment ofstandard deviations, and one such deviation from the mean deserves
special mention.
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In the following classic case of academic humour published in the American
anthropologist journal over four decades ago, Horace Miner (1956:503-507) sets out,
tongue very firmly in cheek, to provide a dryly humorous critique of the
contemporary American culture of the 1950s. Miner employs a process of
defamiliarization by using the language ofempiricism to describe mundane-seeming
Western behaviour patterns. The essence ofMiner's humour is in his assumption of
the guise of a serious-minded anthropologist wearing a relatively straight face in
employing common anthropological concepts in the conventional vocabulary of
behavioural science. The effect is that social customs and so-called 'every-day'
behaviour (such as using a toothbrush) are elevated from the level ofthe mundane to
the level of the comically exotic. An excerpt follows:
'Little is known oftheir origin, although tradition states that they came from the east.
According to Nacirema mythology, their nation was originated by a culture hero,
Notgnihsaw, who is otherwise known for two great feats of strength - the throwing of
a piece of wampum across the river Pa-To-Mac and the chopping down of a cherry
tree in which the Spirit of Truth resided. Nacirema culture is characterized by a
highly developed market economy which has evolved in a rich natural habitat. While
much of the people's time is devoted to economic pursuits, a large part of the fruits
of these labors and a considerable portion ofthe day are spent in ritual activity. The
focus of this activity is the human body, the appearance and health ofwhich loom as
a dominant concern in the ethos ofthe people .. , . The fundamental beliefunderlying
the whole system appears to be that the human body is ugly and that its natural
tendency is to debility and disease. Incarcerated in such a body, man's only hope is
to avert these characteristics through the use of the powerful influences of ritual and
ceremony. Every household has one or more shrines devoted to this purpose .... The
focal point ofthe shrine is a box or chest which is built into the wall. In this chest are
kept the many charms and magical potions without which no native believes he could
live. These preparations are secured from a variety of specialized practitioners. The
most powerful of these are the medicine men, whose assistance must be rewarded
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with substantial gifts. However, the medicine men do not provide the curative potions
for their clients, but decide what the ingredients should be and then write them down
in an ancient and secret language. This writing is understood only by the medicine
men and by the herbalists who, for another gift, provided the required charm ... . The
daily body ritual performed by everyone includes a mouth-rite. Despite the fact that
these people are so punctilious about care ofthe mouth, this rite involves a practice
which strikes the uninitiated stranger as revolting. It was reported to me that the ritual
consists of inserting a small bundle of hog hairs into the mouth, along with certain
magical powders, and then moving the bundle in a highly formalized series of
gestures .... In addition to the private mouth-rite, the people seek out a holy-mouth-
man once or twice a year. These practitioners have an impressive set of
paraphernalia, consisting of a variety of augers, awls, probes, and prods .... The
medicine men have an imposing temple, or latipso, in every community of any size.
The more elaborate ceremonies required to treat very sick patients can only be
performed at this temple. These ceremonies involve not only the thaumaturge but a
permanent group ofvestal maidens who move sedately about the temple chambers in
a distinctive costume and headdress.'
(Miner in Driessen, 1997:227-228)
When viewed in the context of the ongoing synergy between the respective ethos
associated with the schools ofqualitative and quantitative research, Horace Miner's
seemingly whimsical little study of the behaviour of the average American family
comes across as a telling critique of the current status of human studies research
methodology. Considering that Miner's article was published some forty-two years
ago, the satirical content ofthe article raises certain pertinent issues that are food for
further reflection.
Firstly, the content begs the question as to whether the author achieved this
penetrating satirical critique of academic formalism by accident or design. This
question has a relatively straight-forward answer because there was nothing
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accidental about the timing or placement ofMiner's article. It was written at a time
when there was a crescendo in the collective voices celebrating the 'scientific'
revolution in the human studies research community, and Miner must receive credit
for embedding into his text an insightful critique of the prevailing status of human
studies methodology with its one-eyed preoccupation with the stilted academic jargon
and routine paradigms of the so-called 'scientific method' of investigation.
From the standpoint of humour theory, Miner's excerpt is an example of sustained
academic satire that represents an ironic comment on the direction that Miner
perceived anthropological methodology to be moving at the time. The article's
literary form as a satire enhances its critical value, and increases its impact in making
a strong critical $tatement. The article also has the virtue of timing at the height of
the 'human science' movement, and in many respects it owes its effectiveness to its
placement within the context of a so-called 'serious' and therefore esteemed
academic journal. By contrast, its placement in a satirical or humorous publication
may have dulled if not nullified the effect of the reception dynamics of its humour
by telegraphing the humorist's intent.
For the reader, a primary pleasure to be derived in confronting Miner's style of
writing is in the subtlety of its dry delivery that enhances the impact of the second
level of the message, namely the satirical critique on anthropological trendiness in
using formulaic jargon to create a veneer of quasi-scientific 'bookish ethnicity'
(Jousse, 1990: 133). By assuming thejargon ofthe quantitative social scientist, Miner
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weaves a web ofacademic terminology to convincing effect, seemingly based on the
rationale that if you say anything with a straight face and in the language of science,
then it will have credibility.
There is also more to the article than first meets the eye. If we look beyond the
article's novelty value or even the fact that its placement in a normally strait-laced
academic journal gave it the impact of incongruity, we find that what makes the
article a Miner tour de force is in fact the marriage ofstyle with substance. By using
the form and style of the jargon and formulaic methodological conventions he seeks
to satirise, Miner reinforces his message by bringing a humorous twist to the sobriety
of human and/or social science reporting.
Miner's piece is also of interest to qualitative humour theorists as a useful primary
source ofacademic reporting from the United States ofAmerica ofthe 1950s era, and
serves as a document (viz. 'stable data') that is available for further reflective
analysis. Accordingly, as a brief exercise in 'critical reflection' (Killen, 1996: 15),
I may ask of myself the reasons for my positive appreciation of Miner's somewhat
dated article. The first answer that comes to mind is that reading it is a fulfilling
experience because it confirms and reinforces some of my views concerning the
nature of humour research. This is the 'humour of recognition' that Stephen Potter
(1954:174) describes as 'humour by observation', remarking: 'If we laugh, our
pleasure is mixed with the blessed sensation of relief through recognition'. In
Miner's article, humour derives from a sense of recognition of familiar elements in
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an unusual context. Hence, for example, humour derives from the recognition that
here in the pages of a mainstream academic journal is a kindred spirit that
humorously gives substance to my own critical perspective of the state of human
studies research.
Another reflective idea that initially nagged me, perhaps in the context of the more
sophisticated late 1990s, was the uneasy feeling that Miner had overdone the
'inversion cues' (viz. Nacrema = American, Notgnihsaw = Washington, latipso =
hospital and so on), and that he should have put more trust in my sense of humour.
But I concluded that perhaps this was nitpicking because the use ofthe correct words
(without inversion) may well have detracted significantly from the exotic effect
created in the context of a satirical article in a leading American social science
academic journal in the mid-1950s when Comptism, Behaviourism and allied
positivistic '-isms' were at their zenith. This was an era when many considered
reflectivity to be a fanciful and somewhat eccentric practice, and an irritatingly
unnecessary diversion from the earnest endeavours of the pursuit of positivism.
When one empathises with Miner's light-hearted satirical vision in the midst of the
thunderous serious-mindedness ofthe prevailing academic milieu, it is difficult not
to sense the twinkle in Miner's eye or the smiles on the faces of the enlightened
editorial committee who had the courage and humanity to publish this piece at that
time in a prestigious journal.
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From the standpoint ofthe methodological emphasis ofthe present 'qualitative study
of humour theory', Miner's approach is something of a curiosity. Whether by
accident or design, Miner's study emerges as an enlightened idiosyncratic qualitative
comment on the ruling discourse of the invisible college of the human studies
research community ofthe 1950s. On the surface, Miner's article may present itself
as a cheeky little joust at the pretentiousness ofprevailing anthropological jargon, but
it also has a satirical edge that reinforces the message concerning the predilection for
style over substance.
In this respect, the discussion of Jousse's contribution to the literacy-orality debate
in Chapter Eight has direct relevance. Whether he knew it or not (the latter being
probable because Sienaert's translations ofJousse appeared many years later), Miner
provides an almost copybook explication of the classic situation in which 'bookish
ethnicity' is the substitute that replaces anthropological analysis (cf. Jousse,
1990:133). Miner has in fact used 'the dead letters of texts' (Jousse in Sienaert, et
aI., 1994:flyleaf) to demonstrate effectively that academic jargon is a misleading
'parasitic language' (Jousse, 1990:70).
9.4 Anthropological perspectives of humour theory
Anthropology is an area that offers rich promise for further studies within the field
ofhumour research, however thus far the contributions ofanthropologists to humour
theory have been largely in the direction ofdescriptive studies. In this section, brief
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attention is given to the contributions to the growing body of research pertaining to
humour theory by three prominent anthropologists namely: Mahadev Apte, Christie
Davies, and Mary Douglas.
Mahadev Apte (1985) presents a well referenced descriptive survey of humour that
is a work of great scholarship but little distinctiveness. Apte's descriptive survey of
humour and comedy includes topics such as ethnic humour, joking relationships,
sexual inequality in humour, children's humour, the trickster in folklore, and the
biosocial and evolutionary aspects of laughter and smiling. Apte tends to reject the
idea of a general theory of humour, but his own contributions to humour theory are
disappointing in the sense that they are largely descriptive. From the perspective of
an anthropologist, Driessen (1997:225) expresses disappointment at Apte' s decision
not to develop his study of humour in the field of cross-cultural comparison as this
is an area that is an established domain of anthropology.
Christie Davies' (1990) survey ofethnic humour was published some five years after
Apte's (1985) study, and is an even more monumental piece of scholarship.
Whereas, Apte discussed some eight hundred sources in his book, Davies provides
about double the number of bibliographic entries. In respect of the theme of cross-
culturalism, Davies' observations on the functions and modes of ethnic joke-telling
provide some enlightened insights into the nature of ethnic stereotyping. In this
regard, Davies examines the way in which these jokes generally relate to ambiguous
or contradictory situations and may even bring about situations that generate
227
uncertainty and ambivalence. In this manner, ethnic humour is seen as having
diverse social functions. For example, apart from its superficial role of reinforcing
in-group solidarity through mildly conspiratorial camaraderie, ethnic humour also
provides observers with a window into ethnocentric attitudes, and this knowledge
may lead to expectations that influence social behaviour in certain contexts.
Davies (1990:307) also introduces the notion of the 'ethnic script' which refers to a
commonly-shared conventional but fabricated account of ethnic groups that acts as
a springboard for ethnic jokes. In essence, 'ethnic scripts' are testimonies of
prejudice but they usually have a constructive rather than vindictive purpose. Many
ethnic groups (such as the Jewish) delight in using their own 'ethnic scripts' to tell
'ethnic jokes about themselves and they seem to generate a spirit of good-humoured
camaraderie in being the collective butt of their own humour. Clearly, in-group
bonding is a primary implicit goal of those sharing the same 'ethnic script' and
collectively wallowing in the caricatured imperfections of their own group's
stereotypical image.
The concept of 'ethnic scripting' was alluded to in the discussion of the humour of
mixed metaphors in sub-section 7.2.9 in Chapter Seven, and its reception dynamics
present the humour researcher with an interesting riddle to solve concerning the
longevity of this humour category. To some degree, this form of humour can be
viewed in terms of the 'gallows theory' (referred to in Chapter Five as 'amused
cynicism on facing disaster') in which the in-group members have a joking
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relationship concerning their own stereotyped shortcomings, but generally are far less
accepting of non-members participating in the same type of shared amusement. In
some ways, it may also represent the familiar notion of 'misery finding company',
and in this case takes the form of group members finding conviviality and solidarity
in exaggerated accounts ofwell-established (usually negative) stereotypical attitudes
towards themselves as a group. However there is more to 'ethnic scripting' than this
because basically it also signifies self-acceptance and reinforces cultural group
membership in the sense that it demonstrates the capability ofgroup members to rise
above the petty squabbles concerning what mayor may not be construed as being
sociopolitically incorrect. Ultimately, 'ethnic scripting' is a powerful socializing
force that enhances group solidarity, and represents a genre of humour that has a
strong social motive that is positively reinforced on a regular basis by the ongoing
motivational stimulus of operant conditioning, as discussed in sub-section 7.2.9 of
Chapter Seven.
By contrast with Davies' observations concerning ethnic humour, the qualitative
contribution of Mary Douglas (1975) to humour theory offers insights on both an
anthropological level as well as a general level. For example, in discussing the
essence ofjokes, Douglas' analysis alludes to the role ofcomic synergy between the
formal and informal elements ofhumour, as well as the role ofhumour in providing
a behaviour mechanism for tension-reduction, as follows:
' ...something formal is attacked by something informal, something organised and
controlled, by something vital, energetic, an upsurge of life for Bergson, of libido for
Freud'. (Douglas, 1975:95)
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Furthermore, there is much to be said for Douglas' insight that the joke is in fact a
play on form that exhilarates receivers who have the empathy and understanding to
interpret its essence. Douglas (1975:96) also alludes to incongruity theory in her
observation of the functional elements of the joke as bringing' ... into relation
disparate elements in such a way that one accepted pattern is somehow challenged
by the appearance of another which in some way was hidden in the first' .
In discussing the respective contributions of anthropological humour theorists,
Driessen draws attention to the merit of Douglas' insight concerning the nature of
humour as being ' ... the achievement of consonance between different spheres of
experience ... [providing] a source of profound experience for the people involved'
(Douglas in Driessen, 1997:225). The significance ofthis observation should not be
overlooked in the context ofhumour theory. Cognitive consonance which is a state
the reversal psychologists would refer to as being 'paratelic-dominant' is concerned
with a feeling of ease and positivity as ideas and opinions coincide, as opposed to
cognitive dissonance which signifies 'telic-dominant' unease and underlying tension
due to perceptions of ambivalence or dissonant attitudes or opinions (Sampson,
1976:131-137). Furthermore, Douglas' allusion to humour as 'a source ofprofound
experience for those involved' suggests an awareness of the importance of arousal
in the process ofhumour. Clearly, Driessen (1997:224) was once again on the mark
when he suggested with good reason that Douglas was the 'most sophisticated' ofthe
anthropological humour theorists.
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The anthropological approach has much to offer humour theory, particularly as there
is so much latitude for anthropological studies ofhumour within the African setting.
The emphasis placed by anthropologists on culture perhaps serves as the most apt
starting point for further studies of humour by anthropologists. With the possible
exception of Mary Douglas, there appears to be little legacy of original humour
theory in the discipline of anthropology. Nevertheless, the contributions of
anthropologists such as Christie Davies have provided humour theorists with many
insights, particularly with regard to descriptive accounts on a cross-cultural level that
lend support to the findings ofhumour theorists. What has emerged thus far from the
field of anthropology is a body of carefully observed and well documented
descriptive accounts, however there has also been a shortage of distinctive




In the Preface of this study, a seemingly playful comment was made concerning the study
of humour being no laughter matter, and a fitting concluding comment may well be that
behind every jest, there is an element oftruth. Ifwe value the opinions ofacademics, such
as Henk Driessen (1997:222) who describes humour as 'an elusive and difficult topic to
explore', then we may well also conclude that one ofthe chiefattributes ofthis study is that
it tackles the question of humour at all! In the present fmal chapter, further concluding
comments are made concerning the nature of this study, its strengths and limitations, as
well as the hopes and recommendations of the author. The study itself does not stray far
from its terms of reference as a 'qualitative study of humour theory', but the nebulous
nature ofhumour theory tends to militate against specificity, and at times the study assumes
a broad Olympian stance seeking to give epistemological perspective to a wide diversity
ofmultidisciplinary contributions to humour theory.
The initial focus of the present study was on a critical review of a wide range of literature
in the field ofhumour theory and in related fields, and some benefits ofthis investigation
are reflected in the exploratory exercises in reflective practice that follow. Although the
qualifying term 'qualitative' is used in the title of this study, an examination ofthe nature
ofquantitative approaches to exploring humour theory has been within the investigation's
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parameters because the so-called 'qualitative' approaches are largely a collection of
approaches distinguished chiefly by their 'non-quantitative' nature (Tesch, 1990:3).
Accordingly, it has been essential to refer regularly to quantitative research and to examine
its implications for humour research by way of comparison with what qualitative
approaches have to offer. Notwithstanding my self-proclaimed partiality for qualitative
methodology, I have also argued that quantitative research is very much part ofmy vision
of further research in this field.
In addition to constituting a value judgement, my own view of the strengths of this study
also represents an idiosyncratic statement of priorities. Prominent among these priorities
has been a need to confront the pivotal current issue in humour research methodology by
examining closely the nature of the synergy in the field of humour studies caused by the
respective strengths and weaknesses ofthe qualitative and quantitative sides ofthe coin of
research.
Although the quantitative-qualitative controversy appears to be endemic in humour
research, it needs to be contextualized within the frame of reference of a larger-scale
contemporary epistemological debate that pervades virtually all fields of human studies,
and which has given rise to a degree ofpolarisation between the respective protagonists in
certain spheres of research. In some cases, the heat generated by the current
methodological debate has left something of an illusion of an antagonistic dichotomy
between the seemingly divergent quantitative and qualitative methodological standpoints.
This aberration exists entirely because of 'the human side of the enterprise' (McGregor,
1960), and it has been shown that researchers such as Michael Apter (1981, 1982, 1989)
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are quite capable of harnessing the best of both worlds to accomplish meaningful
contributions to humour theory based on research founded in a qualitative approach but
corroborated by quantitative follow-up studies.
A general concern of this study has been the testing of the waters of the status of humour
research. As mentioned above, on occasions the tone ofthis study assumes that ofa broad
Olympian overview of the universe of research in human and social studies from the
perspective of the humour researcher, and from this standpoint discerns that the major
issues of humour theory cannot be confronted satisfactorily by exclusive reliance on the
limited quantitative paradigms of the traditionally positivistic orientation of the ruling
discourse of the recent past. I subscribe to the view that the way forward is through the
greater development of the various approaches to research still accumulating within the
generic collection labelled'qualitative research'. An important proviso is ofcourse that the
benefits ofempiricism are not ignored, because in view ofthe current state ofthe discipline,
humour theorists of all persuasions need all the help they can get.
It is important that the quantitative-qualitative debate is viewed from a less simplistic
perspective than that which merely posits it as a methodological controversy. In this
respect, a leaf can be taken from the book of Marcel Jousse (1990:71) who not only
emphasized the need to restore a sense of worth in the oral tradition in the face of the
onslaught oftextuality, but also indicated that text (the secondary vicarious substitute for
primary experience) had in fact usurped the place of orality as a central aspect of the
'bookish ethnicity' of Westernized culture (cf. Chapter Eight). In much the same way as
the secondary experience of textuality has been erroneously regarded as superior to the
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primary experiences of reality because reality is not more like texuality, the quantitative
approach has been promoted to the detriment of the qualitative approach by the erstwhile
ruling discourse with its strong positivistic bias. These similarities subsist in the
underlying rationales of the respective scenarios perceived on the one hand by Jousse in
respect of literacy and orality, and on the other hand in respect of the status of positivism
as the 'one-best-way' ofresearch methodology in human studies. The raison d'etre ofthe
latter assumption is the implication that qualitative approaches are in fact inferior because
they do not conform to the standards and principles of quantitative practice.
In my view, the arrival of the current Information Age has in some ways exacerbated the
already deleterious situation described in the writings ofMarcel Jousse (1990, 1997) who
seventy years ago painted a convincing portrait of a serious imbalance in academic
perceptions ofhuman behaviour. Jousse's disturbing vision was ofa world ofknowledge
distorted by the effects of a text-biassed perspective of reality endorsed by an academia
blindly attached to 'the dead letters oftexts'. Jousse viewed the preoccupation ofliterate
cultures with textuality as creating what Havelock (1988:135) later referred to as the
'alphabetic culture' which devalued primary experience.
Although the Information Age has promoted the rapid development of vastly more
accessible communication links and has opened up dynamic new worlds of interactive
dialogue that are dramatic improvements on 'bookish ethnicity' rather than static
preoccupations with 'the dead letters of texts', the fact remains that surfing the Internet is
basically a further form of secondary experience performed by sedentary individuals who
sit enthralled by the flickering screen. While they may be more proactive than the so-called
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'couch potatoes' watching mass media television, the electronic communicators are still
experiencing reality vicariously through the secondary unidimensional source of the
monitor - unless of course, they are hooked up to Virtual Reality!
The fact that the so-called 'information explosion' has been accompanied by a 'media
explosion' has resulted in a situation in which the audiovisual benefits of the Information
Age have put the paperless communication experience ahead of the'dead letters of texts'
by providing a superior secondary substitute for reality that has been enhanced by CD-
ROM technology. However, the dangers ofthe Information Age are similar to the dangers
portrayed by Jousse in his observations that textuality was popularly conceived ofas being
both preferable and superior to primary experience. We have now entered an era of
electronic text, interactive multimedia and Virtual Reality technology in which a similar
scenario subsists but where paper-based textuality has been superseded by a compelling
new force. Society now worships at the feet ofa fresh demigod that it has placed at the top
of its communication hierarchy. The new Third Force in the politics ofcommunication is
more powerful and more attractive than traditional paper-based textuality, and considered
by many to be even more preferable and more greatly superior to primary experience than
traditional textuality was ever misconceived as being.
From a personal standpoint, one ofthe primary strengths that I perceive in this study is that
it is opinionated and makes statements on questions of principle, as befits its self-
proclaimed status as a 'qualitative study'. Apart from tackling the quantitative-qualitative
issue directly, the study gives prominence to the long-neglected issue of the role oforality
in humour, albeit from within the limited context ofthe parameters ofthis study. Attention
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is also directed towards the question ofdefining humour in order to create a basic frame of
reference for further study, and this in turn led to the rejection of the definition ofhumour
proposed in the introductory address of a recent prominent international 'cultural history
of humour' conference held in Amsterdam during 1994 (Bremmer and Roodenburg,
1997:1). There is also an in-depth analysis of Murdock and Ganim's 1993 macro-level
study of humour theories, in which I take issue with the researchers and criticise both the
methods and content of the survey itself as well as some of the theories included in it.
This study has also taken upon itselfto give prominence to worthy causes. In this respect,
Chapter Six is devoted to an evaluation of the contribution of Michael Apter (1989) to
humour theory, and gives credit where it is due by acknowledging the worth of Apter's
reversal theory of humour which was needlessly omitted from the Murdock and Ganim
study (1993). However, the Apter chapter, although appreciative of the contribution of
reversal theory, is not merely a panegyric, and contains what I consider to be valid criticism
of Apter's humour theory. In the context of worthy causes, another has of course been
qualitative research in general, and reflective practice in particular. In the spirit of putting
my pen where my heart is, I have even undertaken a few exploratory expeditions into the
relatively uncharted territory of reflective practice, for which I have already claimed
qualitative immunity! In this regard, one of the most worthy causes that can be promoted
among humour researchers is that ofmaintaining an 'open door' attitude. Like most other
qualitative researchers, I espouse the cause ofopen-mindedness and willingness to consider
at face value the merits and demerits of all viewpoints, however idiosyncratic. It follows
that differences of opinion from my own are both expected and welcomed.
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The question of my expressing my perceptions of the limitations of this study is an
interesting one. The parameters of this study do not permit an in-depth study of self-
attribution theories (cf. Martinko, 1995; Sampson, 1976:156-174; Tedeschi and Lindskold,
1976:148-228); however, in this context, experience has shown that the expression of
notions concerning perceived 'limitations' tends to reflect to some degree the
Weltanschauung (or 'world view') ofthe person defining the limitations. The result is that
in such situations one generally learns more about the person expressing these opinions
than about the object ofthe self-critique. Hence, for example, a positivist may observe that
this study is lacking in empirical research; and to this, my immediate response would be
total agreement as well as a reminder that empirical research is beyond the parameters of
this particular 'human enterprise' which has been described in its title as a qualitative study
of humour theory.
From a personal standpoint as the author of a study of humour, the term 'limitations' has
meaning for me primarily from the perspective that I experienced disappointment at the
current underdeveloped state of humour research. My perception of the limitations of the
present study is dominated by my perception ofthe limitations inherent in the nature ofthe
field itself, and consequently is linked by logical extension to my recommendations and
hopes for future progress in the field ofhumour theory. To be more specific, from my own
perspective of the limitations discerned in reviewing the literature relevant to this study, I
was disappointed to find a lack of humour research within the South African context in
general, and in the area of orality-literacy and the oral tradition in particular. There is an
obvious need for further research in this relatively undeveloped field of inquiry, and the
character of such studies may vary from, for example, ethnographic studies of traditional
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patterns ofhumour to more recent accounts ofthe effects ofacculturation or cross-cultural
influences on the nature of humour. This is a potentially vast field of research that offers
wide possibilities, such as for example studies of aspects of humour in the so-called
Information Age.
In respect of more specific recommendations for further research, it is appropriate that I
should refer to my own qualitative pilot study of a few years ago (Gordon, 1995), which
was inspired originally by an argument referred to again earlier in this chapter. I refer to
my endorsement of Jousse' s critical perspective of the lopsided view of reality produced
by the overvaluation oftextuality to the detriment ofthe experience of 'geste', and also to
my submission that the 'media explosion' accompanying the 'information explosion' had
effectively exacerbated the situation by complementing textuality with a range of
sophisticated electronic substitutes for direct primary experiences. It was this 'neo-
Joussean' perspective that fired my interest in the development of the above-mentioned
pilot study to contrast elements of orality (such as traditional 'trickster tales') with the
bookish products ofpopular Westernized culture as typified in the term 'pulp fiction' (also
the title of a popular movie of the time of writing).
The conference paper in question, 'Trickster tales to pulp fiction' (Gordon, 1995,
reproduced in Appendix E) is an example of grounded research that arose from a problem
perceived as part ofmy study oforality and the oral tradition in a situation ofsociopolitical
transformation that involved the process ofacculturation as the young-adult subjects ofthe
pilot study tested the waters of an integrated society in the so-called 'New South Africa'.
The investigation focussed on the leisure behaviour and preferences (viz. reading, television
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viewing, music, etc.) ofyoung-adult urban-based Library and Information Studies students,
and also related to a retrospective survey of aspects of the subjects' childhood leisure
experiences including the experience of the oral communication of trickster tales. From a
methodological standpoint, the pilot study involved the qualitative analysis ofdata derived
from the combination ofa predominantly quantitative questionnaire approach together with
a qualitative interview approach.
The relevance of the 'trickster tales' study to humour studies was immediately evident in
the interviews in which the subjects almost without exception recounted their experiences
of trickster tales with bright nostalgic enthusiasm and a willingness to laugh at their
younger reactions to the worlds of their childhood imaginations. Although these
retrospective testimonies were undoubtedly of the order of 'vignettes of childhood
innocence, adventure and chivalry' (to borrow a phrase from Henry Giroux, 1994:31),
nevertheless the results ofthe 'trickster tales' pilot study can be usefully applied to examine
possibilities of further local studies of popular culture in general, and the study itself
generally revealed the need for more qualitative research of an ethnographic nature. This
need is also an implicit theme of the present study, and I harbour a nagging feeling that
perhaps this study is limited by the fact that it constitutes a discursive dissertation rather
than a full-blown research thesis which includes extensive fieldwork within a South African
setting.
Humour theory is a multidisciplinary enterprise, and I have attempted in this study to
address humour research from a broad base. The net has been spread across diverse fields
such as Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, Philosophy, Communication and Reception
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Theory, and Orality. My parting hope is that specialists from various disciplines associated
with human studies are encouraged by the reading of this study to undertake humour
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Appendix A
Purposes of qualitative research:
a select glossary of relevant terms
from
Qualitative research:
analysis types and software tools
by
Renata Tesch
New York: Falmer Press, 1990.
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improving practices by or in cooperation with practitioners
intensive and detailed study of one individual or of a group as an
entity, through observation, self-reports and any other means
'the reflexive analysis of documents' (Altheide, 1987:65)
'used to document and understand the communication of meaning,
as well as to verify theoretical relationships' (Altheide, 1987:68)
'making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context
(Krippendorf, 1980:21)
'objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest
content of communication' (Berelson, 1952:489)
'making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying
specified characteristics within text' (Stone et aI., 1966:5)
to 'disclose self-evident and unnoticed biases, habits of thinking,
customary conventions, and so forth' through dialogue (de Boer,
1983:155)
to study human experiences as articulated in language taking
'stories [as] starting points for all further thinking and theory
building' (von Eckartsberg, in Valle and King, 1978:186)
'the linguistic analysis of naturally occurring connected spoken or
written discourse' (Stubbs, 1983:1)
providing 'insight into the forms and mechanisms of human
communication and verbal interaction' (van Dijk, 1985:4)
to 'describe behaviour and discover the laws of behaviour' (Jacob,
1987:5) through studying and 'behaviour stream' that constitutes
itself as 'behavioural episodes' as nested in socially defined



















interpreting, and evaluating social phenomena (similar to arts
appreciation)
enlightenment for emancipation
to 'understand the general psychological meaning of some
particular human way of being-in-a-situation, ... through a number
of descriptions ofthis way of being-in-a-situation from people
who have lived through and experience themselves as so involved
[called protocols]' (W. Fischer, in Valle and King, 1978:177)
'classifies and highlights the social organization and distribution
of subjective meanings as native and diverse field realities', being
'concerned with ... cataloguing their forms and relationships in
time and space' (Gubrium, 1988:26)
where we 'think of culture as a cognitive map', and where 'both
tacit and explicit culture are revealed through speech' (Spradley,
1979:7;9)
'to describe and analyse all or part of a culture or community by
describing the beliefs and practices of the group studied and
showing how the various parts contribute to the culture as a
unified, consistent whole' (Jacob, 1987:10)
describing the patterns of interaction of the members of a cultural
group (related to sociolinguistics)
describing and analysing practices and beliefs of cultures or
communities (as consistent wholes)
to study how members of society, in the course ofongoing social
interaction, make sense of 'indexical expressions'. Indexicals are
terms whose meaning is not universal, but is dependent upon the
context (Bailey, 1978:249)
'how members of situations assemble reasonable understanding of
the things and events of concern to them and, thereby, realize them
as objects of everyday life' (Gubrium, 1988:27)
'how people in society organize their activities in such a way that
they make mutual sense, how people do things in such ways that



















'to understand participants' cultural categories and to identify the
organizing principles that underlie these categories ... through the
study of semantic systems (Jacob, 1987:22)
'to defme systematically the meaning of words, or labels - in short,
the names of things in the context of their use' in order to
'construct lexical-semantic fields of linked propositions' (Werner
and Schoepfle, 1987(2):29;38)
to examine and represent series of events as logical structures, i.e.,
as elements and their connections (including the assumptions that
govern these connections) that can serve as explanatory models for
interpreting actual or folkloristic sequences of events (Heise and
Lewis, 1988)
to 'reveal the structure of experience through descriptive
techniques', thereby'disclosing the nature of structure in the form
of meaning' , structure being 'the commonality running through
the many diverse appearances of the phenomenon' (Valle and
King, 1978:15;17;16)
, ... the investigators question, explore, and arrive at conclusions
regarding psychological processes within themselves [so as] to
generate testable experiential hypotheses' (Price and Barrell,
1980:76)
to 'discover theory from data' through the 'general method of
comparative analysis' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:1)
textual interpretation, applied to human actions 'to elucidate and
make explicit our understanding ... by providing an interpretation
ofthem' through 'progressive uncovering and explication'
(Packer, 1985:1088;1089)
'to know the essence of some aspect of life through the internal
pathways of the self (Douglas and Moustakas, 1985:39)
'seeks to understand psychological life by going to those sources





















an 'unstructured and non-quantitative' approach using personal
documents (Bailey, 1978:273), often resulting in typologies or
'through which to examine and analyse the subjective experience
of individuals and their construction of the social world' (lones,
1983:147)
a non-positivistic approach to research in which the researcher is
the instrument, and the focus is on understanding the meaning the
people under study give to their experiences
to investigate 'psychological phenomena which either are beyond
human experiential awareness or which cannot be communicated'
through 'the observation oflived events' (Colaizzi, in Valle and
King, 1978:65;62)
describing conceptually perceived qualities of a phenomenon
through contextual analysis
illuminating intersubjective human experiences by describing the
essence of the subjective experience
evaluation that employs the tenets of naturalistic inquiry and
emphasizing the process by which outcomes are produced rather
than merely judging the outcomes
'aims at a descriptive understanding of psychological phenomena
by reflectively disclosing their meaning' 'through the imaginative
presence to the investigated phenomenon' (Colaizzi, in Valle and
King, 1978:68;62)
'to see how the process of designation and interpretation
[participants are defining and interpreting each other's acts] is
sustaining, undercutting, redirecting and transforming the ways in
which the participants are fitting together their lines of action'
(Blumer, 1969:53)
'understanding how individuals are able to take one another's
perspective and learn meanings and symbols in concrete instances
ofinteraction'(Jacob,1987:29)
describing as precisely as possible the range and the local and
historical contingencies of social regularities in social behaviour
4
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HUMOUR
humour, humor ("hju:m@(r), "ju:m@(r)), n. Also 4 umour, -or, 4-6 humure, 5
-ore, 5-6 -oure.
[a. AF. (h)umour, F. (h)umor, -ur, mod.F. humeur (= It. umore, Sp., Pg. humor):-L.
hu-mo-rem, more properly u-mo-r-em fluid, moisture.
For the spelling cf. HONOUR; humour is now usual in Great Britain, humor in V.S.
The English formations, humoured, humourless, humoursome, are here spelt like the
n. and vb.; but the derivatives formed on a Latin type, as humoral, humorist,
humorous, are spelt humor- as in L. humo-ro-sus, etc. (This agrees with Johnson's
use.) The pronunciation of the initial h is only of recent date, and is sometimes
omitted, esp. in the senses under II: see H (the letter).]
a. That quality of action, speech, or writing, which excites amusement; oddity,
jocularity, facetiousness, comicality, fun.
b. The faculty of perceiving what is ludicrous or amusing, or of expressing it in
speech, writing, or other composition; jocose imagination or treatment of a subject.
Distinguished from wit as being less purely intellectual, and as having a sympathetic
quality in virtue of which it often becomes allied to pathos.
1682 tr. G/anius' Voy. Bengala 142 The Cup was so closed, that 'twas a difficult
matter for us to open it, and therefore the General gave it us on purpose, to divert
himself with the humour of it.
1709 Shaftesbury (title) Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour.
1712 Hughes Spect. No. 525 ~3 Writings which once prevail'd among us under
the Notion of Humour.
1727 Swift To Earl of Oxford, The priest..shew'd some humour in his face.
1728 - Intelligencer No. 3 Humour.. in its perfection is allowed to be much
preferable to wit, if it be not rather the most useful and agreeable species of it.
1759 Goldsm. Pol. Learn ix, Wit raises human nature above its level; humour acts
a contrary part, and equally depresses it.
a1854 H. Reed Lect. Eng. Lit. ii. (1855) 63 The happy compound of pathos and
playfulness, which we style by that untranslateable term humour.
1870 Lowell Stud. Wind. 132 Humor in. its first analysis is a perception of the
incongruous.
1874 Green Short Hist. viii. §10. 585 The strange deficiency of humour which
Milton shared with the Puritans generally.
1887 Lowell Democr. 3 That modulating and restraining balance-wheel which we
call a sense of humor.
1
SENSE OF HUMOUR
1874 L. Stephen Hours in Library (1892) I. v. 197 A delicate sense of humour,
which is the best preservative against all extravagance.
1879 Huxley Hume x. 196 Metaphysicians, as a rule, are sadly deficient in the
sense of humour.
1886 Athenreum 24 Apr. 551/1 A dispassionateness and a sense of humour quite
rare in her sex.
1892 'Mark Twain' Amer. Claimant xxi. 205, I do not suppose that any other
statesman ever had such a colossal sense of humour, combined with the ability
to totally conceal it.
1898 'Merriman' Roden's Cornervii. 74 The exquisite sense of humour had also
slightly evaporated. People said, 'Oh yes, very funny,' than which nothing is more
fatal to humour.
1902 E. Banks Newspaper Gir/210, I am not, I believe, without a saving sense of
humour.
1909 N. Y. Herald in Daily Chron. 8 Mar. 5/2 Both have that great life-saver for men
who have to endure periods of stress and storm-a sense of humour.
1929 Sat. Rev. 24 Aug. 221/2 But in the dialogue of the rustics it shows a delicious
Hardyesque sense of humour.
1936 J. Nehru Autobiogr. xlviii. 387, I remember a frequent complaint of my
father's that his Responsivist friends had no sense of humour.
1937 News Chron. 20 Feb. 8/6 Slang also appeals to our elementary sense of
humour, as when we say of a man who is drunk that he is..stotious.
1938 C. Morgan Flashing Stream 31 He who wrote the Sonnets, or Hamlet's
bidding to Ophelia..had no moderation, no smell of the sixth form, no sense of
humour.
1946 H. Nicolson Eng. Sense of Humour 49 Freud was not alone in defining the
sense of humour asa defence mechanism having as its main function the
protection of the self against discomfort.
1949 Koestler Insight & Outlook v. 69 In the gradually emerging sense of humour,
we have a further outlet mechanism.
1960 G. Maxwell Ring ofBright Water ix. 123 As a useful by-product of his [se. the
otter's] impish sense of humour, the cattle tended to keep farther from the house,
thus.. reducing the number of scatological hazards to be skirted at the door.
1966 R. Jeffries Death in Coverts iii. 93 We all joked about it and Bill got really
ripe. No sense of humour.
1966 F. Spiegl in F. Shaw et al. Lern Yerself Scouse 12 Here the Scouser's sense
of humour outweighs his Schlamperei, for he will never use a single word when he
can think of some more or less long-winded picturesque phrase in its place.
1967 Daily Tel. 15 Apr. 9/3 The average gent is of an aggressive disposition and
a lavatorial sense of humour.
1968 Listener 3 Oct. 428/2 One student outlines his own theories to me. 'This
whole scene began with Dylan, the Beatles, and of course pot.' Another complains
that the militants need a sense of humour and hopes the Yippies move in with their
2
'politics of ecstasy'.
1969 Times 13 Dec. p. v/2 These represented the British sense of humour, our
genius for sending ourselves up, but they seem to me rather to be reinforcements
of such attitudes.
1971 Guardian 8 Sept. 8/3 His pawkily British sense of humour.
1974 M. Moore Silver Birch Country 43 The lady I'm looking after is a dear old
duck, completely weirdo, but she's got a terrible sense of humour, and I like her.
1977 New Wave Mag. vii. 12 Numbers are fast and slow. Some are only about
thirty seconds long. This ain't minimalism. It's a sense of humour.
1977 Birds Summer 59/3 Twitchers are difficult to identify because they are
polymorphic. Best clues are behavioural including carrying Zeiss binoculars and
Where to Watch Birds... Known to have nested in Wandsworth and possess a
sense of humour.
1984 Sunday Times 26 Feb. 10/5 They started winding her up, which is not difficult
since she does not have a great sense of humour.
WIT
wit (wIt), n. Forms: 1- wit, 3-6 wyt, 3 (Onn.), 4-8 witt, 4-6 wytt, wyte, 4-7
witte, wytte, (4 wiit, wijt, whit, 4, 6 wite, Se. vit, vyt, 5 whytt, wette, 6 Se. wott,
7 weet).
rOE. wit neut., more commonly %ewit(t I-WIT n., corresp. to OFris. wit, OS.,
(M)LG. wit, OHG. wizzi (MHG. witz(e, G. witz), ON. vit (Sw. vet, Da. vid), Goth.
un-witi u1>poaEv'Y], uyvo-'u: f. wit- (see WIT v.l ).]
7. Quickness of intellect or liveliness of fancy, with capacity of apt expression; talent
for saying brilliant or sparkling things, esp. in an amusing way. areh. (Cf. sense 8.)
Formerly sometimes opp. to wisdom orjudgement; often distinguished from humour
(see quots., and note s.v. HUMOUR n. 7).
1579 Lyly Euphues (Arb.) 61 As the Bee is oftentimes hurt with hir owne Honny,
so is witte not seldome plagued with his owne conceipt.
1597 Shakes. 2 Hen. IV, i. ii. 11 Men of all sorts take a pride to gird at mee: ..1 am
not onely witty in my selfe, but the cause that wit is in other men.
1650 Davenant Gondiberl Pref. (1651) 27 Wit is not only the luck and labour, but
also the dexterity of thought.
1665 Boyle Occas. Ref!. i. iii. iii. 37 That nimble and acceptable Faculty of the
Mind, whereby some Men have a readiness, and subtilty, in conceiving things, and
a quickness, and neatness, in expressing them, all which the custom of speaking
comprehends under the name of Wit.
1704 Yalden Sir W Aston 187 His flowing wit, with solid jUdgment join'd, Talents
united rarely in a mind, Had all the graces and engaging art, That charm the ear
and captivate the heart.
1765 Chesterfield Lett. to Godson (1890) 180 If you have real wit it will flow
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spontaneously and you need not aim at it... Wit is so shining a quality, that
everybody admires it, most people aim at it, all people fear it, and few love it
unless in themselves.
1777 M. Morgann Ess. Dram. Char. Falstaff163 It being very possible, I suppose,
to be a man of humour without wit; but I think not a man of wit without humour.
1782 Cowper Gilpin 169 Now Gilpin had a pleasant wit And lov'd a timely joke.
8. a. That quality of speech or writing which consists in the apt association of
thought and expression, calculated to surprise and delight by its unexpectedness (for
particular applications in 17th and 18th century criticism see esp. quots. 1650,
1677, 1685, 1690, 1704, 1709); later always with reference to the utterance of
brilliant or sparkling things in an amusing way.
1542 Udall Erasm. Apoph. Pref. **vij b, Neither dooe I esteme it a thyng worthie
blame..with laughter to refreshe the mynde.. , so that the matier to laugh at bee
pure witte and honeste [orig. modo risus sit argutus ac Iiberalis].
1633 G. Herbert Temple, Ch.-Porch xxxix, Laugh not too much: the wittie man
laughs least: For wit is newes onely to ignorance.
1650 Davenant Gondibert Pref. (1651) 26 Wit is the laborious, and the lucky
resultances of thought having towards its excellence..as well a happinesse, as
care.
1677 Dryden State Innoc., Apol. Her. Poetry c 2 b, The definition of Wit.. is only
this: That it is a propriety of Thoughts and Words; or in other terms, Thought and
Words, elegantly adapted to the Subject.
1711 Addison Spect. No. 62 ~2 Mr. Lock's Account of Wit, with this short
Explanation, comprehends most of the Species of Wit, as Metaphors, Similitudes,
Allegories, lEnigmas, Mottos, Parables, Fables, Dreams, Visions, dramatick
Writings, Burlesque, and all the Methods of Allusion.
1744 Corbyn Thomas (title) An Essay Towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit,
Humour, Raillery, Satire, and Ridicule.
a1859 Leigh Hunt in Jrnl. Educ. (1884) 1 Feb. 79 Wit consists in the arbitrary
juxtaposition of dissimilar ideas for some lively purpose of assimilation or contrast,
generally of both.
1900 Hammerton J. M. Barrie & his Bks. 78 There is more 'heart' in humour, and
more 'head' in wit.
b. With qualification (see quots. and sheer wit s.v. SHEER a. 8 b).
1633 G. Herbert Temple, Ch.-Porch xi, When thou dost tell anothers jest, therein
Omit the oathes, which true wit cannot need.
1653 R. Flecknoe Mise., Disc. Lang. 100 Jests, Clenches, Quibbles, Bulls,
&c., ..which although properly they be not Wit (excepting Jests onely, which is a
kind of sportive and wanton wit).
1792 D. Stewart Elem. Phi/os. Hum. Mindv. I. 305 note, I speak here of pure and
unmixed wit, and not of wit, blended, as is most commonly, with some degree of
humour.
t c. A witty saying or story; ajeu d'esprit: in the collocation wits, /its, and/ancies.
Obs.
1595 A. C[opley] (title) Wits, Fittes and Fancies. Fronted and entermedled with
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Presidentes of Honour and Wisdome.
1626 W. Vaughan Golden Fleece i. 12 Except you season your Auisoes with some
light passages with wits, fits, & fancies.
1632 Brome Northern Lasse i. ii. B 2 b, Hee..breakes as many good iests as all the
Wits, Fits, and Fancies about the Towne.
10. (trans! from 7.) A person of lively fancy, who has the faculty of saying smart or
brilliant things, now always so as to amuse; a witty person.
1692 R. L'Estrange Fables ccclxxi. 343 Intemperate Wits will spare neither Friend
nor Foe.
1727 Gay Fables i. x, Wits are game-cocks to one another.
1824 W. Irving T. Trav. I. 180 There is no character tha~ succeeds so well among
wits as that of a good listener.
1835 Dickens Sk. B02, Lond. Recreations, Uncle Bill..is evidently the wit of the
party.
1848 Thackeray Van. Fair xviii, Go on joking, Ann. You're the wit of the family.
IV. 14. Combinations.
e. Special Combs.:
wit-crack, the 'cracking' of a joke (cf. CRACK V. 5), a brisk witticism;
so wit-cracker, one who makes witty or sarcastic remarks;
(b) exercise of one's wits;
wit-jar, an imaginary vessel humorously feigned to contain the wits or senses
(in allusion to Ariosto's Orlando Furioso XXXIX. lvii);
wit-monger, a 'dealer' in wit, an utterer of witty sayings (contemptuous);
wit-worm (now rare), one who has developed into a wit (like a 'worm' or
caterpillar emerging from the egg);
twit-would, t wit-would-be, a pretender to wit, a would-be wit;
t wit-wright, a maker of wit, an author of witty sayings.
1599 Shakes. Much Ado v. iv. 102 A Colledge of *witte-crackers cannot flout
mee out of my humour, dost thou think I care for a Satyre or an Epigram?
1596 Shakes. Merch. V. iii. v. 54 What a *witte-snapper are you.
1632 Brome Crt. Beggarii. i. (1653) 0 6 b, This humorous wity Lady is a *wit-
sponge, that suckes up wit from some, and holds as her own.
1750 Fielding Author's Farce i. vi, Nor was it cram'd with a pack of *Wit-traps,




comedy1 ("kQmldI). Forms: 4 comedye, 4-6 commedy, 6-7 com(m)odie,
-y(e, 7 comredy, -ie, 5-7 comedie, 5- comedy.
[a. F. comedie (14th c. in Littre), ad. L. co-mredia, a. Gr. KWfLqJS'a, n. ofpractice
f. KWfLqJS%S comedian; a compound, either of KefLos revel, merry-making, or of
its probable source, KYfLY] village + amS%s singer, minstrel, f. aE,S-ELV to sing (cf.
ODE). The KWfLqJS%S was thus originally either the 'bard of the revels' or the
'village-bard': see Liddell and Scott.]
1. A stage-play of a light and amusing character, with a happy conclusion to its
plot. Such are the comedies of the ancient Greek and Latin writers, and of the
modern stage. But in the Middle Ages the term was applied to other than
dramatic compositions, the 'happy ending' being the essential part of the notion.
In the English use of the term the following stages may be distinguished:
t a. Its medireval use for a narrative poem with an agreeable ending.
[Probably taken from Italian; cf. the Divine Comedy, the great tripartite poem of
Dante, called by its author La Commedia, because 'in the conclusion, it is
prosperous, pleasant, and desirable', and in its style 'lax and unpretending',
being 'written in the vulgar tongue, in which women and children speak'.]
c1430 Lydg. Bochas Prol. v. i, My maister Chaucer with fresh comedies..that
whilom made ful piteous tragedies.
1430 - Chron. Troy ii. xi, A comedy hath in his gynnynge, A pryme face a
maner complaynynge, And afterwarde endeth in gladnesse.
t b. Applied to mystery-plays or interludes with a prosperous ending.
1616 Bullokar, Comedie, a play, or interlude the beginning of which is ever full
of troubles and the end joyfull.
c. Applied to the ancient comedies, as they became known after the Renascence.
d. The modern use, arising out of band c.
'Roister Doister is regarded as the transition-play from the Mysteries and
Enterludes of the Middle Ages to the Comedies ofModern Times' (Arber R.D.
Introd. 6). '''Ralph Roister Doister" is the first regular comedy in our language'
(Hazlitt a.E.p. Ill. 54).
2. a. That branch of the drama which adopts a humorous or familiar style, and
depicts laughable characters and incidents. (Sometimes personified.)
Old, Middle, andNew Comedy: the three stages ofAttic comedy; the first two
were largely farcical or burlesque in character, and indulged freely in political
and social caricature; the last corresponded to mod~rn high comedy.
1387 Trevisa Higden (Rolls) I. 315 pere [in Sicily] was commedy a song of
gestes firste i founde.
1581 Sidney Apol. Poetrie (Arb.) 44 The Comedy is an imitation of the
common errors of our life.
1598 B. Jonson Ev. Man in Hum. Prol., Persons, such as comedy would
choose, When she would shew an image of the times, And sport with human
6
follies, not with crimes.
1769 Johnson in Boswel/19 Oct., Comedy..exhibits the character of a species,
as that of a miser gathered from many misers: farce..exhibits individuals.
b. comedy o/manners, that kind of comedy in which the modes and manners
of society are amusingly presented. Cf. MANNER n. 1 4 e.
1877 G. Meredith in New Quart. Mag. VIII. 3 Our English idea of a Comedy of
Manners might be imaged in the person of a blowsy country girl-..transforming
to a varnished City madam.
c. Humour; humorous invention; the action or quality ofbeing amusing. Cf. cut
the comedy (CUT v. 21 b).
1877 G. Meredith in New Quart. Mag. VIII. 9 Comedy is the fountain of sound
sense.
1933 P. Godfrey Back-Stage iii. 37 When an actor complains that his 'laughs'
have been 'killed' he means that the audience have been prevented from
laughing at his comedy.
1947 D. Lean in O. Blakeston Working for Films 29 The answer lies in a very
old comedy maxim: Tell them what you're going to do. Do it. Tell them you've
done it.
JOKE
joke (dZ@Uk), n. Also 7 joque, joc, 8 joak.
[Appeared in second half of 17th c., app. originally in slang or colloquial use:
cf. JOKING vbl. n., quot. 1670; app. ad. L. joc-us jest, joke, sport: cf. It. gioco
'game, play, sport, jeast' (Florio).]
1. a. Something said or done to excite laughter or amusement; a witticism, a
jest; jesting, raillery; also, something that causes amusement, a ridiculous
circumstance.
practical joke, a trick or prank played upon some person usually in order to
have a laugh at his expense. Phr. to cut, crack ajoke; to turn a matter
into ajoke, etc.; ajoke is ajoke: a joke is not to be taken seriously (freq.
with the implication that the matter referred to is too serious for jokes); joke
over: the joke is finished (usu. implying that the speaker is not amused by the
words or behaviour of the person addressed).
1683 E. Hooker Pref. Ep. to Pordage's Myst. Div. 15 Jocs, or Witticisms,
Railleries and Drolleries, Quirks and Quillets.
1726-46 Thomson Winter 623 The simple joke that takes the shepherd's
heart.
1741 Fielding Ess., Conversat., Tossing men out of their chairs, tumbling
them into water, or any of those handicraft jokes.
7
1748 Richardson Clarissa Wks. 1883 VII. 410, I..should not forbear to cut a
joke, were I upon a scaffold.
1790 Beattie Moral Se. i. i. §7 The practice of turning every thing into joke
and ridicule is a dangerous levity of imagination.
1837 Dickens Sk. Boz 2nd Ser. 123 A joke's a joke: and even practical jests
are very capital in their way, if you can only get the other party to see the
fun.
1870 E. Peacock Ralf Skirl. I. 186 All practical jokes do seem to be
particularly foolish to those who suffer from them.
1930 R. Gore-Browne By Way of Confession vi. 52 'Goes too far, 'e does!'
agreed an elder with a walrus mustache. 'A joke's er joke.' 'And politics is
politics!' The retort came from a skinny-necked man.
1961 Partridge Diet. Slang Suppl. 1153/2 Joke over! or when do we laugh?
2. trans! An object of or matter for joking; a laughing-stock.
1791 'G. Gambado' Ann. Horsem. x. (1809) 109, I am the joke of the road
wherever I go.
1823 J. F. Cooper Pilot xvi, I shall be the standing joke of the mess-table,
until some greater fool than myself can be found.
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Humour and the oral tradition:
it's not the joke, it's the way you tell it
by Lawrence Gordon
The performance of humour
By dint of repetition in a variety ofcontexts, the popular colloquial saying 'It's not the joke,
it's the way you tell it!' has become so established a part of the living language that it serves
as a constant affirmation of the significant role of performance in the evocation of humour.
The current status of this saying has relevance to the question of oral tradition because it
reflects contemporary attitudes concerning the nature ofhumour as a phenomenon ofhuman
communication.
The saying 'It's not the joke, it's the way you tell it!' has the plausible ring of a populist
proverb. Arguably, it gained currency because it made an impression on those hearing it for
the first time as being an acute observation and common sense explanation for the failure of
a potentially witty or humorous joke to evoke laughter. Whatever its ethnolinguistic history,
the saying appears to occupy a somewhat ambiguous current status as a colloquial expression.
In the ongoing tradition of current Westernized language usage, a variety of social attitudes
are associated with the phenomenon of the popular repetition of a phrase or saying that
appears to have'caught on' in everyday conversation. Such is the case with: 'It's not the joke,
it's the way you tell it!' where the currency of the expression has generated ambivalent
attitudes as an outcome of its own ongoing oral tradition. On the one hand, some folk dignify
the saying with the label of 'maxim', described by Webster (1939:1017) as a 'principle
generally received or admitted to be true'. By contrast, other observers regard 'maxim' as an
inappropriate description for what they perceive as a cliche with a depreciating currency value.
1
The point of difference in these social attitudes appears to pivot on the question of whether
the value of an adage diminishes as its currency increases. At this point, it is appropriate to
consider a paraphrase of the saying under scrutiny, notably 'It's not the saying, it's the way
you say it' in which a fundamental distinction is made between the end (viz. the content) and
the means (viz. 'the way you tell it'). In this respect, phenomenologists would hasten to point
out that a cliche is created in the act of mechanically trotting out an oft-repeated stock oral
or literary procedure; whereas by the same token, similar words or gestures may be presented
with enough insight and sensitivity to prevent this act of communication from being
stigmatized with the label of 'cliche '.
In the contemporary Westernized context, the term cliche carries negative social implications.
In current usage, the word offers a built-in value judgement based on the inference that certain
aspects of communication may be rendered stereotypical by repetition and thereby become
socially infra dig. Cliches evolve as public opinion deems certain forms of expression as
becoming debased through insensitive repetition. Accordingly, the individual's experience
of a particular aspect of oral communication as being cliched is idiosyncratic and highly
contextualised. The nature ofthis experience will vary according to a variety offactors which
may be either intrinsic (such as, for example, the individual's temperament) or extrinsic (such
as, for example, the individual's ethnolinguistic environment). In this respect, one man's meat
may be another man's poison, in the sense that one man's cliche may be another man's source
of enlightenment.
Ironically, those who are particularly wary ofavoiding cliches often feel compelled to preface
their jokes with the stock expression: 'Stop me ifyou've heard this one before'. This popular
saying has the familiar ring of a colloquialism that generally inhibits deeper consideration;
however; on reflection, its implications may be somewhat disconcerting to some
ethnographers as it appears to promote the curious notion that no story is worth retelling.
When viewed from this standpoint, it is not surprising that concepts such as the cliche are of
concern to idealists, traditionalists and purists alike because established notions concerning
the status of the so-called 'eternals' are seemingly challenged by the implication that content
is devalued by repetition. Contemporary Westernized cultures appear to be driven by a
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predilection for change which is often confused with improvement and promotes the value of
'newness'. This trend has not been restricted to science and technology, but also appears to
permeate many aspects ofeveryday life including the way in which many people think oflife
itself.
The repercussions of this First World need for 'newness' are felt in diverse areas, including
populist social attitudes towards traditional beliefs. The effect is that, as a social observer, the
so-called 'man-in-the-street' is prompted to look beyond the popular elementary proposition
immortalized by Keats that truth is beauty and vice versa, and perhaps to wonder how many
times the truth in question must be repeated in order to lose its beauty, or whether ultimately
beauty is 'fresh truth' and whether its corollary that truth is 'fresh beauty' has validity. Such
questions are not merely restricted to either whimsical armchair speculations concerning the
vagaries of populist taste, or even the fanciful ruminations of the 'man-in-the-street' as to
whether the aesthetics of appreciating the beauty in say the Venus de Milo or Leonardo's
Mona Lisa has been debased by the worldwide dissemination ofmillions ofreproductions or
miniaturisations of these artworks.
On the contrary, the implications ofsociolinguistic phenomena such as the cliche are infinitely
wider because they create ambivalent social attitudes that influence popular perceptions oforal
tradition. An obvious example ofthis would be a disenchantment towards' standard versions'
of well-known folktales, and perhaps a desire to 'regenerate' them through humorous
modulations. However, there is also the likelihood that the cliche-induced mindset will be
extended to fundamental questions such as, for example: 'If a traditional greeting is a
formality, then is it not cliche?', and whether or not this in fact represents a contradiction in
a society that on one hand belittles certain actions as cliches and on the other hand takes
umbrage against those who breach the etiquette offormal greeting procedures. Questions such
as these, if taken to their logical conclusions, point to the need for a closer examination of
aspects ofwhat Jousse describes as the 'geste' of human communication. In this respect, for
example, seemingly perfunctory human gestures associated with greeting behaviour (such as
a smile or a wave ofthe hand) merit deeper consideration, and it does not require a great leap
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of insight to realise that this approach offers promising possibilities for what many outsiders
perceive as the predominantly descriptive fields of ethnography and ethnolinguistics.
Contemporizing traditional humour
These winds ofchange in the groves ofacademia are an inevitable response to the realities of
the contemporary status ofthe field as reflected in the ongoing patterns ofdevelopment oforal
traditions currently being established within a variety of settings. On the one hand,
ethnographers continue to pursue the task of dutifully chronicling the dynamism in the style
and content of traditional stories told over the centuries by tale-tellers who have modulated
folklore to suit occasions and audiences. On the other hand, folklorists in contemporary
Western societies need no reminding that traditional tales are constantly being 'freshened up'
for the consumer market by the commercial sector through the introduction ofvarious market-
related strategies to give the old tales a new look.
The application of contemporary modulations to traditional tales by corporate organizations
like Disney inevitably involves changes with a view to contemporizing style and content.
These changes are market-driven and vary accordingly from the level of mere graphic
embellishment to the level ofradical modifications to the plots, characters and locations ofthe
stories. The modifications may occur in an isolated or fragmentary fashion, or they may occur
as a well-orchestrated campaign across a range ofcommercial communicationmedia including
print material, movies, coffee mugs, T-shirts, and music videos. The populist, market-driven
Disney modulations of Aladdin, Beauty and the beast and other tales are monuments to
postmodern commercialism in which considerations of content are mercilessly sacrificed at
the altar ofmarketable style, and where the ring of truth is superseded by the ring of the cash
register.
Humour is one of the most frequently employed new ingredients used to 'spice up' the
traditional tale. Under the supervision of Hollywood moguls, tales with rich oral traditions
(such as Little Red Riding Hood and Snow White) are no longer presented to children as
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serious didactic experiences, but instead have assumed less threatening plots littered with
comic characters. In fairness, however, it must be acknowledged that the folktale genre is
'public domain' by definition. In his anthology, The trials and tribulations of Little Red
Riding Hood, Frank Zipes presents a highly selective collection of thirty-eight different
versions ofthe popular RedRiding Hood saga ranging from Perrault's 1697 tale to Gearhart's
1990 adaptation. This selection of international transcripts is indicative of the fact that tales
such as Red Riding Hood and Snow White have been modulated (at times, radically) by
generations of tale tellers to surprise and delight their intended audiences. For example, in
Ungerer's inventive version of Red Riding Hood, Little Red and the wolf elope and find
conjugal bliss; whereas in French's stylish recasting ofSnow White, the heroine is a New York
jazz singer singing with her band, The Seven Dwarfs.
The mechanisms involved in the communication process for the reception of modulated
folktales focus on a relatively high level ofempathy between sender and receiver because the
effectiveness of the communication depends to a large extent upon the sender's adroit
manipulation of aspects of a shared oral tradition to the satisfaction of the receiver.
Contextualisation plays a primary role in the evocation ofhumour in these modulations which
rely for effect on the reader bringing the baggage ofa degree ofknowledge ofthe original tales
to the reception process in order to derive greater benefit from the communication experience.
The authors' modus operandi is to contrive to achieve humorous effects through an unspoken
collusion with their readers who are light-heartedly invited to participate in escapist exercises
in 'hijacking' classic tales for the purpose of playfully tampering with their plots, characters,
and locales in order to experience delight in the resulting incongruities.
A contemporary manifestation of this widespread desire to delight in the humour of
incongruities in traditional tales is found in the burgeoning commercial industry ofcinematic
animation which thrives upon adaptations of classic children's tales. As with the literary
format, the offerings found in the cinemas and on television are characterised by great
variations in quality. In the context of Hollywood, the concept of folktales as 'tales for the
people' is interpreted literally, and many of the cinematic modulations of the tales are aimed
directly at market researchers' predictions concerning what will bring joy to the marketplace.
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Hence, for example, those entrusted with'Disneyfying' the classic tales have givencute names
to the Seven Dwarfs, a happy ending to The Little Mermaid, and an Oscar-winning soundtrack
to Beauty and the Beast. They have also nurtured a generation of children who identify the
voice of the genie in Aladdin with that of the well known screen comedian Robin Williams,
which is a little confusing as he also played the role ofa middle-aged Peter Pan in the Captain
Hook movie.
Nevertheless, for all its apparent irreverence and insensitivity, Hollywood's seeming fixation
with harnessing the traditional folktales for commercial gain is not entirely without its upside.
The positive side-effect of these developments in the entertainment industry is that for the
modulated experience to be effective the concept of modulation must be embraced by the
public at large. The result has been a widespread resurgence of interest in folktales by
Hollywood's consumer market. While the focus of this interest has not delighted purists
because it veers towards sensationalism, there is no disputing that Hollywood has created a
wide audience with an offbeat fascination for the classic tale and its possibilities for
entertainment. This inevitably leads us to consider the case for populism, and to ask the
perennial questions concerning the advisability ofMohamedjoumeying to the mountain. In
this respect, arguments emphasizing the passivity of the audiovisual experience in
contemporizing the classic tales are worth noting but not entirely valid. The advent of
electronic technology has enhanced and extended this trend in contemporizing folktales by
introducing interactive performance dimensions. As a result, children are empowered to
harness CD-ROM technology to participate in interactive computer games based on the plots
ofthe classic tales. Ifthey play their cards right, they may even experience the 'virtual-reality'
equivalent of flying off to Never-Never Land with Peter Pan.
Traditionally, children have been thought ofas the chiefconsumers ofthe Westernized classic
tale. Consequently, when the commercial popularization ofmodulations of the classic tales
ushered in the neo-folktale revival, literary output has also been directed mainly at children
in publications such as DahI's Revolting rhymes and Wilson's There's a wolfin my pudding.
Consumerism, however, holds the key. As a result of market demands, the content of a fair
proportion ofthe humorously modified traditional tales is directed at adult readership but does
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not exclude precocious children ofall ages. In fact, many ofJames Thurber' s celebrated fables
of the 1950's that stand out as landmarks in this tradition were originally published in the
distinctly adult New Yorker magazine. Thurber's tales accompanied by his own humorous
sketches contain an imaginative mixture of pure farce and sophisticated nuance, and were
clearly designed for a 'crossover' audience of both children and adults.
More recently, adult audiences have been targeted specifically by the introduction of topical
approaches such as James Finn Gamer's Politically correct bedtime stories in which the author
establishes an 'adult' tone in the preface by drolly explaining that the wording of the book's
title was selected in order to avoid the cliche 'fairy stories' lest it ~hould be considered
'homophobic'. The chiefmerit ofGamer's collection ofrecast traditional folktales is 'the way
he tells it', as evidenced in modified titles such as The Three Codependent Goats Gruff, as
well as new insights into Snow White's relationship with the seven 'vertically challenged
men'. However, for all the sustained irony and stylish humour of Gamer's approach, the
reflective reviewer is left with certain question marks concerning the traditional folktale and
its ongoing status in the oral tradition.
On the one hand, Garner's meticulous attention to the originals leaves an initial impression
that the publication is a humorous monument to the heritage of folklore. On the other hand,
the author's adroit reworking of the traditional tales is essentially congruent with the post-
modem predilection for style over substance, and some readers may feel that the irreverent
tone constitutes a cynicism towards the values inherent in the tales and their role in cultural
transmission. However, a third view is perhaps more pertinent than the other two. This is that
Gamer's collection has both style and substance, and is first and foremost a social satire
directed at the prevailing hysteria surrounding 'political correctness'. Gamer's recast stories
are rhymes for the times that cheerfully use the traditional tale as a stylish commercial vehicle
for humorous social comment. Although the author's modus operandi may offend folktale
purists, Gamer's central concern may not be a critique of the values inherent in the tales but
instead may be the expedient use of poetic licence to adapt the tales as the medium for his
message.
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The oral tradition of using humour to take the edge off social criticism is probably as old as
storytelling itself, and it has a diverse and well-documented history. Amongst the major
players are renowned literary icons such as Rabelais, Cervantes and Pope, as well as a host of
social satirists through the decades. Of relevance in the contemporary African literary context
are well-established popular works such as Chinua Achebe's penetrating Sixties satire of
African politics, A man of the people, as well as Tom Sharpe's novels about apartheid South
Africa, Riotous assembly and Indecent exposure.
By contrast, Garner's Politically correct bedtime tales represents a stylish but minor
contribution to an oral tradition in which humour forms the basis for presenting relatively
nonconfrontational social criticism. In Garner's case, the use of the folktale as the vehicle is
commercially inspirational because the content of the tales combine contextual accessibility
with emotive familiarity. The tales have an appeal to a wide and mainly adult readership with
a nostalgic and arguably retentive attitude towards the literary roots of childhood.
Furthermore, the satirical effect of injecting 'political correctness' into time-honoured plots
is whimsical enough to appeal to mature readers with a sense of oral tradition.
Humour across the verbal-nonverbal divide
The oral tradition of using humour as the basis of incisive social comment applies on a
universal level to ordinary folk in conversation, as well as to 'performance artists' such as
traditional tale- tellers, court jesters and their contemporary Western counterparts who include
'stand-up comics' telling jokes and politicians making speeches. Newspaper cartoonists, for
example, contrive to use illustrations to portray relatively radical sociopolitical ideas
humorously, thereby circumventing the more confrontational route ofpresenting messages in
words only. In view ofthe vast differences between the respective communication processes
pertaining to the reception of words and pictorial material, comparisons across the verbal-
nonverbal divide are generally odious. Statements such as 'A picture is worth a thousand
words' may be fair comment as hyperbole but definitely betray muddled thinking when taken
less figuratively.
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The dichotomy between pictures and written words stems from the fundamental differences
between the media of communication involved. Written words are unidimensional in the
sense that they are presented in textual form and must be decoded by readers who assume the
onus of responsibility in the reception process through their proactive roles in the act of
reading. By contrast, the multidimensional nature of the graphics and messages within
cartoons produces a qualitatively different set of communication dynamics from those
pertaining to the reception oftext. Cartoons contain visual cues that telegraph the cartoonist's
message thereby modifying the nature of the proactivity demanded of the receiver to
consummate the reception process. The result is that cartoons effectively provide conditions
that shift some of the onus of responsibility in the reception process from the receiver by
increasing visual immediacy and decreasing dependence on the act ofreading. In spite ofthis,
the locus ofcontrol still remains predominantly with the receiver who may accept or reject the
cartoonist's efforts on the basis of personal conclusions concerning the cartoon's content.
The communication process places demands on a diverse range of situational factors that
include the receiver's predispositions and attitudes towards the sender, as well as the sender's
perceptions ofthe receiver from available feedback. Inevitably, the graphic communicator has
an initial advantage over the wordsmith in respect of the immediacy ofmessage's impact on
the receiver of the communication. Furthermore, the nature of the cartoonists' genre offers
inherent features that provide the artist with a potential advantage over the writer in evoking
humour. Whereas the humorous writer has the headline and lead-in sentence, the cartoonist
has the whole picture. Cartoons are more immediately accessible because visual perception
of pictorial material operates on a holistic level, as compared with the more fragmentary
perceptual process involved in the decoding of words in text. Furthermore, the illustrator is
usually able to preempt the reception ofhumour by providing a variety ofcomical visual cues
(such as caricature sketches of well-known public figures) that predispose the receiver's
attitudes towards the content prior to achieving the insight required to 'catch' the joke.
The appearance ofcomical sketches or caricatures amidst newspaper text tends to set the tone
for relaxation that is reinforced by the prior development of a communicational relationship
between the regular reader and the cartoonist. Usually, this relationship is based on hedonism,
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as readers are conditioned by the anticipation ofpleasure through the expectation ofachieving
a gratifying response to the cartoon. The development ofa 'mindset' or predisposition on the
part ofthe receiver ofa cartoon facilitates a climate in which the cartoon is usually approached
with expectations ofthe undemanding enjoyment oftopical lampooning. In addition to taking
advantage of the receivers' predispositions towards a humorous response, the art of the
cartoonist is generally to obtain the desired spontaneous response by minimizing the required
investments of time and intellectual effort on the part of the receiver. The relatively
nonthreatening climate pervading the cartoon format probably contributes significantly to the
reason why cartoons are generally considered less offensive than text with either the same or
far milder messages.
The art of sociopolitically-conscious cartooning has a relatively well developed historical
tradition in which generations of cartoonists have operated effectively in an area of
communication across the so-called 'verbal-nonverbal divide'. The cartoon genre has played
significant roles in national newspapers and well-known publications such as Punch, Private
Eye, and National Lampoon in reflecting social attitudes in various contexts and in a variety
of styles. In addition to the conventional 'single-sketch' sociopolitical cartoon that is a
standard feature in most newspapers, a more recent addition to this tradition has been the
topical sociopolitical comic strip that takes advantage of the fact that many members of its
audience have been nurtured on a diet ofWait Disney and DC comics rather than the Brothers
Grimm. To some extent, cartoonists using the cartoon strip format as a vehicle for the
sociopolitical message enjoy the advantage ofappearing alongside nonthreatening and largely
apolitical comic-strips such as Dagwood, Peanuts or the Flintstones. Many ofthe newspapers'
adult readers will have been conditioned since childhood to the relaxed and jolly atmosphere
associated with the experience ofcomic-strips, and the policy ofnewspapers to group comic-
strips together has resulted in the apolitical syndicated strips becoming the unwitting allies of
the cuckoo in the nest. In many cases, familiarity breeds content with the result that tensions
are eased and defences are lowered for the potential reception ofcommunication with content
that in other circumstances may be considered to be threatening.
10
In South Africa, for example, the immensely popular Madam andEve comic strip series takes
fairly broad satirical swipes at a wide range of controversial topical issues to the obvious
delight of an audience sensitized to a social environment in which the moral high ground of
political correctness is well trodden. In the case of Madam and Eve, both the comic strip
format and the sympathetic way in which the characters are drawn are important qualitative
factors enabling the cartoonists to convey their message to a relatively relaxed and positively
receptive audience. The cartoons' form and treatment decreases tensions by predisposing the
audience to the reception of a humorous message that cartoonists are able to convey within a
relatively nonconfrontational climate. Clearly, the graphic medium for delivering the
cartoon's message is integral to the gestalt of the message itself. The implications for
reception theory are that the medium ofthe message prejudices the nature of the relationship
between sender and receiver in the communication process.
In essence, words are a neutral medium whereas cartoons introduce observer bias by preparing
the audience for humour. On the one hand, there is little other than the title to predispose the
reader to the humour in a word-based textual medium such as Spike Milligan's Puckoon. On
the other hand, the immediacy ofthe graphics-based cartoon medium predisposes the audience
to the reception ofthe humour in the cartoonists' message, whilst simultaneously desensitizing
the audience from elements of message that otherwise may have been considered
confrontational. These contrasting scenarios call to question established notions concerning
the relationship between the medium and the content of the message in the communication
process. Clearly, the reality of the reception dynamics of communication processes is more
complex than Marshall McLuhan's sweeping generalisation that 'the medium is the message'
would suggest, however those ignoring the significance of the medium are at peril. While
there is no doubt that the medium is an integral aspect of the 'geste' of cartoon
communication, there is equal certainty that cartoonists are the orchestrators of a process in
which the content of the message is conceived in empathy with the target audience.
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Humour in the communication process
A comparative study ofthe communication processes involved in the transmission of textual
words and graphics provides some insight into the complexity of the elements and
mechanisms operating in communication processes in general. The fact that text and graphics
are 'hard copy' captive sources that can be perused and analysed at the convenience of the
analyst is a clear indication of the relatively greater complexity inherent in the process of
analysing behaviour representing aspects of the dimension of oral performance with its
multidimensional shades of meaning for both sender and receiver.
Human performance is an elusive phenomenon that defies replication, and the methodological
trials of human scientists in this particular field are a tapestry of frustration. Granted, the
researcher has recourse to traditional sources such as textual transcripts of the overt verbal
transmission ofthe oral performer, and perhaps photographs or sketches ofaspects ofthe oral
performance. Furthermore, technological advances have placed audiovisual media such as
video technology at the disposal of the human scientist for the purpose of recording human
behaviour. Prospects of developing some meaningful source material on aspects of orality
have been encouraging, but the results are usually an approximation rather than replication of
the oral performance under scrutiny. Nevertheless, researchers in this field have a tradition
of being thankful for small mercies, and need all the help they can get, however imperfect.
A primary task of the human scientist is to apply the scientific method to the selected area of
focus in order to systematically examine the available evidence that may permit relatively
reliable and valid conclusions concerning these aspects ofhuman behaviour. In this context,
humour arising from the performance dimension may be viewed in terms of the perspective
ofphenomenological functionalism that individualises each communication situation in terms
ofan existential act ofcreation. In this respect, the humour created within the communication
process is perceived as residing in a dynamic fusion of the performance elements of 'the way
you tell it' with 'the way you hear it'. It should be noted that in view of the poetic licence
with which the specific terms 'tell' and 'hear' are used to include related aspects such as
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'write' and 'read', it would be more appropriate to substitute them with the more academically
acceptable, generalised terms 'send' and 'receive' respectively.
Humour may be viewed from a holistic perspective as the outcome of a communication
process that may be affected by a variety ofvariables. In this sense, humour is created under
suitable conditions by the conjunction of a sender (who, for example, may be a storyteller,
author, dancer, mime artist or cartoonist) and a receiver (who, for example, may be an observer
or listener, or both). There may also be cases, as in repartee, where individuals are active
participants in a dynamic interactive process in alternating roles ofsender and receiver. This
humorous interaction may occur as part of a performance observed by a nonparticipating
audience, or it may involve a performer who initiates audience participation as a strategy to
create opportunities for enhancing a humorous performance.
The concept of humour is too complex to be encapsulated in a 'quick-fix' definition, which
in some degree accounts for the popularity ofthe phenomenological functionalist perspective.
Few would dispute the view that humour is evoked as a state of arousal that arises from a
perception formed within the dynamism of the communication process. The arousal of a
humorous disposition or attitude in the reception of a message signifies the existence of a
dynamic affective perspective of reality. As such, humour is a qualitative phenomenon that
defies quantification, and its quality is dependent upon a number of factors that are relevant
to the reception process. For example, the degree ofbehavioural activity and passivity of the
protagonists in the process varies according to the nature of the humorous communication
involved, as does the degree of verbal and nonverbal input. However, the performance of
humour cannot be measured in words or deeds. In this respect, the vast comedic legacy ofthe
era of silent movies provides evidence in the flickering monochromatic images of Charlie
Chaplin, Buster Keaton and others that 'the way you tell it' did not necessarily have to be
verbal or textual.
One of the more enlightening of the many dictionary definitions of humour is that it is the
'character ofa complex situation exciting joyful, and in the main quiet laughter either directly,
through sympathy, or through empathy' (Drever, 1964:123). This approach from a so-called
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'dictionary of psychology' alludes to the consensus view that laughter often represents a
release of tension rather than a sense of humour, and informs us that humour is 'excited' as
joy obtained from sympathy or empathy. This observation appears to be corroborated by a
random survey ofother dictionary definitions of 'humour' which reveals that lexicographers,
along with human scientists, are of the consensus that the links between the sense of humour
and the act of laughter are tenuous. The general view is that humour is no mere laughing
matter, but is best described in terms of a state of mind created in particular situations under
particular circumstances. However, the survey also indicates that less certainty can be attached
to explanations concerning the mainsprings of the nature of this humorous evocation ofjoy~
Etiological perspectives
These insights into the nature ofhumorous communication signify the need for a consideration
ofhumour from a standpoint beyond the etiological perspectives offered by phenomenological
functionalism. In this respect, a review ofacademic literature indicates that three basic schools
of thought predominate, and that while they have intrinsic differences, they are not entirely
mutually exclusive. Firstly, the superiority theories emphasize that pleasure derived from the
misfortunes of others appears to bring a sense of security and well being, particularly if the
misfortune concerned is not too serious. In this respect, the Germans have given the world the
term 'schadenfreude' which literally means 'joy from damage'; while the French speak of
'rire jaune', the rueful 'yellow laughter' evoked within those suffering misfortune.
Secondly, relieftheories emphasize the laughter response as a mechanism that brings a release
of tension. Freudian theorists in this category indicate that the process of releasing tensions
through laughter may have the cathartic effect of displacing latent aggression. A familiar
example of this category is the excessive merriment derived from a group of suppressed
children when the strict schoolmaster releases their tension by making a humorous remark.
Further examples of the relief theory of humour relate to Freudian defence mechanism
theories. Hence, for example, the process ofreaction formation is said to occur when a person
is seen as releasing tension by reacting in away that is the antithesis ofexpectations, such as
in hysterical laughter as a response to hearing sad news.
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Thirdly, incongruity theories generally postulate that humour is derived from perceptions or
insights concerning unexpected phenomena under conditions that are conducive to humour.
The latter is probably the most common type of so-called 'adult' humour, and generally
involves an element ofsurprise or an unexpected twist to a tale. Into this category falls the so-
called 'inverted' traditional tales where the humour stems largely from unexpected changes
to the anticipated plots, characters, locations and themes of traditional tales. A well-known
example is provided in Roald Dahl' s Revolting rhymes when Little Red Riding Hood removes
a revolver from her knickers and 'terminates' the wolf without mercy. Another interesting
example of this category is Rapunzel's revenge: fairy tales for feminists which is collection
of traditional tales that have been modified to delight feminists of all ages. Both examples
derive their humour largely from incongruity laced heavily with 'Schadenfreude' as the
traditional tales are twisted to humorous effect, and readers are invited to delight in damage
done to the characters clearly identified as being deserving of receiving their comeuppances.
The broad etiological spectrum associated with humour suggests that we are dealing with a
social phenomenon characterised very much by its diversity. As a consequence, 'humour' has
become a generic label applied to many aspects ofcommunication behaviour which may occur
in an almost infinite variety ofsettings. Hence, for example, humour may be formalised in the
recounting of oral or literary jokes in which the intention to entertain is announced, thereby
predisposing the receiver to a state of humorous arousal. On the other hand, humour may
creep informally into varying oral and literary situations, such as for example when humour
filters slowly into a lengthy discourse, or when it is evoked in an instant with a voice inflection
or the raising of an eyebrow. It is difficult to identify a common thread that runs through all
humour, other than that it is a state of arousal created in the phenomenological moment and
that it involves a 'connection' with the individual's perspective of reality which in turn
involves a measure of understanding or insight.
The degree of understanding that lies behind the evocation of humour appears to have an
empathetic base that encompasses a variety ofemotional implications that may range from the
sublime to the ridiculous. Shakespeare, for example, in the finest bittersweet tradition, used
humour to heighten the sublime tragedy of his great literary works Macbeth, King Lear and
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Hamlet, thereby providing almost textbook endorsement of the case of relief theorists.
However, at the other end of the scale, the TV comedian Gerry Seinfeld humorously appeals
to our collective sense ofthe ridiculously incongruous by enquiring quizzically whether Bozo
the Clown was so-named in order to distinguish him from Bozo the Accountant or Bozo the
Brain Surgeon.
Conclusion
The task of getting to grips with the essence of humour is no laughing matter. The
phenomenon ofhumour is created as the product ofa communication process that starts with
'the way you tell it' and is fulfilled by 'the way that you see it'. An active receiver in this
process perceives a message as being humourous by relating it to the intrapersonal context of
his or her own individualized world ofexperience. Likewise, each person's so-called 'sense'
ofhumour is a state ofmind that signifies an individualized quality ofreceptivity to incoming
messages. As an intrinsic state, it is influenced by the way that the individual is impacted by
a wide range of qualitative factors which may be intrinsic (for example, worry, illness or
hunger) or extrinsic (for example, noise or visual distractions). Humour, like beauty, is in the
eye of the beholder, and must be respected for its complexity.
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A sense of humour
Over fifty years before Shakespeare conceived his first dramas, the French humorist Francois
Rabelais proclaimed with remarkable insight that' le rire est le propre de I 'homme', thereby
affirming his belief that laughter was a property peculiar to humankind. Laughter is an overt
expression of mirth popularly associated with conceptions of humour. Laughter is also the
source of popular misconceptions concerning humour because laughter is frequently a
response that does not signify a joyous insight into the nature of humanity. Nevertheless, the
so-called 'sense of humour' is highly esteemed as an essential prerequisite for human survival
amidst the pressures and demands of life in highly complex post-industrial societies.
Humour is a leveller that facilitates a social climate in which a shared experience allows
human beings to bond in spite of their differences. Humour defuses tensions by providing a
platform on which individuals preserve their own sanity whilst also cementing human
relationships. A 'sense of humour' is a highly valued personal and social asset in
contemporary society for both enjoying life as well as coping with it. This standpoint is
reinforced by the popular belief that humour implies insight into the human psyche because it
stems from a sense of humanity that is the mark of a sympathetic response to the human
condition. Not surprisingly, a sense of humour is considered a highly desirable personal
characteristic.
This desirability results in the common practice of confusing behavioural characteristics (e.g.
repeated laughter) with the cognitive capacity to make humorous insights concerning the
human condition. Furthermore, humour (like love) is associated with emotional warmth and
understanding, and many people regard these qualities more highly than less emotive and
more singular pursuits such as skill in abstract reasoning. Most people willingly admit to
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human frailties such as being impractical or unambitious or even unintelligent, but very few
admit to lacking a sense of humour.
Humour and humanity
With a collective sense of satisfied anticipation, millions of children and young-at-heart adults
have witnessed a recurring in-joke on the popular Star Trek television series over the past
twenty-five years. The familiar scenario is that the human hero Captain Kirk (William
Shatner) passes a humorous remark that puzzles the extraterrestrial super-intelligent Vulcan
Captain Spock (Leonard Nimoy with elongated false ears). There is that customary pregnant
silence as the joke falls flat, while the intellectually superior Spock looks quizzical, and finally
mutters in confusion: 'Humour - it is a difficult concept. It is not logical' (12 : 232).
This response induces conjugal warmth within the global village as electronic cave dwellers
everywhere share yet another affirmation that being clever is not all there is to life. Spock
may be of sound moral fibre and a genius, but he is not human. He does not possess that
magical 'sense of humour' that virtually all human beings claim as a birthright. It is the latter
quality that kindles a sense of brinkmanship that enables the vast Star Trek audience to feel
comfortable with the outsider Spock's unquestionably superior intellectual capabilities.
Emotional warmth is associated with what is commonly referred to as a 'sense of humour' ,
and both are highly valued as 'human' traits. In the same way as Spock's alien origins are
characterised by his inability to 'see' the joke, there is also an implicit belief that our own
humanity is somehow measured by the depth of our humorous insights. The mature person is
one who can rise above the immediacies of personal problems, and 'see the funny side'. A
sense of humour is considered an important element of personal and social development as it
allows the individual to cope with the human frailties of self and others.
Human frailty and humour are inextricable. It has been said almost to the point of cliche that:
'To err is to be human', and there seems to be a universal acknowledgement that human frailty
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is an acceptable and normal human characteristic. Certainly, it is written into Western belief
systems that man is basically a humble sinner because he is human and not a god, and that the
meek shall inherit the earth. The socially acceptable face of Western man's self-image is
founded on the Christian ethics of humility and tolerance. On the surface at least, this
perspective traditionally aggrandizes the virtues of modesty and concern for others, while
deploring inordinate self preoccupation as manifested in the so-called 'inflated ego'. An
abiding defect usually attributed to the latter is a nonexistent sense ofhumour - perhaps the
unkindest cut of all!
John Donne's observation that: 'No man is an island' is a central consideration in a social
climate in which the development of a sense of humour is part of an extended awareness of
others in relation to ourselves. Concepts of humour are rooted in a process of identification
with others as individuals interpret the nature ofhuman behaviour. Human sympathy derives
from empathy towards others, and humour is the result of perceptions derived from a
contagion of feelings that have been referred to as 'primitive passive sympathy' (4 : 290). As
such, humour is a qualitative response deriving from a state of 'being human'. Humour is
man's humanity to man.
Defining humour
Precise and satisfying definitions of 'humour' are hard to find. The Concise Oxford
Dictionary (2 : 592), for example, uses rather unsatisfactory terms such as 'facetiousness',
'comicality' and 'jocose imagination'. It is more useful to follow the lead provided by the use
of 'humour' as a verb that implies the act of indulging or gratifying another's pleasure. This
gives an indication of the empathetic basis of humour that is so evident in the distinction made
between the meanings of humour and wit as being primarily a difference between heart and
head. Wit is generally regarded as a more cerebral, less sympathetic and therefore more
detached mechanism. By contrast, humour is characterised as relying less on intelligent
wordplay but more on the emotional well being derived from insights into incongruencies in
human behaviour.
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The value of the distinction between humour and wit is also enlightening when considering
allied terminology such as 'comedy' or 'farce'. These terms may be regarded as denoting
forms or vehicles in which humour may appear as a device or mechanism. Therefore, for
example, a critic may refer to the 'lack of genuine humour' in a 'weak comedy' or 'poorly
contrived farce'. On the other hand, the mechanism ofhumour may be employed tellingly to
heighten the impact of a tragedy, as for example in Shakespeare's dramatic use of the
gatekeeper scene in Macbeth. In a similar respect, the tragic atmosphere of King Lear is
heightened by the sad humour in the old king's ramblings. Humour has many faces but here it
has the sigh of' la doce vita', the bitter sweetness of human frailties.
The use of humour in children's literature is perhaps in most cases less sublime, but common
threads can be identified. Authors using humour as a device in children's literature usually
derive a sense of 'funniness' from an ability to empathize with their intended audience as
receivers of textual communication. These insights deriving from 'primitive passive
sympathy' are the basis by which the author interprets the attitudes and cultural values of
potential readers of the work. The author's insights into the nature of human behaviour under
certain conditions and in certain situations are reflected intrinsically in the treatment of aspects
such as character, plot, theme and setting.
Humorous subversions
Literary tradition cannot be ignored. Authors of fiction write within the context of what
Leavis once called 'the great tradition'. This awareness of past and contemporary
performance in the field extends to practising authors of children's literature where the classic
folktale also has a 'great tradition'. H~our is also a vital ingredient of children's books, but
is a device used pervasively across the genres with the result that many of the more humorous
children's books are not in fact categorised as 'children's humour'. In practice, the majority of
books described as 'children's humour' are based on the 'situation comedy' (e.g. the farmer
and his wife exchange roles for the day), and the humour derives from the author's treatment
of the central dilemma. In recent times, the label of 'humour' has become identified strongly
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with the sub-genre known in the literary circles as the 'subverted text'. The appeal of this sub-
,genre to both adults and children has led to it rapidly becoming a well-patronised source of
revenue in the children's book trade.
The so-called 'modulated' or subverted texts in children's literature refer to manipulations of
established literary models. Godwin (9 : 303) indicates that 'modulation' refers to any such
manipulations, whereas 'subversion' refers to a 'more radical overturning of prior text,
meaning or generic convention'. This form of literary subversive activity is founded in the
post-modernist tradition of reevaluating both function and form. The result is that the
structure and function of the traditional tales are reformulated to varying degrees as part of the
creative writing process. This involves a process of reconstruction and development of the
tale, and is far more than merely a case of a stylistic or cosmetic updating of the text.
Reactions to textual humour are symptoms of pleasurable physiological release aroused by an
insight that an unexpected turn of textual events has subverted the readers' expectations. This
may involve the use of unexpected wordplay, as in Garner's 'politically correct' perspectives
of the emperor who was not essentially naked per se but merely endorsing a clothing-optional
lifestyle. However, usually the unexpected textual events involve radical plot subversions
such as in Roald Dahl's Revolting rhymes where Red Riding Hood shoots the wolf, or in
Anne Sharpe's Not so little Red Riding Hood (18: 324-7) where the heroine has a black belt
in karate and flattens the wolf without ceremony.
The elementary basis of the humour in the subverted text lies in the irony perceived by the
audience initiated to the original text prior to its subversion. In a sense, the effect on the
reader is a sort of painless 'future shock' with a smile. The events that are anticipated do not
in fact transpire as the reader's expectations are pleasurably subverted. Godwin (9 : 299)
refers to this as irony perceived by an 'inner circle' of readers who recognise textual
incongruities in terms of the conventions established by a prior model.
An oft-quoted example is Roald Dahl's undermining of the traditional Little Red Riding Hood
plot conventions by having the far-from-innocent Miss Riding Hood use a lethal weapon to
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eliminate the wolf. Furthermore later in the anthology, the redoubtable Miss Hood, her
appetite whetted by her first kill, demonstrates all the hallmarks of a psychopathic killer. She
extends her subversive activities in new directions. Firstly she unhesitatingly eliminates
another wolf who had been bothering the three little pigs, and secondly both figuratively and
literally bags the last surviving pig as well.
Once more the maiden's eyelid flickers.
She draws the pistol from her knickers.
Once more, she hits the vital spot,
And kills him with a single shot.
Pig, peeping through the window, stood
And yelled, 'Well done, Miss Riding Hood!'
Ah Piglet, you must never trust
Young ladies from the upper crust.
For now, Miss Riding Hood, one notes,
Not only has two wolfskin coats,
But when she goes from place to place,
She has a PIGSKIN TRAVELLING CASE.
The politics of entitlement
(3 : 47)
With rather heavy academic licence, the phraseology used in the title of this paper borrows
from two sources. The first and more conspicuous is 'Revolting rhymes' drawn directly from
the title of Dahl's anthology of 'twisted tales', while the second concerns the reference to
'humour as a subversive activity' found in the subtitle of this paper. This phrase is borrowed
from the title of Postman & Weingartner's radical sixties publication Teaching as a
subversive activity in which the authors express their vehement criticism of the prevailing
American teaching 'establishment' and urge a more radical approach based on overturning
traditional educational conventions. In many ways, this post-modernist desire to critically
examine structures and functions rather than simply blindly accept past conventions out of
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reverence for their longevity is reflected in the subversive activities of the authors of
subverted tales. This spirit is found rather pointedly in DahI's bland irreverence. It also
resides in the greater subtlety ofmore thought-provoking and more innovative essays than
Dahl's within the sub-genre of the subverted classic children's tale, such as for example in the
works of Tomi Ungerer, and Philippe Dumas and Boris Moissard.
However, whatever may be said of the lack of subtlety and twisted logic of the content of
DahI's book, there is no doubt that the title is a semantic tour deforce. 'Revolting'is
popularly used to signify extreme distaste but may be granted a positive connotation when
used colloquially with a humorous cue. Little encouragement is needed to understand the
playfully conspiratorial inflections in phrases such as 'How wickedly hilarious!' or 'How
delightfully revolting!', both having very British nudge-nudge wink-wink cues to shared
humour. In this sense, the term 'revolting' probably accurately describes the popular
perception of Dahl's so-called 'devilish' sense of black humour that combines elements of the
macabre with an air of subversiveness.
However, there is more to the phrase 'revolting rhymes' than the implication ofa collection
of stylishly distasteful humorous tales. 'Revolting' derives from 'revolt' that means to
overturn or subvert, and describes what Dahl does in subverting traditional folktales to
produce a humorous response from readers who find his plot details at odds with their
conventional literary expectations. The reader is called upon to embrace the subversive
activity by joining the 'revolt' and taking pleasure in the unexpected. An intimate conspiracy
is forged between author and reader with the aim of both having fun in bringing down the
status quo which is after all fair game because it is a folktale that belongs to the people. This
is a literary toyi-toyi with verbal toys.
A further point of irony in Dahl's title is the use of the term 'rhymes' that connotes a modest
literary form of little intellectual significance, as used in the phrases: 'nursery rhymes' or
'rhymes for the times'. Irony rests in the fact that Dahl's recasting of the classic tales cannot
simply be dismissed as 'rhymes' that some may find revolting. In essence, Dahl has modified
the conventional plots to suit the times. Dahl' s Red Riding Hood is at first glance the modem
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woman, defending her honour and dealing uncompromisingly with the wolf. However, in
Dahl's very next story, The three little pigs, the intrepid Miss Hood flatters to deceive, when
she emerges as a seemingly assertive feminist role model extending a handgun of friendship
to the male (chauvinist?) pig who is destined to become her travel bag. These little macabre
touches involve modem plot subversions that journalists would currently describe as 'pure
Hollywood', as testimony of their populist appeal.
Dahl's dialectic, in which textual conventions are undermined and new structures created, is
generally aimed at arousing laughter while at the same time demonstrating a little heavy
handedly that 'crime does not pay'. The humour at the base of these functions resides in
Dahl's cheerful assault on the reader's textual expectations. This pleasurable enough process
is made all the more painless by Quentin Blake's appropriate cartoon-style illustrations that
clearly signpost the author's devilish intentions. Between them, Dahl and Blake succeed in
removing all the tension from any future shocks within the text. The readers anticipate the
'shocking' humour on the horizon.
Typecasting the subversive activities
The subverted tale has distinctive literary characteristics. The mechanisms of subversive
activity in this sub-geme can be classified in terms of the aspects that are subverted. The
following categories pertain:
i) plot subversion in which the author alters plot elements as in Tomi Ungerer's
inventive version in which Little Red Riding Hood and the wolf elope and find
conjugal bliss;
ii) character subversion in which the humour resides in the fact that the personality
of the characters has changed radically (such as Dahl's gun-toting Miss Hood), or
the characters themselves eye subverted (such as in Ahlberg & McNaughton's Big
bad pig that gives sympathetic treatment to the three little wolves);
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iii) setting subversion in which humour derives from a re-creation of the setting as in
French's stylish updated account of Snow White in New York;
iv) standpoint subversion in which the main thrust ofthe humour stems from a
changed viewpoint in the retelling of the story from a new angle, as in Scieszka's
device in using A. Wolf as narrator in telling The true story of the three little pigs;
v) theme subversion in which the underlying theme of the tale is humorously
subverted so that the thrust of the tale receives new meaning, as in the selected
series oftales under the title Rapunzel's revenge: fairy tales for feminists that is
self explanatory; and
vi) style subversion in which the literary style of the work is subverted to achieve a
humorous effect as in James Finn Gamer's Politically correct bedtime stories in
which the pseudointellectual tone parodies the simplicity of the original versions
of the classic tales (e.g. 'Snow White and the seven vertically challenged men').
These mechanisms of subversive activity in children's literature are of course not mutually
exclusive. For example, Sciexzka's The true story of the three little pigs by A. Wolf employs
a range of interesting plot, setting and theme subversions while being told from the Wolfs
perspective. The publication also has a lively Runyonesque stylistic tone as befits a 'hard
luck' tale told by an imprisoned wolf indignantly insisting that he was 'framed'.
Similarly, Fiona French's Snow White in New York not only enjoys a downtown Manhattan
setting, but also has interestingly understated plot and character innovations such as the
wicked queen being a ruthless socialite and the seven vertically challenged men as
comprising a jazz band who (in the spirit of the original tale) accept Snow White at face value
and are instrumental in her instant success as a night club singer. The heroine's prince
charming is the dashing New York Time's society page reporter who puts her on the front
page, thereby igniting the ire of her explosive step mother. The modernised plot details run
true to theme, and the story ends with a wedding and a sunset. French's tale is subverted
primarily on the level of setting (Le. the modem concrete jungle replaces the traditional dark
woods).
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Dahl's 'revolting rhymes' have an interesting modulation in the didactic literary style that
ultimately effects a standpoint subversion. Dahl uses the aside to the audience as a feature of
his informal literary style, taking readers into his confidence, and at times conspiring with
them as to the fate of characters whom he intends to punish. Of Goldilocks, Dahl (3 : 29)
says:
This famous wicked little tale
Should never have been put on sale.
It is a mystery to me
Why loving parents cannot see
That this is actually a book
About a brazen little crook.
Had I the chance I wouldn't fail
To clap young Goldilocks in jail.
The eye of the beholder
The process of contextualisation is a focal concept in determining the nature of humour as the
product of the reception dynamics of experiencing children's literature. The subverted text
draws its sources of humour from the overturning of the expectations brought to the reading
experience by the readers themselves.
The aetiology of the humorous reading experience is difficult to encapsulate in
metacommunicational formulae. However, it may be safely assumed that humour (like
beauty) is in the eye of the beholder. The reception of textual humour requires reading
activity that enhances the hedonic or pleasure-orientated experience, and the phenomenon of
humour is created as a product of the reading experience. Contextualisation is the key in a
phenomenological process the active receiver 'sees' the humour within the intrapersonal
context of his or her own literary background and personal value system.
Three fundamental humour theories tend to predominant. Firstly, the so-called superiority
theory, typified by the German term 'Schadenfreude' (i.e. malicious glee), is generally based
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on the pleasure derived from the misfortune of others that brings a sense of security.
Secondly, the so-called incongruity theories are based on the idea that humour stems from
insights deriving from perceptions of unexpected phenomena. Thirdly, the so-called relief
theories are chiefly Freudian in origin, and focus on the view that laughter affords a release of
tension and has a cathartic effect that cleanses aggressive instincts.
Attention should also be given to reasons for the failure of receivers to see humour in texts
obviously perceived by authors as 'humorous'. Dahl's subversions are viewed with horror by
purists wishing to preserve the status quo, and leave others unsmiling for a variety of reasons.
There is no doubt that the perception of humour (or lack of it) within the reading experience
resides in the unique reception dynamics with which each reader encounters the text. For
example, the sophisticated folktale specialist would immediately recognise Dahl's version as
a stylish seventies reworking of James Thurber's shorter 1939 version in which Little Red
'took an automatic out of her basket and shot the wolf dead' (18 : 229). But the
derivativeness of the plot may not be the only reason Dahl's version of Little Red Riding
Hood has been seen as lacking in humour. Some regard the tale as being distasteful in the
extreme for a variety of reasons, not the least being the unsympathetic treatment of Miss
Hood or indeed the fact that the tale has been perceived as a monument to specie-ism,
insensitively perpetuated by Dahl. Nevertheless, as Little Red Riding Hood has proved to be
a remarkably adaptable folktale that has survived in many forms and with coats of many
colours.
In Frank Yipes' scholarly treatise on Red Riding Hood, many versions (some subversions) of
this folktale are presented with varying plot resolutions, including Tomi Ungerer's inventive
version in which Little Red and the wolf elope and find conjugal bliss (18 : 261-4). Apart
from the fact that this tale is species-friendly and affirms the concept of a 'suspension of
belief as a dominant feature of the author-reader relationship in the 'once-upon-a-time'
context, it also imaginatively captures the whimsical air of French humour. One imagines
that ifUngerer were asked to account for his tale's denouement, he would probably smile and
say: 'If a dog can laugh and a cow can jump over the moon, then surely a wolf can marry the
girl of his dreams'.
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A rhyme for all times
The survival of folktales through the ages is a fascinating phenomenon. There was a time
when the almost uncontrollable drive towards automation seemed to threaten the very
existence of print media. In the aftermath of publications by Lancaster and others concerning
the looming 'paperless society', there was a spate ofjournal articles focussing on the
imminent demise of the book. To some extent, a similar scenario pertains in respect of the
classic tale that must endure the onslaughts of both intrinsic and extrinsic pressures.
Extrinsically, the so-called 'media explosion' has threatened the textual basis of classic tales
by placing them in a new audiovisual dimension through the growth of the film and videotape
and audiotape industries. The trend, has been extended into an interactional dimension in
which children may now use CD-ROM technology to participate in computer games based on
the plots of the classic tales.
Intrinsically, modulations ofmany sorts have subversive effects on traditional aspects of
classic tales. Not least among these are media intrusions such as the 'Disneyfication' of the
classic tales. This has extended far beyond homely practices such as giving cute names to the
Seven Dwarfs. It involves modifying plots to produce happy endings as in 'The Little
Mermaid', and it involves tampering with the story to provide opportunities to include
enough musical items to compile an LP for audio-disc or CD marketing as in 'Beauty and the
Beast'. We also have a generation of children who think that Captain Hook looks like Dustin
Hoffmann, and that the genie in Alladin sounds like Robin Williams.
The unparalleled increase in the popularity of subverted folktales seems to beg the question as
to whether this phenomenon threatens the survival of classic folktales. Purists who seek to
preserve the integrity of the classic tales face an uphill struggle in the face of corporations
driven by the profit motive. There is no doubt that the prospect of the quick dollar has made
the classic children's tale something of an endangered species. Nevertheless, the popular
children's text cannot be regarded in splendid isolation. The overwhelming reality of the
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market-oriented multimedia environment cannot be conveniently waved aside and labelled as
'crass commercialism' from a position of moral high ground.
Certain facts are incontrovertible. The humorous subverted classic tale has gained strength
from its appeal to adults as purveyors and purchasers of children's literature. Likewise,
children who grow up amidst a heritage of traditional 'classic' tales do so in a social milieu in
which change is regarded as a goal, and in which the printed page is generally a poor second
to the 'flickering screen'. The increasing sophistication of the children as 'media-consumers'
constitutes a power group that has placed radical new demands that effect the survival of
traditional children's tales.
Through all these pressures, the hardy classic tale appears to have adapted to the nature of
this onslaught for a variety of reasons, not the least being that subverted tales owe their
existence in no small measure to the popularity of the tales towards which the subversive
activity is directed. Geme and sub-geme are by definition juxtaposed like unidentical twins.
The results have been witnessed in the assimilation of the subverted tale as an integral part of
an ongoing dynamic literary tradition. In traditional or subverted forms, the classic children's
tale is a rhyme for the times as well as a rhyme for all times.
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FROM TRICKSTER TALES TO PULP FICTION:
RECEPTION DYNAMICS IN A TRANSFORMING SOUTH AFRICA
by Lawrence Gordon
The term 'a transforming South Africa' is well known, but few people think in terms ofthe full
implications of transformation which goes beyond change. The 'transforming South Africa'
is taking on new forms, politically, socially, technologically and culturally in an era of
unprecedented upheaval on almost every level. It is also an era that has witnessed increasing
demands on library and information services, and in consequence there is an ongoing need for
LIS user studies to enable the profession to obtain more clarity concerning the type of user
service appropriate to the objectives of the LIS facility.
This study falls into the category ofa 'transformation' LIS user survey, and is ofrelevance to
public libraries because it involves a pilot user study that focuses on the leisure reading
behaviour of young 'traditionally disadvantaged' students specialising in the National
Diploma: Library and Information Practice at the M.L. Sultan Technikon in Durban. While
this study is basically a small scale localised user study ofa specialised population, it should
be seen in terms of a broader canvas than this. This is a small step forward in a journey to
gain a better view of the South African young adult black reader within the sociocultural
dynamics of these times.
There is no doubt that the sociopolitical changes that have radically affected the public lives
ofcitizens within a transforming South Africa have also impacted significantly on the private
lives ofSouth Africans ofdiverse cultural backgrounds. The post-apartheid freedoms and the
pressures ofthe market-driven economy have accelerated urbanisation and peri-urbanisation
to generally unanticipated levels. These demographic trends have significant ethnographic
implications, among which is the erosion oftraditional rural family life and its consequences.
One of the consequences for rural young adults transplanting themselves to the urban jungle
in search of employment or further education has been a combination of future shock and
culture shock. The big city world is indeed usually not what they were led to expect, and the
vast urban-rural sociocultural differences impact significantly on their efforts to make the
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adjustment to life in the 'fast lane'. A key aspect of this adjustment concerns reception
dynamics, in this case: the transformation of the individual's communication environment
from an orality-based tradition to one based on the written word and the flickering TV screen.
This paper scrutinises the transformation experience of the South African black young adult
moving from the traditional 'trickster tales' scenario to the Westernized 'pulp fiction' scenario.
Trickster tales epitomize the oral style associated with folklore, popularly conceptualised as
the collective voice of the people because these stories appear to have grown from the roots
ofthe culture. In the South African context, the term 'trickster tales' is commonly used to refer
to folktales in which a human or animal trickster who is 'up to no good' ultimately receives a
come-uppance in a morally correct denouement. 'Trickster tales' is also the title ofa book by
Trevor Cope, former University ofNatal (Durban) Professor ofZulu. This collection ofZulu
tales translated into English conjures up images of venerable grandmothers around evening
fires in the heart of KwaZulu thrilling their grandchildren with traditional children's stories
(izinganelwane) that had the purpose ofteaching them traditional values in preparation for life.
The morality motive has far less prominence in pulp fiction. Webster's dictionary (p. 1337)
describes 'pulp' the noun as 'a mixture forming the basis from which paper is made', and
probably more relevantly 'pulp' the verb as 'to reduce to a soft cohering mass'. What we
understand by 'pulp fiction' is forgettable, unenduring, unremarkable storytelling that is good
.to be read once, then pulped in order to provide paper for more of the same, and so on in a
continuing cycle. The overriding feature of,pulp fiction' is its reliance on cliches in language,
plot development, characterization and moralizing.
The movement from trickster tales to pulp fiction is viewed as a central dilemma ofthe media
reception behaviour of black young adults in a transforming South Africa. On the one hand,
trickster tales represents the oral style steeped in tradition, rich in social conscience and
explicit morality. It is part of a communication process that is interactive and participative,
and serves to reinforce family values. On the other hand, pulp fiction represents the slick
modem text or its media equivalent. Pulp fiction is generally characterised as being shallow
and cliche-ridden, and is popularly viewed as an expendable distraction from reality. By
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contrast, the storyteller in the oral tradition is a primary source in a meaningful interactive
process. People nurtured in this rich but bookless tradition will develop reception styles very
different from those of people reared in a text-based tradition.
At this point, it is necessary to introduce a note of caution. Not all pulp fiction is as morally
bankrupt as the movie of this title; and not all old tales are venerable. There is a nostalgia
attached to old things that often causes them to be over-valued. Likewise, not all old folktales
are exactly monuments to right living or morality, as I am sure those who have read Roald
Dahl's account ofGoldilocks will testify. In the same way, modem fiction has an impressive
array oftalented authors who write fiction rather than pulp fiction;,but at the same time, pulp
fiction represents a consumerist sector of the publishing market that obviously satisfies the
reading needs of millions world-wide. It is debatable whether the product(Le. pulp fiction
itself) plays a role in shaping these needs and creating its own market.
There can be no disputing psychosocial and cultural differences between the oral and textual
styles, and these differences are reflected in the reception dynamics of these styles. Reading
is essentially an encounter between the individual and the printed page. Notably, one of the
most significant books on reading behaviour is entitled 'Lost in a book' (by Victor Nell), which
reflects the fact that reading is basically an introspective act that severs social contact. It is
solitary unless the reader is reading aloud to another person or other persons; and when this
takes place, we have entered the realm of the oral style. In this case, the reader interfaces
between the listener and the text, and in effect becomes a second intermediary between the
author and his audience.
The communicational relationships involved may be explained by the use of
metacommunicational models. The classic Lasswell model of the late 1940s emphasized the
role of the sender of the communication as follows:
Sender----> message------>channel----------> receiver
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This approach was later developed to acknowledge the fact that the receiver was not merely
a receptacle, but rather a human being who brought attitudes, needs and knowledge to the
communication process. In short, the receiver interprets and gives meaning to the message.
Sender----> message------>channel<-----<?~----->receiver
In the case of the oral style, in which a storyteller recounts a folktale and provides a















In the oral style, the storyteller is virtually a primary source in an interactive process. With
regard to communicational pursuits such as television-viewing and radio-listening, it has been
suggested that the audiovisual aspects ofthe latter have a greater affiliation with the oral style
than reading. More complete answers to questions of this nature await further research. An
interesting finding of the study described below was that there is little evidence of a culture
of fictional reading amongst young adult South African librarianship students from the
traditionally disadvantaged groups.
DETAILS OF THE STUDY
A small scale pilot study was conducted on the readership and viewership behaviour ofstudent
librarians at the M.L. Sultan Technikon in April 1995. This questionnaire survey was offered
to the 83 students studying towards the National Diploma: Library and Information Practice
on a voluntary basis. Forty-eight students participated in the survey. Ofthese, 38 were Zulu,
6 Xhosa, 2 Northern Sotho, I Southern Sotho, and I Tswana. The gender distribution was
relatively balanced with 26 males and 22 females. The age of the students was between 18
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and 23 years. The demographic features of the students participating in the study were
described in terms of groups representing their domestic status. The domicile of the student
was viewed in terms of the site of the traditional family home. It was found that some
students still resided at home, while others resided in Technikon residences, boarding houses
or with relations who are city dwellers within Durban and its environs. Four groups were
identified, as follows:
Durban-urbans: 27 urban dwellers, urban born and still at home;
Peri-urban: 7 peri-urban dwellers, peri-urban born and still at home;
Rural-urbans: 11 11 urban dwellers with rural upbringing whose parent or
parents have moved to the city while they were in high school;
Rural-rural: 13 urban boarders who return to rural homes for all holidays.
Trickster tales experience:
Storytellers: Parents have no real role in the traditional setting, and as grandparents will be
expected to carry on that tradition. This is not expected to change. Without exception, all
students reported that the storytellers were grandmothers, either their own (most common) or
a 'grandmother' figure who was known as a tale teller.
Time, place and circumstances: The time that stories were told was almost without
exception in the late afternoon or early evening, and sometimes (but not necessarily) coincided
with the evening meal. More often however, the grandmother's storytelling function was
combined with the function of safely collecting all the children of the home or kraal into a
single location to ensure all were there and safe for the night. In many cases, the grandmother
told stories every night until most of the children fell asleep, and then slept alongside the
children.
Sender, receivers, reception dynamics: The stories were in nearly all cases remembered
with amusement and nostalgia. The storytellers (the grandmothers) obviously had a bond with
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children, and told the stories to their enjoyment even ifthe plots had been previously known.
Children participated by responding loudly, often in cheering or laughter reactions which were
encouraged. In many ofthe tales, the children were taught to participate actively in the story
by chanting formal lines of encouragement or praise in unison.
The content of the stories
Plot and theme: The stories adhere to the oral traditions ofthe trickster tale. There is a hero
figure, sometimes a human, sometimes an animal. There are problem situations, dilemmas,
and obstacles to overcome. There is generally an evil or 'no-good' character who is sometimes
a cannibal or sometimes has troll-like characteristics (such as the 'tokoloshe' in Zulu tales).
The villain of the story may also be a devious animal such as the jackal (or ujakalashe in
Xhosa tales), and as expected the plot is worked around a situation in which the tables are
turned on the trickster who receives some sort ofjust punishment. The stories are strongly
moralistic - at times not too dissimilar to Aesop's Fables, and have heavily emphasized lessons
at the end of the story.
Characters: A great variety oftypes ofcharacters populate the stories. Generally, the stories
concern humans and animals who can usually converse across-the-species through a universal
vernacular. However, a bean converses with a lump ofcoal in Xhosa folklore; while in Zulu
folklore, humans converse with the sea, or parts of the body converse( for example, the ears
talk to the eyes). There are a variety of heroes, and the villains may be giants, cannibals,
tok%shes, or even evil witches and witchdoctors. Ultimately, love conquers all, and good
triumphs over evil.
Pulp fiction
In observing the subjects' current reading behaviour (i.e. April 1995), several trends were
significant:
• Only five out of the 48 subjects showed any evidence of having read novels since
passing matric. There was a general sense ofamused embarrassment about this, and
the reasons given were chiefly: pressure of studies and assignments, noisiness of the
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living environment (especially the Technikon residence), and time taken travelling to
and from the Technikon. The length of novels was also mentioned as a reason why
the shorter stories and articles in magazines were generally preferred.
• All 48 subjects claimed to have read at least one magazine during the month before
the survey, and virtually all could provide the titles of at least two magazines. The
most popular magazine amongst males was Drum (both Zulu and English language),
and amongst females: You (an English magazine), followed by Cosmopolitan, then
True Love. Amongst a certain group ofthe subjects, the young adult magazines Pace
and Thandi were popular.
• As regards newspapers, the City Press and The Sowetan were most popular,
followed by the local Durban dailies, the evening paper Daily News and morning
paper The Mercury, both published by the Natal Newspapers Group. None of the
students claimed to read the paper on a daily basis, with the average being twice a
week. About 10% of the students said that they read only one of the Sunday
newspapers and no other newspapers. None of the subjects lived in a home that had
a newspaper subscription.
• Television viewing was a daily past-time for about 60% ofthe subjects, while others
watched only for specific purposes. The most popular programme was 'The News'
which was watched by approximately 75%of the viewers who watched on a daily
basis. The most popular programmes amongst both sexes were what the subjects
described as 'stories'. When asked to rank their favourite type of television fiction
programmes, the males rated action first, comedy second and love third; while the
females rated love first, comedy second and action third. Only about 10% ofthe male
viewers admitted to watching the 'soapies' such as 'Loving', 'Egoli', and 'The Bold and
the Beautiful', as compared with approximately 70% of the female viewers. About
half of the male viewers watched TV soccer on a regular basis, and about 35% tried
whenever possible to watch interview and 'talk show' programmes such as those
hosted by Felicia Mabuza-Suttle and Dali Thambo. Approximately 45% of the
viewers claimed to be able to exercise the main decision as to what station to watch.
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About 80% of the viewers watched mainly CCV, and preferred to view programmes
broadcast in the 'home language'.
• Music was popular with virtually all students, and the radio was a very popular
source of communication. In a straight forward choice between ethnic traditional
music and pop music (both local and overseas), approximately 70% favoured the
latter. However, only about 55% of those who preferred pop music said that they
actually disliked traditional ethnic music. Of those who liked pop music, soul was
ranked first, fusion second and rap music a poor third. 'Boyz II Men', a black soul
ballad harmony group, were ranked most popular vocal artists, and Kenny G., a white
fusion sax player, was voted most popular instrumentalist. American pop music was
favoured over British pop music, and the favourite female artists were the Americans,
Whitney Houston and Mariah Carey.
In certain cases in the interview situation, the responses seemed to confirm popular notions
concerning the so-called 'Americanization' of worldwide urban youth culture. A small
subgroup within the pilot group had seemed to experience a significant implosion of the so-
called universal urban 'pop' culture on traditional culture, as reflected in their television
viewing, leisure reading, musical tastes, and mode ofdress. We have heard the term 'African-
Americans' applied to USA citizens; and in this case, one is tempted to refer to 'American-
Africans'. But, young adulthood is an age dominated by a search for identity, and the 'city'
sophistication aspired to by these young adults may be a thin and temporary veneer. There
is still a distinctively 'African attitude towards the role of the public libraries as centres for
personal upliftment providing spaces for study, in contrast with the traditional Western
perspectives of public libraries as sources of leisure reading.
In conclusion, a word of caution is necessary. It must be borne in mind that this research,
while interesting and informative, is to be approached tentatively by persons wishing to draw
generalised conclusions from the findings. The data from this study derives from a small scale
pilot study conducted on a particular localised group of student librarians in April 1995, and
extrapolations cannot be made validly or reliably in respect ofthe general student population,
let alone young adult black library users in general. A more thorough research study, based
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on the pilot study experience, has been prepared for implementation early in 1996, and it is
hoped that the findings of this study will shed further light on this fascinating topic.
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